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Abstract 
Prior tax and accounting studies in the United States find that companies 
adopt strategies to aggressively minimise corporate tax, provided the 
expected tax benefits exceed the financial reporting costs.  Also, where 
managers are remunerated on targets based on after-tax earnings or stock 
value they are likely to pursue more aggressive tax strategies.   
 
This thesis extends this line of research to the Australian dividend 
imputation system in a period of tax rate reductions.  In this system, 
corporate profits are ultimately taxed at the personal tax rates of 
shareholders and corporate tax becomes a prepayment of shareholder tax on 
dividend income. As corporate tax is not necessarily viewed as a cost, 
managers are likely to focus on maximising before-tax profit, distributing 
franked dividends (i.e., dividends that carry credit for corporate tax paid) 
and have little incentive to engage in costly tax-avoiding strategies.  Tax 
rate reductions during the period 1999 to 2003 provide a setting to examine 
corporate tax strategies when faced with the opportunity to avoid tax. 
 
This thesis uses the ratios of three effective tax rate measures to the 
statutory tax rate as the proxies for tax strategy and uses regression analysis 
to test four hypotheses using the data of 491 publicly-traded Australian 
companies.  The first hypothesis predicts that companies distributing 
franked dividends have more conservative tax strategies than those that do 
not.  The second hypothesis predicts that companies under close scrutiny by 
the Australian Taxation Office are also likely to have more conservative 
strategies than those that are not.  Consistent with incentives to maximise 
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before-tax profit, the third hypothesis predicts that managers remunerated 
with share options do not implement more aggressive tax strategies as 
predicted in a classical system of company tax.  The fourth hypothesis 
predicts that managers continue to pursue conservative tax strategies in the 
years before tax rate falls and do not pursue aggressive tax strategies as 
observed under a classical tax system.  All four hypotheses are strongly 
supported by empirical evidence. 
 
One important tax policy implication of the findings from this study is that it 
provides empirical support for the notion that Australia’s dividend 
imputation system protects the integrity of corporate tax revenue and this is 
an advantage compared to the classical system that taxes profits twice. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the research 
Variation in the effective tax rates (ETRs) of companies is the focus of 
empirical research that is largely United States (US) based (Yin, 2003).  
Although it explains some of the variation, the reasons are not conclusive 
(Dyreng, Hanlon & Maydew, 2010).  ETR is a ratio measure of tax and 
accounting profit.  Tax liability is computed by applying the statutory tax 
rate (STR) to taxable income based on tax law.  However, taxable income 
and tax liability reported in corporate tax returns are not available to the 
public, so ETRs can only be computed using accounting numbers. The 
numerator of ETR can be total tax expense, current tax expense or tax paid, 
and the denominator is pre-tax accounting profit. ETRs of companies can 
differ because some companies are better placed than others to take 
advantage of favourable tax breaks provided in tax law. 
 
Prior research suggests that aggressive tax strategies, in addition to 
differences in tax and accounting rules, partly explain variation in ETRs 
(Desai, 2003; Graham and Tucker, 2006).  Earnings management (the use of 
accounting techniques to smooth or manipulate reported accounting profit) 
is suggested as another source of variation (Phillips, Pincus and Rego, 2003; 
Hanlon, 2005).  Prior research also confirms that individual company 
characteristics such as size, industry and extent of foreign operations 
account for the differences in ETRs (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Rego, 
2003; Harris and Feeny, 2003; Tran & Yu, 2008).  There remains 
unexplained variation.  This thesis explores the extent to which managerial 
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incentives to avoid tax play a role in variation of ETRs.  These incentives 
are likely to be different in Australia where there is a dividend imputation 
system, rather than a classical system of company taxation (as in the US) 
that taxes the company on profits, then again taxes shareholders on these 
profits when distributed as dividends.  In this classical system where profit 
is double-taxed, company tax is a cost to be managed by companies.  This is 
different to the system of company tax operating in Australia. 
 
Australia has a dividend imputation system that taxes profits at the company 
level.  The tax paid by a company is then attached to the dividends as a tax 
credit to the shareholders when distributed so company tax is a pre-payment 
of shareholder tax, rather than a real cost.  Incentives to avoid company tax 
under the dividend imputation system are therefore likely to be different 
from those under the classical system.  There is no empirical research that 
explores this difference.  Prior research does explore the effect of a dividend 
imputation system on capital market valuation of shares (Brown & Clarke, 
1993), its effect on formation of dividend clienteles (Bellamy, 1994) and its 
effect on dividend payout policy of companies (Pattenden & Twite, 2008).  
This thesis explores the effect of incentives to avoid tax in Australia’s 
dividend imputation system of company tax.   
 
1.2 Meaning of tax strategy 
In this thesis, tax strategy is defined as corporate decisions to pursue (or not 
to pursue) reductions in company income tax, although not to explicitly 
evade tax.  Company tax can be reduced through tax planning, undertaking 
tax favoured investments, tax shelters, and lobbying to gain tax benefits.  
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Due to ambiguity in tax law, some tax avoidance schemes may be held to be 
illegal upon scrutiny by the tax office or court decisions.  Tax strategy also 
covers this type of non-compliance.  The sample of companies used in this 
thesis is large publicly held companies.  Directors and managers in these 
companies are less likely to engage in outright tax evasion due to criminal 
implications in company and tax laws and/or stronger corporate governance 
than might be the case in privately held companies.  For this reason tax 
strategy does not include outright tax evasion, such as deliberate omission 
of taxable income.   
 
Aggressive tax strategy has been defined by McBarnet (2005) as the bullish 
attitude to opportunities in tax law and the culture of creative compliance 
that underlies it.  Braithwaite (2005) documents the growth in sophisticated 
tax strategies offered by elite accounting firms in Australia and the US and 
the accompanying growth in tax consulting fees of companies.  Transactions 
that are engineered to generate tax losses, to exclude income, wealth or 
capital gains from taxation, or defer income to a later year are some 
examples.  The result of aggressive tax strategies is less tax per dollar of 
profit, i.e., a lower ETR rate.  The ratio between a company’s ETR and the 
STR is a measure of tax strategy.  Companies with a conservative tax 
strategy have a high ETR and hence an ETR/STR ratio approaching unity, 
and those with aggressive tax strategies have a low ETR and hence an 
ETR/STR ratio falling short of unity. 
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1.3 Research hypotheses  
Theoretically, in a dividend imputation system, it is irrelevant who pays tax 
on company profits, the company or the shareholder, since the cash flow 
received by the shareholder is the same.  Intuitively this implies that 
managers are likely to maximise profit before-tax, pay tax and impute 
company tax paid to shareholders with distribution of dividends.  If an 
aggressive tax strategy is pursued by managers, the company will pay less 
tax, but its dividends will carry less imputed tax credit.  Companies 
distributing franked dividends (i.e., dividends that carry imputed tax credit) 
must have paid tax on their profits and are more likely to pursue 
conservative tax strategies.  It therefore seems likely that tax strategy will 
vary depending on whether dividends are paid and whether they carry 
imputed tax credits.  To test this assertion, the first hypothesis predicts that 
companies distributing franked dividends are more likely to have 
conservative, rather than aggressive tax strategies.   
 
Incentives to avoid tax may also differ between companies depending on the 
level of scrutiny and risk of audit by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO).   
The ATO audited 89% of the top 100 share-market listed companies in 2004 
yielding $1.6 billion extra revenue (Australian Financial Review(AFR), 5 
Aug 2005).  For the three and a half years to March 2002, a project targeting 
international profit shifting by medium to high tax risk companies resulted 
in more than $2 billion in tax adjustments, claimed to be a billion in extra 
tax for every million spent on the project (Braithwaite, 2005).  Company 
managers’ incentives to avoid tax may be affected by this tax office scrutiny 
and whether a company falls under this scrutiny or not may account for 
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some of the variation in ETRs.  The second hypothesis predicts that 
companies under close ATO scrutiny are more likely to have conservative 
tax strategies than those not under close scrutiny. 
 
Rewarding managers with share options as part of their remuneration 
package contractually aligns the interests of shareholders and managers.  In 
a classical system of company tax, managers have incentives to maximise 
profits after-tax, as share valuation models use profit after-tax to project 
future share price.  Prior research confirms they therefore have incentives to 
minimise tax costs (Phillips, 2003).  However, this prediction does not hold 
in a dividend imputation system where managers have incentives to 
maximise profit before-tax, pay company tax as required by tax law, then 
impute the company tax to shareholders with dividend distributions.  Share 
prices are likely to reflect that shareholders use tax credits to reduce their 
income tax liability and are therefore likely to value profits that have been 
taxed.  Since there is no prior research that tests this assertion, this thesis 
specifically examines whether rewarding managers with share options leads 
to conservative tax strategies in a dividend imputation system.  The third 
hypothesis predicts that remuneration based on share options is likely to 
lead to conservative tax strategies, rather than aggressive tax strategies as in 
a classical tax system.   
 
Variation in ETRs can eventuate for the same companies in different time 
periods from external one-off opportunities arising, for example, from tax 
rate changes.  Prior research confirms that managing accounting income has 
a greater priority than managing taxable income, since meeting or beating 
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earnings targets has a favourable capital market outcome (Kasznik and 
McNichols, 2002; Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew, 2004).  However, tax-
induced earnings management has been documented in a one-off period of 
tax rate change (Guenther, 1994; Davenport & Tran, 2004).  If both taxable 
income and accounting profit are deferred to a lower taxed year, this 
suggests tax savings outweigh the costs of reporting lower accounting 
earnings.    
 
Changes to business tax were announced by the Australian Government on 
21 September 1999 (Commonwealth of Australia, 1999).  The changes 
included two reductions in the company tax rate in the 2001 and 2002 
financial years.  If tax is not a real cost to the company but a prepayment of 
shareholder tax, managers are unlikely to have incentives to shift income to 
a lower taxed year.  A fall in STRs means future imputation credits for 
shareholders will fall.  Therefore, managers may have incentives to 
maximise imputation credits before the tax rate fall.  For these reasons, 
managers may not pursue windfall company tax savings.  This research is 
set around the years of company tax rate falls so that observations can be 
made to assess whether companies manage accruals for one-off tax savings.  
The fourth hypothesis predicts that companies do not pursue aggressive tax 
strategies in the years before a STR fall. 
 
1.4 Motivation and contribution 
Anecdotal evidence from the business community is mixed about the effect 
of dividend imputation on management decisions.  One source suggests that 
dividend policy remains a financing decision and franking of dividends is 
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not necessarily an influence on managerial behaviour (Business Review 
Weekly (BRW), 2004).  In this article opinions were canvassed from the 
capital market about the effect of dividend imputation on management 
decisions.  A director on seven large Australian company boards says he has 
never seen dividend imputation as a big factor in decision-making: 
I can’t think of any time when we have sat back and said: ‘We 
can’t do that [because of dividend imputation].’ I think it is way 
down the line (BRW, 26 Feb-3 March, 2004, pp. 82-83).  
A different opinion is expressed by a tax partner in a paper presented at a 
conference of tax practitioners and academics:  
…many companies with a significant Australian resident 
shareholding will structure their affairs to take into account 
the value of franking credits to their shareholders.  It’s great 
to see Australian companies paying Australian tax (Madden, 
2006, p. 195).   
There is also a difference of opinions in the business community about the 
level of tax avoidance by large companies.  The financial press reports that 
top companies face audit over profit shifting: 
The number and value of international-related party dealings is 
growing, reflecting the globalisation of the Australian economy.  
They were estimated to exceed $150 billion this year [2003], the 
ATO said (AFR, 13 November 2003, p. 11). 
However, in the same article, an Ernst & Young partner said many 
Australian companies were not making the most of transfer pricing in their 
tax planning.  He said this was perhaps because: 
Most Australian companies have Australian shareholders who 
benefit from franking credits, so there is an incentive for 
Australian companies to pay tax in Australia and benefit 
shareholders. 
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There is little published academic research on the effect of management 
incentives to avoid tax in a dividend imputation system and how this might 
differ to a classical system of company tax.  It is important to establish 
empirically whether a dividend imputation system does mitigate managers’ 
incentives to avoid tax.  There is some support for the proposition that ETRs 
of New Zealand companies are associated with franked dividend payouts 
(Wilkinson, Cahan & Jones, 2001).  An Australian study finds gross 
dividend payout is positively correlated with the ETR and franked dividends 
(Pattenden & Twite, 2008).  This thesis tests whether ETR measures are 
positively related to the distribution of franked dividends, to ATO audit 
scrutiny and to share option remuneration.  It also provides evidence about 
the extent to which managers give up the opportunity to save tax by shifting 
income when STRs fall.  If companies distributing franked dividends are 
less tax aggressive than those that do not, this is of interest to capital market 
participants, economic and tax policy advisers in Australia and to countries 
considering a dividend imputation system. 
 
1.5 Research method and findings 
Company tax liability is a confidential matter between a company and the 
ATO.  Prior US research confirms that tax information constructed from 
annual reports of companies provides a reliable indication of company tax 
liabilities (Plesko, 2003; Lisowsky, 2009).  This is because published annual 
reports show the results of operations for the same underlying economic 
transactions from which taxable income is derived.  Fundamental 
differences between tax and accounting rules are reconciled in a tax note to 
company financial statements.  Proxies for tax strategy can be derived from 
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the tax disclosures in company annual reports.  In this thesis, tax strategy is 
proxied by the ratio between a company’s ETR and the STR, where ETR is 
the quotient of tax expense or tax paid divided by accounting profit before 
tax. 
 
An empirical analysis is undertaken in this thesis to test reasons for 
variation in tax strategy using multivariate regression modelling.  Data used 
is collected from annual reports of Australian companies listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) for the period 1999-2003 from the Aspect 
and Connect4 databases.  Regression modelling explains variation in a 
dependent variable by variation in independent variables, holding constant 
the impact of the other independent variables.  Three ETR measures are 
used as proxies for tax strategy, the dependent variable: total ETR (Tran & 
Porcano, 1997, Yin, 2003; Tran & Yu, 2008; Frank, Lynch & Rego, 2009), 
current ETR (Mills, Erikson & Maydew, 1998; Harris & Feeny, 2003; Rego, 
2003; Tran & Yu, 2008) and tax paid ETR ( Dyreng, Hanlon & Maydew, 
2008). 
 
Independent variables used to explain variation in tax strategy are dividend 
payout ratio and extent of franking, tax office scrutiny, type of managerial 
remuneration and year.  Independent variables to control for known 
variability in ETRs from prior research are also constructed from data in 
annual reports. 
 
Results from empirical regression analysis support all four hypotheses, 
giving support to the expectation that managers do have different incentives 
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to avoid tax in a dividend imputation system of company tax compared to 
the classical tax system which is still adopted in the US.  Companies 
distributing franked dividends and under close tax office scrutiny are more 
likely to have a conservative tax strategy.  Contrary to a classical system of 
company tax, in a dividend imputation system share option remuneration 
does not lead to aggressive tax strategies.  Finally, changes in tax law over 
the period 1999-2003 that reduced the STR did not result in companies 
aggressively pursuing windfall tax savings in years before the tax rate falls.   
 
1.6 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 1 of this thesis has introduced the research hypotheses and the 
research design.  The remainder of the thesis is arranged in the following 
order.  Chapter 2 reviews prior empirical tax research from economics, 
finance and accounting that is relevant to this thesis.  Chapter 3 outlines the 
Australian institutional environment surrounding large listed companies in 
the 1999-2003 financial years’ period.  Using existing theory for companies 
in this environment, Chapter 4 develops four testable hypotheses.  The 
research method used to test these hypotheses is outlined in Chapter 5.  The 
results of the regression analysis described in Chapter 5 are presented in 
Chapter 6.  The conclusions of this thesis and their implications are 
presented in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Tax strategy has been defined as the opportunistic but legal choices 
managers take that affect the ratio of tax to accounting profit.  Prior research 
is biased towards tax avoidance studies that reduce this ratio and its focus is 
on how to measure an ETR and its determinants.  There is little empirical 
evidence on the cross-sectional variation in tax avoidance between 
companies (Dyreng, Hanlon & Maydew, 2010).  Book-tax gap research 
explores the gap between accounting profit and taxable income to assess tax 
avoidance and is a complementary measure to ETR in assessing tax 
strategy.   
 
This chapter provides an analysis, synthesis and evaluation of research on 
different incentives to avoid tax in a classical system versus a dividend 
imputation system of company tax.  The chapter starts with an initial review 
of two streams of tax avoidance research, studies of the book-tax gap and 
studies of ETRs. Based on this prior research the chapter then considers four 
factors found to influence managers’ tax strategies: double taxation of 
company profits and dividend policy, tax office scrutiny, performance-based 
remuneration based on profit after-tax, and tax-induced earnings 
management. 
 
The first stream of research considers the determinants of the gap between 
book income (accounting profit) and taxable income.  The second stream of 
research considers the determinants of variability in ETRs between 
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companies and over time (ETR studies).  Because management incentives to 
minimise tax can vary significantly between the classical system of 
company tax and a dividend imputation system (discussed later in this 
thesis), this review separates prior evidence (largely from the US) where a 
classical system applies from studies examined in a dividend imputation 
system (Australian and New Zealand studies).  Several studies from the 
United Kingdom (UK), where a partial imputation system applies, are also 
referred to briefly.  Following this review the chapter then considers prior 
research on the above four factors found to influence managers’ tax strategy 
in a classical system of company tax and alternatively, in a dividend 
imputation environment. 
 
This literature review explains the origins of the research questions asked in 
this thesis and from which hypotheses are developed in Chapter 4.  A 
concise appraisal of all the research papers discussed is provided in 
Appendix A (pp. 175-196). 
 
2.2 Book-tax gap literature under the classical system of company tax 
This literature explores the magnitude and sources of the difference between 
accounting profit under generally accepted accounting principles and 
taxable income under income tax legislation.  These studies examine the 
years 1982-2001 following publication of research by the US Treasury in 
1999 suggesting this gap had widened and may be the result of increased tax 
avoidance.  Treasury used tax return data to calculate the ratio of book to 
taxable income for the period 1991-1996 for a sample of large companies.  
It estimated that the ratio grew from 1.25 during the period 1990-1994 to 
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1.86 in 1996.  Academic research (detailed below) confirmed these results 
but found alternative explanations for its increase other than tax avoidance.   
 
Using financial statement data to compare taxable income and accounting 
profit for the years 1988-1999, Manson and Plesko (2002) confirm that the 
gap increases but is partly the result of tax-favoured investment in capital 
goods and research and development.   
 
When tax return data are matched with financial statement data for the 
period 1991-1998, Mills, Newberry and Trautman (2002) find an increasing 
book-tax ratio from 1.07 in 1991 to 1.63 in 1998, and the gap widened 
particularly in the financial services and communications industries, 
suggesting the impact of tax breaks given to these industries. 
 
Desai (2003) also shows that it is not only the permanent differences 
between tax and  book income that account for the gap but also timing 
differences in recognizing revenue and expense under accounting and tax 
rules.  When accounting profit disclosed in annual reports is compared with 
taxable income calculated from these reports for public companies over the 
period 1982-2000, the gap widens during the 1990s.  The largest cause of 
this gap is the different recognition criteria for employee stock options: the 
expense is recorded for accounting purposes but not for tax until options are 
exercised.  He also includes an analysis of the effect of earnings 
management on the gap.  Aggressive earnings management is one 
explanation of a widening gap if accounting profit is managed without 
affecting tax currently payable on profits.  When adjustments for earnings 
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management and known differences between tax and accounting rules such 
as employee stock options are made, however, there are still unexplained 
differences and he concludes that increased tax sheltering activity cannot be 
dismissed as one reason for the shortfall. 
 
Based on company data over the period 1993-2001, Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006) develop a measure of tax avoidance based on the component of the 
book-tax gap not attributable to accounting accruals.  This measure is used 
to investigate the link between tax avoidance and stock option remuneration.  
The theory posited in this paper suggests an interaction between corporate 
governance, incentive-based remuneration, tax avoidance (or sheltering) and 
theft by managers.  Theft is the diversion of company resources for private 
use.  When a company is weakly governed, tax avoidance is complementary 
to management theft because it helps managers to hide company resources 
from shareholders.  An increase in incentive compensation can thus reduce 
both tax sheltering and theft.  When a company has strong governance and 
therefore theft by managers is less likely, an increase in incentive 
compensation will increase tax avoidance to enhance share value.  This 
suggests that increased tax avoidance can enhance or lower share value 
depending on the level of corporate governance.  Results confirm that in 
companies with weak corporate governance, stock option incentive-based 
compensation was negatively related to the measure of tax avoidance, but 
not in well-governed companies. 
 
Consistent with the above, Wilson (2009) uses large book-tax difference to 
identify tax avoiders.  He finds that aggressive tax sheltering companies 
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with strong corporate governance exhibit positive abnormal returns.  These 
results may explain the findings of other researchers suggesting a conflict in 
managers’ incentives between minimising tax and maximising share value.  
Hanlon (2005) finds that companies for the period 1994-2000 with the 
largest book-tax differences have lower earnings persistence.  This evidence 
suggests that large book-tax differences are seen as a “red flag” by investors 
and that they reduce their expectation of future earnings persistence.   
 
When a sample of 44 large tax avoiders was matched with a similar sample 
of companies over the years 1975-2000, Graham and Tucker (2006) found 
that the annual deductions generated by the tax shelters in their sample were 
more than three times as large as interest deductions for comparable 
companies.  This suggests that aggressive tax avoidance can be so 
successful in reducing tax that these taxpayers do not bother to use debt 
financing to generate interest expense as a tax deduction. 
 
My evaluation of the book-tax gap literature from the US classical company 
tax environment is that it explains some determinants of cross-sectional 
difference in tax strategy and suggests some companies are more prepared 
than others to pursue aggressive tax strategies.  My research questions 
concern the role of managers’ incentives to avoid tax and whether these 
incentives are different in a dividend imputation environment. 
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2.3 Book-tax gap literature under the dividend imputation system of 
company tax 
The only Australian book-tax gap research study is a detailed analysis of tax 
notes in annual reports of 46 companies over the period 1984-1993, to 
address the issue of book-tax alignment (Tran, 1998).  This study highlights 
specific book-tax differences reported by Australian companies and shows 
that the book-tax income gap is largely caused by deliberate government 
policies and the different objectives and principles of the tax system and the 
financial reporting system.  
 
In Australia, capital gains became taxable for assets purchased after 
September 1985 and a dividend imputation system was introduced in 1987, 
removing double taxation of dividends for individual shareholders.  No 
research has been undertaken to test the effect of these changes on tax 
strategy of managers.  Since shareholders invest for a return in the forms of 
dividends and capital gain on selling the shares, the tax differential between 
dividends and capital gains is likely to affect the dividend payout policies 
and tax strategies of companies.  This thesis specifically explores managers’ 
incentives to avoid tax in a dividend imputation environment. 
 
2.4 Effective tax rate literature under the classical system of company 
tax 
An ETR is a measure of tax expressed as a percentage of accounting profit 
and can be used as a relative measure of tax avoidance.  There is a large 
body of ETR research in accounting and public finance literature that 
largely examines the determinants of differences in ETR between firms and 
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over time (Callihan, 1994; Dyreng, Hanlon & Maydew, 2008).  Conflicting 
results of early studies are analysed and explained by later researchers but 
gaps remain in explaining ETR differences.   
 
One explanation for differences is the ETR metric itself.  The “measure” of 
tax used by researchers is total tax expense (Stickney & McGee, 1982; 
Zimmerman, 1983) or only the current portion of tax expense (Gupta & 
Newberry, 1997; Mills, Erickson & Maydew, 1998; Yin, 2003; Rego, 2003) 
or tax paid (Dyeng, Hanlon & Maydew, 2008).  Accounting profit is 
adjusted in some studies (Stickney & McGee, 1982) or operating cash flows 
used instead of profit (Zimmerman, 1983; Gupta & Newberry, 1997).  
When means, maximums and minimums of five ETR measures used in prior 
studies over the years 1980-1983 are compared, there are significant 
differences between them (Omer, Molloy & Ziebart, 1991).  Different 
methodologies also produce conflicting results (Callihan, 1994). 
 
Attempts to find the “best” ETR measure have concluded that ETR is an 
imperfect measure (Wilkie & Limberg, 1993) and since there is significant 
difference between measures, researchers can include several measures to 
ensure robustness of results. 
 
There is also discussion in the literature about the suitability of using 
numbers from financial statements rather than tax returns to measure ETR 
(Plesko, 2003).  The confidentiality of tax return data means it is usually the 
case that researchers rely on publicly available tax information in annual 
financial reports in their analysis of ETRs.  Recent research that examines 
 - 28 -
 
the association between current US tax expense in annual reports and the tax 
liability actually reported in US tax returns, concludes that the publically 
available tax expense gives a reliable estimate of actual tax liability 
(Lisowsky, 2009).  Although the latter is not an ETR study, it confirms the 
reliable use of publicly available data in ETR research. 
 
One objective of ETR research is to explain the combination of factors that 
result in cross-sectional differences in ETRs.  Again, there are conflicting 
results.  Early research suggests capital intensity (investment in depreciable 
assets), leverage and natural resource firms have reduced ETRs while 
foreign operations and size are less important (Stickney & McGee, 1982).  
However, Zimmerman (1983) shows that the largest fifty US companies 
have a greater ETR than other firms, suggesting size is a determinant. 
 
Empirical results show that profitability is a confounding factor in ETR 
studies.  Wilkie (1988) points out that mathematically, if reconciliation 
items between accounting profit and taxable income are held constant but 
profit increases, then ETR also increases.  Since this work, studies of ETRs 
have included a measure of profitability to ensure reliability of results. 
 
Longitudinal studies examine why ETRs vary, not only cross-sectionally, 
but for the same company over time.  Again, there are mixed results from 
this research.  Using data from the 1980s, Gupta and Newberry (1997) find 
no distinct relation between ETR and size; but the negative association with 
capital intensity and the positive association with profitability of prior 
studies are confirmed.   
 - 29 -
 
 
A longitudinal study using UK data finds a positive relation between ETR 
and size for companies in 1968-1979, weaker in 1980-1993 and negative in 
1978 and 1982 (Holland, 1998).   
 
In a later study using US data for the years 1990-1997, Rego (2003) finds 
that the extent of foreign operations has a negative relation with ETR and 
concludes that the prior contradictory findings about the relation of ETR and 
firm size are likely due to model misspecification (i.e., omission of “foreign 
operations” as an explanatory variable). However, when only multinational 
corporations are considered, she finds that higher levels of US pre-tax 
income are associated with lower ETRs, but higher levels of foreign pre-tax 
income are associated with higher ETRs. 
 
An ETR reflects tax preferences or strategies of companies and different 
research results for size and profitability may be explained, for example, by 
whether large companies are under scrutiny from government or public 
bodies or whether they have more funds available to seek tax planning 
advice.  One US study, for example, finds a negative relation between tax 
planning costs and ETRs (Mills, Erickson & Maydew, 1998). 
 
Whether the ETR falling over time reflects aggressive tax minimisation is a 
big driver of ETR research, particularly in a period of large public company 
failures.  A longitudinal study of US listed companies during 1995-2000 
finds that ETRs did fall during this six year period, but that this was largely 
due to different accounting and tax treatments of employee stock options 
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(Yin, 2003).  However, some aggressive tax minimisation cannot be ruled 
out as an explanation for the remaining decline in ETRs. 
 
A conclusion of the book-tax income gap and ETR literature reviewed thus 
far is that prior studies rely on large book-tax differences and low ETRs to 
indicate tax avoidance by companies.  This gives confidence in using ETR 
measures in this thesis as proxies for tax strategy.    
 
My evaluation of the above literature is that results are inconclusive with 
respect to the exact determinants of ETR, although conflicting results may 
suggest that managers employ different strategies in response to different 
incentives.  This is the focus of my research – to test how these incentives 
affect the ETR.  Since Australian companies are the focus of this study, 
prior Australian ETR research, which relies on the wider ETR studies 
referred to above, is reviewed. 
 
2.5 Effective tax rate literature under the dividend imputation system of 
company tax 
Australian ETR research uses both tax return data (Wickerson, Reddan & 
Khan, 2001; Harris & Feeny, 2003) and annual report data (Tran, 1997; 
Tran & Yu, 2008) to test prior results of ETR research in other countries. 
 
A statistical analysis of ETRs of more than 500 ASX listed companies for 
the years 1983-1993 confirms US results that industries given favourable 
tax treatments have lower ETRs (Tran, 1997).  The research also shows that 
firm size has a negative relation with ETRs (Tran & Porcano, 1997).  Both 
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studies use average ETRs for the period 1983-1993 in the analysis.  These 
results are confirmed in a later study using annual ETRs for company years 
1994-2004 (Tran & Yu, 2008).  A further result of the latter study is that the 
difference between ETR and STR has narrowed over the period and it is 
suggested that this may be the result of tax law changes following the 
Australian Government’s Business Tax Review in 1999. 
 
Changes in tax law invariably change incentives and therefore tax strategy 
can change.  My study tests whether tax strategy did change in 2000 and 
2001, the years before the STR fell in two steps.  My study additionally uses 
an indicator variable for each of the years 1999 to 2003, to better reflect 
possible changes in tax strategies over the period of tax rate changes. 
 
In response to an Australian Government Senate Committee request to 
provide supporting evidence for the assertion by the Commissioner of 
Taxation that company tax collections had grown at a rate greater than gross 
domestic product, research was undertaken by the ATO.  A number of ETR 
measures were developed by tax officials using tax return data to analyse 
the tax performance of large companies during the 1990s (Wickerson, 
Reddan & Khan, 2001).  The trend analysis shows a general upward trend in 
ETRs over the period, but a downward trend in the ETR measured as tax 
payable/total profit.  There is volatility around the year of a tax rate increase 
in 1996.  No reasons are given in the study for the overall improvement in 
the ETR or why this trend differs to similar research studies in the US. 
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One intuitive reason may be the audit programs of the ATO.  My study 
develops and tests such an assertion.  The volatility around a year of tax rate 
increase (33% to 36%) may suggest taxable income shifting to the lower 
taxed year.  My research study also tests incentives to shift income when the 
tax rate falls in 2001 (36% to 34%) and 2002 (34% to 30%). 
 
When data sourced from tax returns are used by Harris and Feeny (2003) to 
model ETRs of large Australian companies, the results confirm the size 
effect found by Tran (1997) and Tran and Yu (2008).  There is also 
evidence from this study suggesting companies with foreign operations, 
research and development expenditure, and capital intensive companies 
have lower ETRs.  The study includes a variable measuring what Harris and 
Feeny (2003) call “unobserved heterogeneity” (Harris & Feeny, 2003, p. 
953).  The analysis confirms the importance of this variable in explaining 
why the ETR of a company differs from the STR.  This finding confirms the 
suggestion from US research that unobserved “firm-specific characteristics” 
are likely to be related to ETRs and with other independent variables (Gupta 
& Newberry, 1997, p. 4). 
 
My thesis suggests that one explanation for the unobserved “firm-specific 
characteristics” or “unobserved heterogeneity” from previous research is 
different underlying managerial incentives to aggressively minimise tax.  In 
particular, I examine whether incentives arising from the institutional 
environment in which the company operates are relevant factors.   
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One aspect of the institutional environment of interest to my research study 
is the effect on managerial incentives of a dividend imputation system in 
Australia.  In this environment, company tax becomes a prepayment of 
shareholder tax, imputed to the shareholders as a tax credit when dividends 
are distributed.  Company profit is taxed once, not twice, as in the classical 
system.  Incentives to avoid tax may be different from a classical system 
because company profits are ultimately only taxed at the personal tax rates 
of shareholders.  Dividends on which tax has already been paid are likely to 
be of value to investors and this may change dividend policy of companies.  
Prior research on the role of dividend policy is analysed below, first in the 
classical system and then in a dividend imputation system.   
 
2.6 Taxes, dividend policy and corporate finance literature (classical 
system) 
In a review of research about how tax affects company decisions to 
maximise its value, it is concluded that companies facing high tax rates are 
more likely to make decisions to get tax benefits that lower their ETRs 
(Graham, 2003).  However, there are no conclusions about whether tax is 
the most important factor, or why tax benefits are not more aggressively 
sought, or how much shareholder taxes are considered by managers in 
dividend payout policy.  Finance theory posits that dividend policy is 
irrelevant for the determination of market prices as firm value equals the 
present value of future operating cash flows (Modigliani & Miller, 1958; 
Miller & Modigliani, 1961).  Dividend policy is influenced by a company’s 
investment opportunities, its capital-structure mix and the availability of 
internally generated capital (Peacock, et al., 2003).   
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The value of a share is equal to the present value of future dividends and 
investors are indifferent to their total return being received as dividends 
along the way or a capital gain when they sell the share.  This claim has 
remained robust.  Even if there is a tax differential between income from 
dividends and realization of capital gains or between shareholders, investors 
become a clientele for the company that has a dividend payout policy that 
suits their preference (Dhaliwal, Erickson & Trezevant, 1999). 
 
The theory of tax clienteles predicts that investors buy shares that suit their 
preference for capital gains or dividends.  Support for the theory is given by 
Dhaliwal, Erickson and Trezevant (1999).  This study found that when 
companies initiated a dividend over the period 1982-1995, the percentage 
ownership of institutional shareholders, who preferred high dividend shares, 
increased.   
 
Further, a survey of 384 executives of US companies by Brav, Graham, 
Harvey and Michaely (2005) found that dividend payout policy had little 
impact on investor clientele and it was not used as a tool by management to 
alter company ownership.  Results also show that tax considerations played 
a secondary role and that differential tax of dividends and capital gains was 
not a dominant factor in decisions about whether to pay or increase dividend 
distributions.  
 
In this classical setting where the company is taxed on its profit and 
shareholders are taxed on this profit again when received as dividends, 
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company tax is seen as a cost and managers have incentives to aggressively 
minimise company tax.  This is because dividends are paid from after-tax 
profit, and the lower the tax, the greater is the potential dividend that can be 
paid to shareholders.  In companies with relatively low dividend payouts, 
managers also have incentives to minimise tax.  They will want to maximise 
share value and valuation models use after-tax profits.  There are further 
incentives to do so if managers are in receipt of performance-based 
remuneration in the form of share options.   
 
The empirical evidence shows, however, that tax avoidance is not always 
rewarded by the market (Hanlon, 2005), although this is not necessarily 
always the case in companies with high levels of corporate governance 
(Desai & Dharmapala, 2006).  Incentives to avoid tax may also differ in 
companies paying out dividends and those that retain profits for future 
growth.  In any case, in a classical system, there is no empirical evidence 
that dividend policy is affected by the tax preferences of investors.  
However, there is such evidence in a dividend imputation system. 
 
2.7 Taxes, dividend policy and corporate finance literature (dividend 
imputation system) 
Results from research conducted in dividend imputation environments may 
be at odds with the evidence from the classical tax environments (e.g., the 
US) that investors choose shareholdings to suit their tax preference.  A 
research study using British data over the period 1955-1981 found that 
companies with institutional investors decreased dividend payouts when 
dividend taxes increased (Poterba & Summers, 1984).  A later British study 
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using data for 1973-1983 confirmed these results (Lasfer, 1996).  An 
Australian study had similar findings.  Based on a 1992 survey of Australian 
managers, Anderson (1993) found that 80% of them said they responded to 
the dividend preference of their shareholders. 
 
Following the introduction of dividend imputation in Australia in 1987, 
empirical research documents that dividend payout ratios increased from 
31% in 1986 to 50% in 1990 (Nicol, 1992).  Later research for the period 
1987-2001 documents an increase in the average dividend payout to 60% of 
profits (Kenny, 2001).  When the increase is further analysed, payout ratios 
for companies paying unfranked dividends declined while payout ratios for 
companies paying franked dividends rose. 
 
Researchers had predicted that dividend clienteles would change following 
the introduction of dividend imputation (Hamson & Ziegler, 1990).  This 
prediction was upheld in research over the period 1985-1992 (Bellamy, 
1994).  This study supports the existence of dividend clienteles and the 
increase in franked dividend payouts relative to unfranked dividend payouts. 
 
However, there is conflicting evidence of the existence of dividend 
clienteles in the Australian dividend imputation environment.  A capital 
market research study, over the period 1973-1991, models share price 
before and after dividend imputation (Brown & Clarke, 1993).  There is 
support for the existence of a clientele effect across dividend yield pre-
imputation but this is not supported after dividend imputation.  The 
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conclusion is thus made that investors prefer capital gains even after the 
removal of double taxation on dividends. 
 
One conclusion that can be drawn from the prior research on the effect of 
tax on dividend payout is that franked dividends are more valuable to 
shareholders than unfranked dividends.  This means shareholders who can 
use imputation credits prefer franked dividends while those that cannot may 
prefer capital gains.  A more relevant conclusion from this literature for my 
study is that company managers have different incentives to minimise tax, 
depending on whether dividends are being distributed or not.  If they are, 
shareholders will value franked, rather than unfranked distributions.  
Support for this supposition comes from the two studies outlined below. 
 
Unlike Australia, New Zealand extends franking credits to dividends 
distributed to non-resident portfolio shareholders.  A study using New 
Zealand companies over the period 1991-1995, tests the effect of dividend 
imputation on tax minimisation at the time when the imputation credit was 
extended to non-residents (Wilkinson, Cahan & Jones, 2001).  Some support 
is found for the expectation that ETRs are related to franked dividend 
payouts.  There is no Australian research that specifically tests whether the 
levels of dividend payout and franking is related to ETRs.  Australian 
research that examined changes in dividend policy around the time of the 
introduction of a dividend imputation system (1982-1997) found that 
dividend initiations, dividend payouts, and dividend reinvestment plans 
increased following imputation (Pattenden & Twite, 2008).  This study 
included ETR and franked dividends as determinants of dividend payout 
 - 38 -
 
policy and results showed a significant positive relation between these 
determinants.  My research study explores reasons for this result.  In 
particular, it tests whether managers are influenced by the tax preference of 
their shareholders and thus whether there are incentives to be conservative 
or aggressive in their tax strategies. 
 
2.8 Incentive effect of tax office scrutiny (accounting policy choice 
literature) 
Conflicting findings in prior ETR literature show that large companies can 
either have higher or lower ETRs relative to small companies.  Such results 
are expected if large companies face different tax risks as some will have 
more to lose or gain than others in their pursuit of tax minimisation or 
avoidance.  A review of selected accounting policy choice literature 
highlights how the choice of an accounting policy can influence the 
incidence of company tax. 
 
In a large, public company, strategic investing, operating and financing 
decisions are made by managers as agents for capital providers as 
principals.  Agency theory suggests that to align these two interests, 
shareholders and creditors incur costly contracting to ensure managers 
operate in their interests.  Managers, in their turn, can choose accounting 
policies to meet these contract hurdles while acting in their own self interest 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  In a principal-agent relationship where 
managers act on behalf of the shareholders, maximising profits and 
minimising tax might seem the ideal management strategy.  However, if tax 
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is avoided in an over-aggressive way, it is the shareholders of the company 
who suffer the cost of audit and fines.   
 
Similarly, if the government tax revenue collection agency sees that 
company profits are excessive when compared to taxable income declared, 
costly audits may ensue with details of transactions required to be provided 
to tax collecting authorities.  To avoid these costs, managers may adopt 
certain accounting techniques to lower accounting profits and thus avoid 
scrutiny for audit.  There is empirical evidence that large firms have higher 
ETRs than smaller ones (Zimmerman, 1983).  This result is contrary to 
Australian ETR research previously discussed that finds larger firms have 
lower ETRs (Tran & Porcano, 1997; Harris & Feeny, 2003).  The result of a 
higher ETR is explained in terms of lowering the costs of scrutiny and 
transfer of wealth from the company.  Australian results of lower ETRs are 
explained as large companies are better able to use tax incentives that 
reduce tax.  These opposite results may also suggest companies respond 
differently to risks of audit.  
 
A study of listed New Zealand companies in 1984 examines the effect of 
scrutiny of ETRs on accounting policy choice by managers (Wong, 1988).  
At the time of the study, New Zealand companies enjoyed export tax credits 
given to exporters.  There are two methods of accounting for export tax 
credits.  The tax credit can be deducted from sales or income tax.  The study 
shows that politically sensitive companies (those whose ETRs are under 
scrutiny) adopt the method of accounting for export tax credits (the credit to 
sales method) that raises their reported ETR to that of non-politically 
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sensitive smaller companies.  These companies are thus able to retain their 
export tax credits. 
 
In a similar study of US companies over the period 1981-1984, researchers 
investigated whether political scrutiny of ETRs influenced accounting 
policy choice (Northcut & Vines, 1998).  At that time, political groups used 
ETRs to argue that some large companies were avoiding tax and used this 
result to argue against lowering the US company tax rate in the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986.  Results suggest that this political scrutiny of ETRs causes 
companies with low ETRs to choose income-decreasing accruals with low 
book-tax conformity.  Book-tax differences are used to measure tax 
avoidance, although only part of the difference may be the result of 
aggressive tax minimisation, as previously discussed in the review of the 
book-tax gap literature. 
 
Prior research does support the size of the book-tax gap being a “red flag” 
for tax audit.  Using a sample of audited companies from the US Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) over the period 1982-1992, analysis shows that there 
is a positive relation between tax adjustments by the IRS and book-tax 
differences (Mills, 1998).  A similar study replicating this research using a 
similar sample of New Zealand companies over the period 1991-2000 found 
a similar positive relation between adjustments and book-tax differences 
(Cho, Wong & Wong, 2006). 
 
Although macro-level trend analysis suggests a general upward trend in 
ETRs of Australian companies over the period 1992-1998 (Wickerson, 
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Reddan & Khan, 2001), audits by the ATO have realized large amounts of 
unpaid company tax. 
 
The growth in sophisticated tax strategies offered by elite accounting firms 
in Australia and the US during the 1990s has been documented in interviews 
with tax professionals, as has the growth in tax consulting fees of companies 
(Braithwaite, 2005).  The response of the ATO to this documented cost of 
tax avoidance is the Large Business and Tax Compliance group, specifically 
set up to audit company groups with more than $100 million in turnover 
(Carmody, 2005).  Targeted company groups include not only large listed 
companies but also Australian subsidiaries of foreign multinationals and 
large Australian private companies.  The sample included in this thesis is 
restricted to companies listed on the ASX operating in Australia with 
predominantly Australian shareholders.  Results of audits of these large 
company groups, published by the ATO, do not differentiate the three types 
of company groups and should therefore be read with this in mind.  Tax 
realized in audits of large corporations in the 2003-2004 financial year was 
over $1.6 billion (AFR, 5 Aug 2005).  One of the “red flags” the ATO uses 
in choosing audit targets is those showing low ETRs and using aggressive 
transfer pricing agreements (Granger, 2003, p. 33).   
 
The above published audit success may explain mixed research findings of 
ETRs and large companies in classical and dividend imputation 
environments.  Prior Australian research finds a negative relation between 
large companies and ETRs (Tran & Porcano, 1997; Harris & Feeny, 2003; 
Tran & Yu, 2008).  In classical environments the relation between size and 
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ETRs is either positive, negative or none (Gupta & Newberry, 1997; 
Zimmerman, 1983; Rego, 2003; Stickney & McGee, 1982). Clearly, some 
companies are prepared to take more risks than others in minimising tax.  If 
it is larger companies that are under scrutiny, managers may be less 
prepared to take these risks.  This research study tests the relation between 
close ATO scrutiny and tax strategy of Australian companies. 
 
2.9 Incentive effect of after-tax remuneration literature 
Agency theory suggests that to align shareholders interests and managers 
interests, the agent’s compensation or remuneration can be tied to 
observable outcomes (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986).  In a classical system of 
company tax, this is likely to be after-tax profit as this is the reward 
accruing to shareholders for their investment and from which dividends are 
paid or funds re-invested for future profits.  In the longer term, 
compensation can also be tied to increases in share price in the form of 
share options given now but exercisable in the future at a potentially higher 
share price.  This aligns shareholders long term interests with those of their 
agents.  Managers will have incentives to implement accounting and tax 
strategies that maximise after-tax profit, since this is the amount that accrues 
to shareholders and is used to model future profit and share price.  Agency 
theory thus predicts that managers will implement tax strategies to minimise 
tax expense and maximise after-tax profit.  Support for this prediction is 
provided from some prior research studies. 
 
Phillips (2003) surveyed tax and executive managers over the period 1995-
1997 to investigate the relation of compensation and effective tax rates and 
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found that remuneration of tax managers, based on after-tax profit, was 
associated with lower ETRs.  Compensating the chief executive officer on 
an after-tax basis, however, shows no significant relation with ETR.   
 
However, later research by Rego and Wilson (2010) found that tax 
aggressiveness was positively associated with equity based compensation 
for both tax executives and chief executive officer.  The difference in results 
may be due to conflicting incentives faced by the two levels of executives. 
 
A situation where an aggressive tax strategy is more likely to be pursued is 
where tax departments of companies are treated as profit centres and their 
tax managers are evaluated on the basis of tax savings or value added to the 
company.  Robinson, Sikes and Weaver (2010) provide evidence from a 
1999 survey of chief financial officers.  They test the association between 
the tax department evaluated as a profit centre and ETR.  The results show 
that those companies where the tax department is evaluated as a profit 
centre rather than as a cost centre have significantly lower ETRs. 
 
Recent research illustrates the importance of this managerial influence on 
tax strategy.  Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew (2010) test the association 
between individual top executives and ETRs of companies over the period 
1992-2006.  They tracked 908 executives across firms over time.  Their 
results show that individual executives play a significant role in determining 
the level of tax avoidance that firms undertake and the magnitude of the 
executive effects on tax avoidance is large. 
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I am not aware of any Australian research that tests the relation between 
managerial remuneration and tax avoidance.  I expect that, in a dividend 
imputation system, company tax is not a real cost because company tax can 
be imputed to shareholders through dividend distribution.  Because of this, 
managers will be more likely to maximise before-tax profit, rather than 
after-tax profit.   
 
Empirical evidence (Brown & Clarke, 1993) indicates that in the early years 
of imputation (up to the early 1990s) companies were not fully adapted to 
the system.  It can be argued that in the 2000s, listed Australian companies 
with predominantly Australian operations and Australian shareholders, are 
fully aware of the value of imputation to shareholders.  Tax paid by the 
company is actually tax paid on behalf of shareholders, especially since 1 
July 2000 when shareholders can claim a refund of any excessive 
imputation credits.  Managers of these companies are therefore expected to 
maximise before-tax profit, rather than after-tax profit. 
 
Incentive compensation using share options encourages managers to do 
whatever increases share value.  Under a classical system there is evidence 
that this may not be aggressive tax avoidance (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; 
Hanlon, 2005).  I expect that the same is true in an imputation system.  
Again, I am not aware of any research evidence using Australian companies 
that sheds light on this expectation. 
 
My evaluation of the literature testing the effect of performance-based 
remuneration on tax strategy is that, in a classical system of company tax, 
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executive remuneration based on after-tax profit, is more likely than not to 
result in an aggressive tax strategy.  I expect that the opposite is true in a 
dividend imputation system.  Perusal of annual reports shows that the 
remuneration of executives of Australian companies is based on a range of 
benchmarks.  This research study attempts to find an answer to the question 
of whether rewarding managers of companies with share options is a factor 
affecting tax strategy among companies. 
 
2.10 Tax-induced earnings management literature 
The book-tax gap literature reviewed previously suggests earnings 
management as a determinant of the book-tax income gap (Desai, 2003).  
Earnings management has been a popular area of accounting research for 
over twenty years.  The argument for its presence is that given opportunity 
and discretion in accounting policy choice in deriving accounting numbers, 
accounting profit can be “managed” to meet profit forecasts and other 
benchmarks, although evidence of earnings management has proved elusive 
to academic researchers.  A review of this literature suggests that earnings 
management does exist to influence share market perceptions, to increase 
compensation of managers, to avoid violating debt covenants with lenders 
and to avoid regulation (Healy & Wahlen, 1999).  Research results also 
suggest that managers of companies receiving share option remuneration, 
have strong incentives to boost share price and therefore to engage in 
managing earnings to meet or beat market analyst expectations (Dechow & 
Skinner, 2000). 
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There are other rewards in meeting market expectations.  Research that asks 
how important it is to meet earnings targets finds that for US companies 
over the period 1986-1993, those that meet profit expectations have 
significantly higher earnings forecasts and realized profits than companies 
that do not (Kasznik & McNichols, 2002).  This finding suggests that 
investors may perceive companies that consistently meet forecasts to be less 
risky. 
 
There is research that finds that the incentive to meet set targets can involve 
real economic sacrifices, not merely accounting manipulation.  Based on a 
2003 survey of 400 US executives, followed up by 22 interviews of chief 
financial officers, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) found that 78% of 
the sample of managers would sacrifice long-term value to smooth earnings.  
In the survey responses, 80% of the managers strongly agreed that they 
would decrease discretionary spending (delay maintenance), while 55.3% 
would delay starting a new project they expect to be profitable, and 40.4% 
would bring revenues to account now rather than next period.  Analysis 
suggests that managers take these steps because they think short-run 
volatility in share price will affect cost of capital, leading to loss of their 
reputation in the labour market and in the mind of equity analysts.  Such 
financial reporting costs are likely to conflict with aggressive tax 
minimisation strategies.  If tax expense is aggressively managed, reported 
profit may be reduced (for example, by deferring income and/or accelerating 
expenses).  This outcome may not be consistent with the goal of maximising 
or smoothing profit. 
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Earnings management can influence the timing of actual economic events or 
its recognition as a recorded transaction (Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, 
2005).  Smoothing accounting profit can take the form of both deferral 
and/or acceleration of income and expense.  This manipulation of current 
accruals affects both accounting profit and taxable income.  The question 
then arises as to which is most important and whether there are different 
answers to the question across companies.  The question has been discussed 
and reported in academic research known as the book-tax trade-off 
literature.  This name arises since it is suggested that costs of not meeting 
profit expectations may conflict with strategies that reduce reported profit 
for tax savings and this creates a trade-off between them. 
 
Almost all of the book-tax trade-off studies have been undertaken in the US 
and show substantial evidence over a 20 year period of research, that 
companies forego tax savings to reduce financial reporting costs 
(Shackelford & Shevlin, 2001).  The imputation system of company tax may 
change this outcome for Australia.  This is because for those companies that 
benefit from imputation, company tax is not a real cost, but a pre-payment 
of shareholder tax, so there is no point for these companies to engage in 
costly arrangements to save tax.  The trade-off between failing to meet 
profit forecasts and saving tax may therefore be irrelevant.  However, there 
are likely to be some companies in a dividend imputation environment for 
whom saving tax is a priority.  For example, some companies have low 
dividend payouts, or have foreign shareholders unable to use the imputation 
credits.  An advertised fall in the STR is likely to be an attractive 
opportunity to reap windfall tax savings.  Prior research studies from 
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companies operating under a classical system are therefore outlined, as well 
as an Australian study.  
 
A research study that documents the book-tax trade-off in a classical system 
uses the example of accounting for stock options to show strong support for 
the trade-off of net tax benefits for a better financial reporting outcome 
(Matsunaga, Shevlin & Shores, 1992).  Following changes in US tax law in 
1986, companies could convert incentive stock options to non-qualified 
options.  The disposal of these options results in both a reduction in reported 
accounting profit and a tax deduction.  Results show that few companies 
convert, despite the opportunity of a tax deduction.  These few companies 
are those with the strongest earnings so they may expect little “market” 
effect.  It is estimated in this study that the mean company tax benefit 
foregone is $551,000 to avoid a 2.3% reduction in reported earnings.   
 
Another research study documents companies that pay tax on non-existent 
earnings, so great is the desire to overstate reported earnings to meet 
forecasts (Erickson, Hanlon & Maydew, 2004).  A sample of companies 
accused of accounting fraud by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
between 1996 and 2002 is analysed by researchers.  The fraud typically 
includes inflating revenues, inventory and other assets.  For a sample of 27 
companies accused of overstating earnings by a mean amount of $124.5 
million, a mean of $11.84 million is paid in tax on this fraudulent amount.  
The researchers suggest that companies overpay tax to reduce the chance of 
outsiders discovering their overstatement of accounting earnings.  However, 
the optimal tax strategy suggested by the book-tax trade-off literature is not 
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always one where avoiding tax is a secondary aim.  When STRs fall, for 
example, maximising share value and minimising tax can coincide. 
 
Several tax induced earnings management studies followed the change in 
tax rates contained in The Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the US.  This Act 
reduced the legal company tax rate from 46% to 34%, leading to an 
expected large reduction in tax expense.  Using accrual models from the 
earnings management literature, Guenther (1994) examined whether firms 
deferred income in response to a tax rate change.  The results suggest that 
current accounting accruals were used in the period prior to the tax rate 
change to defer revenue to the low tax period and to accelerate expenses in 
the current high tax period.  These current accruals (receivables, payables, 
accruals and prepayments) affected both taxable income and financial 
accounting profit.  Large companies were more willing to report reduced 
income and those companies with higher debt/equity ratios were less willing 
to do so.  Similar results were reported in research using changes in fourth 
quarter gross profit and selling, general and administrative expenses in the 
years around the tax rate fall (Scholes, Wilson & Wolfson, 1992).  On 
average, the 812 sample companies saved around $500,000 in tax by 
deferring sales for one quarter.  The results also confirmed the result that 
smaller companies are less opportunistic tax savers.   Both studies document 
the use of negative current accounting accruals to effect tax-induced 
earnings management for windfall gains when the tax rate falls.  Results 
also suggest that companies are different to each other in responding 
because they face different risks.  This difference in response is illustrated in 
the following two studies. 
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Lopez, Regier and Lee (1998) confirmed the results of Guenther (1994) by 
using a more robust earnings management model and a variable to reflect a 
firm’s propensity to engage in tax minimisation.   Tax aggressive firms were 
those with relatively higher explicit tax subsidies (either because of 
accelerated depreciation deductions or tax exempt income).  Interestingly, 
tax aggressive firms were found to make greater negative discretionary 
current accruals shifts in the year preceding the tax rate change than other 
firms. 
 
On the other hand, a tax rate fall has little impact on the tax induced 
earnings management behaviour of loss firms.  Yin and Cheng (2004) 
contrast the responses of profit and loss companies.  The results show that 
non-tax incentives explain more variation in current accruals of loss firms.  
This result perhaps suggests that profit companies use negative current 
accruals to take advantage of tax savings because the financial reporting 
costs are lower than for loss companies. 
 
There are several published Australian research studies testing the response 
of companies to tax law changes.  In 1996, the STR rose from 33% to 36%.  
Tax law allows inventory to be valued at cost, market or replacement value 
each year.  This is different to accounting standards that require inventory to 
be valued at the lower of cost or market each year.  To shift taxable income 
from the higher taxed year to the previous lower tax year, companies can 
choose to value at the higher of cost or market in the year prior to the tax 
rate increase.  In the year of the tax rate increase, inventory valuation can be 
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reverted back to the lower of cost or market.  Davenport and Tran (2004) 
examined the deferred tax assets of Australian companies over the period 
1994-1997 and found that companies with inventory holdings shifted 
taxable income from 1996 to 1995 by electing to value inventory at the 
higher of cost or market in 1995 for tax purposes.  The reported inventory 
levels of these companies also significantly increased in 1995. 
 
The Australian STR fell in two steps from 36% to 34% in 2001 and from 
34% to 30% in 2002.  There is no published research testing tax induced 
earnings management following this tax rate fall.  A comparison of the 
ETRs of Australian companies over the period 1994-2004 found that the 
book-tax difference narrowed over the period as a result of tax reform 
measures following the Review of Business Taxation in 1999 (Tran & Yu, 
2008).  However, the study does not specifically test for tax induced 
earnings management.  My thesis tests whether companies seek windfall tax 
savings by shifting income to the lower taxed years.  Although companies 
tried to save tax in 1996, this does not necessarily mean that companies 
would again do so in 2000 and 2001, years before the STR falls.  As noted 
earlier, from 1 July 2000, excessive imputation credits can be refunded to 
shareholders.  This means domestic company tax and domestic shareholder 
tax become more completely integrated. 
 
The book-tax trade-off literature has been reviewed generally, but more 
particularly to highlight prior research that finds evidence of tax-induced 
earnings management when tax rates change.  These studies document the 
use of current accruals to shift income to lower taxed years.  However, there 
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are other strategies to reap one-off tax savings.  For example, planned asset 
sales can be brought forward or deferred to realize profit or loss on their sale 
in the most tax effective year.  Similarly merger and acquisition plans can 
be implemented to realize any associated gains and losses on doing so in the 
preferred tax year.  This thesis attempts to include all tax strategic 
transactions in answering the question of whether there is significant 
shifting of income in the years around the tax rate falls of 2001 and 2002.  
ETRs are used to reflect this rather than current accounting accruals. 
 
2.11 Summary 
The literature review contained in this chapter evaluates prior work that is 
relevant to this study.  It guides development of further research questions 
coming out of prior literature.  Prior research does not fully explain the 
variation existing between the ETRs of companies.  Results from book-tax 
gap and ETR research suggest a large part of the variation is the result of 
permanent differences between tax and accounting rules.  Differences in 
recognition of income and expense under tax and accounting rules also 
account for differences.  The influence of managerial incentives on 
differences in ETRs between companies has largely not been addressed in 
prior literature.  This leads to opportunities for further research. 
 
Most prior literature on tax avoidance comes from a classical system of 
company tax.  Management incentives to avoid tax are expected to be 
different in a dividend imputation system, where the tax a company pays is 
actually a pre-payment of shareholder tax, rather than a cost to be managed. 
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This chapter outlines areas where managerial incentives in a dividend 
imputation system differ to incentives under a classical system of company 
tax.  These incentives may play a role in cross-sectional variation of ETRs.  
Prior literature in these areas suggests fruitful exploration of further 
questions.  First, there is no research that specifically tests managers’ 
incentives to avoid tax when distributing dividends in an imputation system.  
Second, while there is published research documenting both opportunity of 
tax avoidance and the costs of tax audit in doing so, there is none asking 
whether the level of risk of an ATO audit is also explanatory in ETR 
differences.  Third, prior literature finds performance-based remuneration 
based on after-tax profit, including share options, influences managers to be 
more aggressive in minimising tax in a classical tax system.  This 
hypothesis has not been tested using Australian companies in a dividend 
imputation system.  Fourth, research testing tax-induced earnings 
management in times of tax rate change suggests some companies do take 
opportunities to save windfall tax when STRs fall.  Managers’ incentive to 
do so in a dividend imputation system has not been tested. 
 
The context of the study in this thesis is the Australian institutional 
environment  in a period of tax rate fall (1999-2003).  While Chapter 2 
outlines the origins of research questions to be addressed in the study from 
prior literature, Chapter 3 proceeds with an outline and discussion of the 
Australian institutional settings in which these questions are addressed.  
Chapter 4 develops the four hypotheses addressing the research questions in 
the context of this institutional environment. 
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CHAPTER 3 – INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The tax avoidance literature reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests a number of 
determinants of variation in ETRs of companies.  These include tax 
favoured treatments of certain income and expenses in tax law, differences 
in recognition of revenue and expense under accounting and tax rules, 
aggressive or conservative tax strategy, and earnings management to smooth 
accounting profit.  An understanding of the institutional arrangements 
governing the imposition of tax and its collection is therefore important in 
explaining this variation. 
 
This chapter describes in detail the institutional environment surrounding 
the taxation of Australian companies in the 1999-2003 period covered by 
this research study.  The research questions ask how this environment 
affects managerial incentives to avoid tax and how this is different to a 
classical system of company tax. 
 
This thesis tests hypotheses in the Australian institutional setting.  The 
following features of the setting are outlined in this chapter. 
 
1. The dividend imputation system introduced in 1987 that ended 
double taxation of company profits.  It explains the changes this has 
brought to share ownership, dividend yield and its effect on 
incentives to avoid tax.  
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2. The basics of the Income Tax Assessment Acts (ITAA) 1936 and 
1997 (Acts) are outlined.  Companies are taxed at a flat rate on their 
taxable income.   
3. The tax disclosure requirements and accounting standards that large 
companies must comply with when preparing published financial 
reports are described. Due to the confidential nature of corporate tax 
returns, the data used in my study are data from corporate annual 
financial reports.  
4. ETRs used in prior literature to measure tax strategy are defined.   
5. The business tax reforms announced by the Treasurer of the 
Australian Government on 21 September 1999 resulting in a number 
of new taxation regimes for companies over the period 1999-2003 
are outlined.  Although they contained a reduction in the statutory 
rate of company tax, removal of other favourable provisions 
compensated for the expected loss in tax revenue.   
 
Most of the above provide the setting in which Australian companies 
develop their tax strategies that may be different to each other and indeed, to 
companies operating in a classical system of company tax.  This chapter 
also discusses and illustrates how and why tax strategies are different to 
each other, and concludes with a summary. 
 
3.2 Dividend imputation system of company tax (Part 3-6 ITAA 1997) 
This section includes a discussion of imputation or franking credits arising 
from the introduction of a dividend imputation system, associated changes 
to capital gains tax and superannuation funds and an outline of the nature of 
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Australia’s capital market.  This is because at the time a dividend imputation 
system was introduced as a tax policy, a tax on capital gains had barely 
begun and compulsory superannuation did not exist.  All of these changes 
affected the composition of the capital market and in turn, managements’ 
incentives to avoid tax.  The section concludes with an explanation of how 
changed incentives affect tax strategy.  
 
3.2.1 Imputation (franking) credits 
Australia had a classical system of company tax from 1940.  A company 
was taxed as a separate taxpayer and shareholders were taxed on dividends 
received from the company without any recognition of the tax paid by the 
company on income generating the dividends.  An inter-corporate dividend 
rebate (section 46, ITAA 1936) meant dividends received by corporate 
shareholders were tax free.  The 1987 imputation system replaced the 
classical system of taxing profits twice by imputing to non-corporate 
shareholders the company tax already paid on the dividend received.  The 
imputation credit is added to the dividend income of the shareholder 
(dividend income is assessed for tax at the gross amount) and the 
shareholder is entitled to a tax offset for the imputation credit.  Dividends 
are only imputed to the extent of the Australian tax paid, called the franking 
amount, such that the higher the rate of Australian company tax paid the 
greater the tax offset will be.  The section 46 rebate, however, exempted 
from tax all dividends received by corporate shareholders that are public 
companies, whether tax had been paid by the company paying the dividend 
or not. 
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Changes to business tax were announced by the Australian Government on 
the release of the tax review report, Review of Business Taxation, A Tax 
System Redesigned on 21st September 1999.  One of these changes was the 
phased removal of the inter-corporate dividend rebate.  It does not apply to 
unfranked dividends paid outside wholly-owned company groups after 30 
June 2000 or to franked dividends after 30 June 2002.  From 1 July 2002 
corporate recipients of franked dividends, like other taxpayers, gross up 
dividends received by the franking credit and receive a tax offset equal to 
the amount of the franking credit.  Intra-group dividends are ignored within 
consolidated groups where the wholly-owned group is consolidated for tax 
purposes. Another important change to the imputation system is that from 1 
July 2000, if the franking credit received exceeds the tax payable by non-
corporate shareholder, the shareholder is entitled to a refund of the excess 
(section 67-25, ITAA 1997). 
 
The dividend imputation regime described above is attractive to 
shareholders investing for a dividend return on investment.  Company tax 
paid becomes a pre-payment of shareholder tax and company profits are 
ultimately taxed at the shareholders’ personal tax rates.  As such, there are 
no incentives for Australian companies to engage in costly tax-avoiding 
arrangements. They simply pay Australian company tax as required by law, 
then pass the tax credit onto shareholders with dividend distributions.  
 
Not all shareholders benefit from Australia’s dividend imputation system.  
Franked dividends are tax driven and some companies pay insufficient tax 
to fully frank dividends.  This is because, first, they may have tax-exempt 
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income or because they are the recipients of other preferential tax policies.  
Dividends will be only partly franked depending on the amount of tax paid 
by the company.  Second, franking credits can only come from company tax 
paid in Australia.  Where profits are earned from operations in foreign 
countries and tax is paid elsewhere, Australian company tax will be reduced 
by foreign tax credit/offset and dividends will not carry franking credits.  
Third, foreign investors do not have access to franking credits although they 
are exempt from withholding tax on franked dividends before they are sent 
overseas.  Companies with foreign income and/or with foreign shareholders 
are likely to pursue strategies that maximise share price and capital gain 
returns to shareholders.  
 
3.2.2 Companies and capital gains tax 
On 20 September 1985 the Australian Government introduced a capital 
gains tax, removing the tax free status of capital gains from share 
ownership.  Realized gains for all taxpayers became assessable income.  The 
gain was calculated with the cost of the asset indexed using a consumer 
price index so that only “real” gains were assessable income.  In September 
1999 changes were made to tax legislation.  Indexation was removed for all 
taxpayers and replaced with a 50% discount for individual taxpayers and 
33⅓% for superannuation funds.  The discount was not extended to 
companies.  The removal of indexation effectively removed the advantage 
of capital gains over ordinary income profits for companies. 
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3.2.3 Dividend imputation and superannuation funds 
Australian superannuation funds have large shareholdings in Australian 
companies.  From July 1988 a flat rate of tax of 15% on superannuation and 
pension fund earnings was introduced.  At the same time the benefits of 
dividend imputation were extended to these funds as shareholders.  In 1988 
the flat rate of company tax was 49% compared to 15% for superannuation 
funds.  This meant that if they received fully franked dividends they had 
extra credits to offset against other fund income.  From 1 July 1992 
compulsory superannuation contributions were legislated.  Australian 
employers paid a minimum of 3% of each employee’s salary to a 
superannuation fund.  This percentage contribution has grown to 9%.  The 
effect of this has been that Australian superannuation funds allocate more 
than half of their equity to Australian shares and this represents a quarter of 
total market capitalisation of listed Australian shares on the ASX (Chessell, 
2006). 
 
3.2.4 Dividend imputation and the capital market 
Australia’s capital market is small by world standards.  Only 1,499 
companies were listed on the ASX at the end of June 2001 (ASX, 2001).  A 
large proportion (51%) of its citizens own shares, 29% of this ownership 
held through superannuation and managed funds (ASX, 2003).  A large 
percentage of shares in Australian companies are owned by these 
institutional investors.  As such they can have a significant influence on 
share price and dividend payout policy.  Prior research (Nicol, 1992) 
confirms that payout ratios rose in response to the introduction of dividend 
imputation in Australia and they have remained high.  Research shows a 
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ratio of 65% franked to 35% unfranked dividends (Kenny, 2001).  One 
reason for this is that franked dividends in particular are desired by 
shareholders: individuals, companies and institutional investors.  
Superannuation funds and shareholders with marginal tax rates less than the 
company tax rate derive additional benefits.  Income of superannuation 
funds is taxed at 15% which means they can use excess franking credits to 
offset the tax on other fund income. 
 
3.2.5 Dividend imputation and tax strategy 
Given a preference for franked dividends by Australian shareholders, 
Australian companies distributing dividends are likely to distribute 
dividends that are fully franked.  Such companies are less likely to adopt 
aggressive tax strategy as they must pay close to the statutory rate of 
company tax on profit distributed as dividends to shareholders.  Companies 
that have not paid tax close to the statutory rate will be unable to fully frank 
dividends.  It is therefore expected that there will be a difference in tax 
strategy between companies depending on the extents of their foreign 
operations and foreign ownership.  In particular, a company with Australian 
shareholders expecting fully franked dividends will be less tax strategic than 
one with foreign shareholders not expecting franked dividends. 
 
3.3 Income tax assessment acts  
Australia has a self assessment regime for the collection of income tax, 
whereby taxpayers self assess their liability according to tax law.  Liability 
for income tax is determined by the amount of taxable income, a residual 
concept outlined in the provisions of the ITAA 1997. 
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Income tax = [(assessable income – deductions) * tax rate] 
 – tax offsets (s. 4-10 ITAA 1997) 
Income is assessable when derived (Division 6 ITAA97) and outgoings and 
losses are deductions when incurred (Division 8 ITAA97).  The notions of 
assessable income, deductions, the timing of derivation of income and 
incurrence of deductions have been left to interpretation by the judiciary.  
Realized capital gains are assessed as income.  Income is “derived” when it 
comes in to the taxpayer, deductions are “incurred” when there is an 
outgoing or a definite obligation connected with deriving the income.  
Although there is some similarity with the accounting notions of earning 
income and incurring expenses, the judiciary makes the final decision and 
accounting rules are only a source of reference.  Accounting rules do not 
require certainty but “more probable than not” for recognition, and 
“matching” of revenue and expense is not a rule in tax law.  Accounting 
standards allow ‘property, plant and equipment’ to be valued using either a 
“cost” or “revaluation” model.  However, market valuations are not relevant 
under tax law where depreciation deductions must be based on cost, never 
market value.  Companies will implement tax strategies to comply with tax 
provisions but they will assess their income tax liability in accordance with 
the provisions of tax law, paying only as much tax as the law requires.   
 
Choices are made at year-end about the extent of accelerating deductions, 
deferring income, writing off bad debts and obsolescent inventory and other 
tax transactions.  When assets are acquired the diminishing value (reducing 
balance) method can be chosen for maximum depreciation allowances as 
early as possible (Division 40 ITAA97).  Assets acquired before 21/9/1999 
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can use broad-banding to substantially accelerate depreciation deductions 
over a shorter time span.  Companies engaged in research and development 
and the mining industry can claim immediate deductions for capital 
expenditure, otherwise denied under deduction provisions.  A tax loss can 
be carried forward indefinitely and offset against future profits (s. 36-15 
ITAA97).   
 
Before 1 July 2002, individual companies were separate taxpayers 
calculating taxable income and submitting separate tax returns, even if they 
were members of a consolidated group for financial reporting.  Members of 
wholly owned groups of companies could transfer losses between members 
before declaring their individual taxable income.  Capital assets could also 
be “rolled over” between group members without triggering a capital gains 
tax event.  Multinational companies could strategically locate operations 
and structure capital and profit sharing to take advantage of lower tax rates.  
From 1 July 2003 provisions that allowed the intra-group transfer of tax 
losses and foreign tax credits ended with the introduction of tax 
consolidation for wholly-owned groups. 
 
Provisions in the income tax Act outlined above provide some discretion to 
companies when self assessing their tax liability.  General and specific anti-
avoidance provisions in the tax Acts to protect Australia’s income tax 
revenue may limit tax-avoiding arrangements.  General anti-avoidance 
provisions provide discretion for the Tax Commissioner to re-characterise 
transactions to what they would have been if tax had not been avoided.  
Section 456 ITAA36 attributes to Australian owners, income derived and 
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retained by offshore entities.  Division 13 is directed against transactions 
between residents and non-residents that affect the level of income arising in 
each jurisdiction from the level it would be if they dealt at arms length.  
This division allows the Commissioner to reallocate income or adjust 
deductions by substituting an arm’s length consideration.  The general value 
shifting regime attacks non-arms length transactions between related parties.   
 
In addition to specific anti-avoidance provisions found throughout the 
income tax Acts, a general anti-avoidance provision, Part IVA ITAA36, 
seeks to cancel any transactions entered into by taxpayers to avoid tax.  The 
legislation works by identifying a scheme giving a tax benefit to a taxpayer 
that is entered into for the sole or dominant purpose of receiving the tax 
benefit.  The interpretation of tax avoidance provisions have been left to the 
judiciary although tax rulings (not legally binding) are provided by the ATO 
to give guidance.  These rulings set out the Tax Commissioner’s 
interpretation of tax law.   
 
The ATO administers the income tax Acts.  The integrity of the self 
assessment system is maintained by tax audits of targeted groups of 
taxpayers.  Tax law contains provisions giving wide powers to the 
Commissioner of Taxation to audit (sections 263, 264, 170 ITAA36) and 
penalties for non-compliance (Part 4-25, Sch 1 Taxation Administration Act 
1953).  The provisions of the income tax Acts do give discretionary choice 
to taxpayers and they self assess their income tax liability subject to the risk 
of audit and its associated penalties.  It is assumed that companies will do 
this using provisions in the tax Acts that ensure their tax liability is limited 
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to what is due under the Acts and no more.  Almost two-thirds of company 
tax is collected from large companies.  The size of this tax revenue and the 
complexity of their business transactions is the reason large companies are 
specifically targeted for compliance attention (Carmody, 2005). 
 
The tax assessed and paid by companies is a confidential matter between the 
company and the tax office.  Tax returns are lodged with this office and are 
not available on public record.  However, under Australian accounting 
standard AASB 1020: Accounting for Income Tax (Tax-Effect Accounting), 
companies must disclose tax information since it is thought to be useful to 
shareholders and other users of annual reports. 
 
3.4 Accounting standards and disclosure requirements of annual 
reports 
Although the same underlying transactions form the basis for both 
confidential tax returns and publicly available audited annual reports, each 
is produced using different legal codes.  Company tax is assessed, as 
outlined in the previous section, in accordance with the ITAA 1997.  
Financial statements are prepared at the end of the financial year in 
accordance with Australian accounting standards given legal status by the 
Corporations Act 2001.  Two sets of books are not kept however.  Company 
tax returns are prepared some months after the end of the financial year.  
There is a reconciliation calculation, taking the accounting profit number 
from the income statement as the starting point, adding and subtracting 
items of difference in calculating accounting profit and taxable income.  An 
extract from the company income tax return (form C), showing this 
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reconciliation process, is shown in Appendix B (pp. 197-200) for the 
financial year ended 30 June 2003.  What follows is an explanation of this 
reconciliation process.  Tax disclosure requirements of the relevant 
accounting standard are then discussed to illustrate differences in tax and 
accounting legal codes and the difficulties in extracting tax information 
from annual reports. 
 
3.4.1 Reconciliation of accounting profit or loss to taxable income or 
loss 
Reconciliation of accounting profit with taxable income is necessary 
because the liability to pay tax is based on taxable income according to the 
income tax assessment Acts, not generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP).  Under the accounting conceptual framework definition of expense 
given in SAC4: Definition and Recognition of the Elements of Financial 
Statements, an expense is an outflow that reduces equity; it does not say that 
expenses are incurred in the process of earning income.  Under this 
definition, income tax is an expense, rather than an appropriation of profit.  
This expense is calculated after adjustment to accounting income for those 
items of revenue and expense that are included in one or other of accounting 
profit or taxable income but never in both.  These items are known as 
permanent differences. 
 
Permanent differences arise when accounting income is tax exempt, for 
example capital gains on assets purchased before 20 September 1985.  
Expenses recognised for accounting purposes that are not allowable tax 
deductions, such as entertainment expense, depreciation of the revalued 
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portion of assets, or goodwill amortisation and writedown, also give rise to 
permanent differences.  Allowable tax deductions in excess of costs incurred 
(for example, the 125% deduction for qualifying research and development 
expenditure) are not recognised as accounting expenses and also give rise to 
a permanent difference.  Tax expense in the annual report is calculated by 
applying the STR to accounting profit adjusted for permanent differences.   
 
3.4.2 Tax and the annual report 
Accounting standards prescribe the requirements for the structure and 
content of annual reports.  From 1 January 2005 Australia adopted 
international accounting standards.  The following discussion follows 
disclosure requirements in standards before that date.  AASB 1034: 
Financial Report Presentation and Disclosures prescribed general 
requirements for the structure and content of financial reports.  Income tax 
expense was reported in the statement of financial performance in 
accordance with AASB 1018: Statement of Financial Performance.  AASB 
1020: Accounting for Income Tax (Tax Effect Accounting) prescribed 
income tax disclosure in annual reports.  Income tax expense calculated on 
accounting profit adjusted for permanent differences needs to be further 
adjusted for timing differences to compute tax liability, because the timing 
of recognition of some items of revenue and expense differs between GAAP 
and the ITAA.   
 
Timing differences arise due to, for instance, differences in accounting 
depreciation and tax depreciation of depreciating assets, and provision for 
some expenses in deriving accounting profit that are denied under tax law as 
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they are not yet “outgoings”, such as provisions for bad debts, long service 
leave pay, and warranties.  Under the tax Acts such expenses are deductible 
when the outgoing is made.  Tax expense is therefore divided into a current 
portion and a deferred portion.  Current tax liability is shown in the Balance 
Sheet in accordance with AASB 1040: Statement of Financial Position as a 
current liability, and deferred tax, the net amount expected to be paid at 
some future time is a non-current liability.  Current tax expense, being the 
tax liability due for the current period is theoretically tax payable under the 
ITAA.  There may be further adjustments to tax payable to the tax office if 
there are tax credits like foreign tax paid and franking credits and other 
offsets.  The reconciliation process described above is outlined in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Difference in derivation of tax expense and tax paid 
 
Corporations Act 2001 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 
Revenue – Expenses Assessable Income – Allowable 
Deductions 
= Accounting Profit = Taxable income 
Adjusted for permanent differences 
such as: 
- concessional tax deductions 
- tax exempt income, including   
dividends that attract s.46 rebate 
and franking credits 
+ non allowable deductions such 
as: 
- goodwill amortisation/write-
down 
- depreciation of re-valued 
portion of  assets 
- entertainment expense 
 
=Adjusted accounting profit  
x STR x STR 
= Tax Expense:  
Deferred tax expense  
+ Current tax expense = Tax payable 
 - Tax offsets (credits and rebates) 
 = Net tax payable for the year 
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Tax paid is disclosed in the Statement of Cash flows in accordance with 
AASB 1026: Statement of Cash Flows.  Company tax is paid in four pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) instalments and a final balance being the difference 
between the actual tax liability and the four PAYG instalments. The first 
instalment paid in an accounting period is the fourth quarterly instalment 
payment for the previous accounting period.  The other three quarterly 
payments are for current year income based on the previous year’s results.  
This means disclosed current tax expense and deferred tax expense relate to 
the present year’s accounting profit but disclosed tax paid has elements of 
the present and past year’s accounting profit.  In an annual report to 
shareholders then, income tax disclosures prescribed by accounting 
standards normally include an income tax expense, a current tax liability 
and a deferred tax liability, and a cash tax paid (cash outflow). 
 
3.5 Effective tax rate (ETR) measures 
The different tax and accounting rules contained in the ITAA and GAAP 
discussed above explains why companies may have tax liabilities different 
from applying the STR to accounting profits.  Permanent and timing 
differences may arise naturally due to differences between accounting and 
tax rules, or may be created by adoption of aggressive tax strategy.  It is for 
the latter reason that ETRs can be used to measure the relative tax strategy 
of managers in companies.  Companies with concessional tax deductions, 
deriving exempt income under the income tax acts, with tax credits and 
rebates to offset against tax payable, and deferring their tax liability to the 
future have lower ETRs than companies that do not. 
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Taxable income, on which tax liability is calculated, is derived by the 
reconciliation process described above whereby accounting profit is first 
adjusted for permanent differences in tax law and accounting rules.  The tax 
expense calculated on accounting profit adjusted for permanent differences 
is then adjusted for timing differences.  Timing differences arise as income 
and expense can be recognised and incurred in different years under tax and 
accounting rules.  Total tax expense is the result of adjusting accounting 
profit for permanent differences only and applying the STR to the adjusted 
accounting profit.  Current tax expense is calculated when accounting profit 
is adjusted for both permanent differences and timing differences, and 
applying the STR.  Thus, total tax expense includes both current and 
deferred tax expense.  This is represented in equation form below. 
 
Total tax expense = (AP ± Permanent differences) × STR 
Current tax expense = (AP ± Permanent differences ± Timing differences) × STR 
Where AP = accounting profit 
 
If the above 2 equations are divided by accounting profit, two measures of 
ETRs result. 
ETR1 = Total tax expense / accounting profit = (1 ± PD/AP) × STR 
ETR2 = Current tax expense / accounting profit = (1 ± PD/AP ± TD/AP) × 
STR 
Where PD = permanent differences; TD = timing differences. 
 
Thus ETR1 is a function of permanent differences between accounting 
profit and taxable income, scaled by accounting profit.  The smaller the net 
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permanent differences the closer ETR1 will approach the STR.  ETR2 is a 
function of permanent and timing differences between accounting profit and 
taxable income, scaled by accounting profit.  The larger the relative size of 
these differences the further apart ETR2 will be from the STR (unless 
permanent and timing differences offset each other). 
It follows that one reason for the variation in ETRs between companies is 
because they have different net permanent and timing differences. 
 
A third ETR based on cash flow is a novel alternative to accrual measures of 
income tax.  Due to the PAYG instalment arrangement and the time lag of 
tax collection, an ETR using tax paid in a year is likely to be different to 
ETR2 that uses current tax expense.  Companies pay annual tax liability in 
quarterly instalments.  As noted, the first quarterly payment in a financial 
year (due in July) is the final tax instalment for the previous year.  The 
following three quarterly instalments relate to the current year (due in 
October, January/February, April).  Company tax paid in a year also 
includes the final balance for the previous year minus the sum of the four 
quarterly instalments (payable/refundable in January/February) when the tax 
return is lodged.  The net tax payable for the year in Table 3.1 does not 
therefore represent the tax that is actually paid in the year.  However, tax 
paid in a year can be a reasonable cash proxy of net tax payable for the year.  
Hence, company tax paid divided by accounting profit gives a third ETR 
measure.  Tax paid is disclosed in the annual cash flow statement.  While 
this may not all relate to current year profit, it does provide a proxy for a tax 
cash flow measure and a third ETR measure. 
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ETR3 = Tax paid / accounting profit. 
 
A cash flow ETR also avoids the complexity inherent in using accrual tax 
numbers because they are also used to measure discretionary accruals in 
earnings management of accounting profit. 
 
3.5.1 Company tax strategy 
One element of corporate tax strategy is how conservatively or aggressively 
a company uses permanent and timing difference opportunities to reduce or 
defer tax.  Permanent differences arise because there are items of income 
that are tax exempt under the ITAA.  They also arise as some expenses are 
specifically excluded as a deduction.  These items will be included in 
computing accounting profit but never in taxable income.  On the other 
hand, the ITAA allows extra deductions, such as the 125% deduction for 
research and development expense.  The extra deductions will be included 
in deriving taxable income but never in accounting profit.   
 
Timing differences occur when a deductible expense for tax is recognised 
before the expense is recognised for accounting profit.  For example, 
diminishing value depreciation is claimed as a tax deduction, while straight 
line depreciation is expensed for reporting of accounting profit.  When 
expenses are accrued before being claimed as tax deductions, this also 
creates a timing difference.  Provisions for long service leave and 
allowances for bad debts are expensed when estimated, while tax law allows 
a deduction when the leave is paid and the debt becomes bad.  As timing 
differences reverse over time, ETR3 will be affected by these changes.    
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Australian taxation legislation allows tax losses to be carried forward to 
reduce taxable income in future years (Division 165 ITAA97).  The 
accounting standard for income tax applicable for the years of this study is 
the 1989 version (the income statement approach).  AASB 1020: 
Accounting for Income Tax (Tax-Effect Accounting) requires the recognition 
of a deferred tax asset arising from unused tax losses when it “is virtually 
certain” that future income will be available to offset against the tax losses 
(paragraph .03).  Whether the tax benefits from past losses are recognised as 
deferred tax assets (or future income tax benefits) is therefore dependant on 
whether the companies are sure that they can generate assessable income to 
utilise the tax losses.     
 
Whether permanent and timing differences are discretionary choices for 
companies is a matter of argument.  If they are largely non-discretionary, 
then ETRs do not provide a good relative measure of 
conservative/aggressive tax strategy.  However, I argue that many of these 
differences can be discretionary.  Tax law and accounting rules differ but 
whether choices are made to take advantage of tax free or tax advantaged 
investment opportunities is discretionary.  Further, realization of a tax-free 
capital gain will mean accounting profit and taxable income differ but the 
time of realization is discretionary.  Tax law is used to implement 
government policy.  Examples are the 125% deduction for research and 
development and accelerated capital allowances to encourage capital 
investment.  The permanent and timing differences arising from these 
investments are arguably discretionary, since tax is deferred to the future 
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when the profits from the investments are available only if the decision to 
undertake new investment is made. 
 
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that tax strategies are implemented by 
companies in line with their particular institutional and economic 
characteristics and that the discretionary choices made will be reflected in 
their ETRs.  For this reason, tax strategy is measured in this study using 
ratios of ETR1 and STR, ETR2 and STR, and ETR3 and STR.  Ratios of 
ETRs are calculated for comparative purposes as the STR fell over the 
period of study following business tax reforms. 
 
3.6 Business tax reforms 
Business tax reforms implemented over the period 1999-2003 are outlined 
in this section.  Then five reform measures relevant to incentives to avoid 
tax are discussed.  These are the falls in the statutory rate of company tax, 
changes to the capital allowance regime, changes to capital gains tax, 
removal of the dividend rebate and changes to prepaid expenses. 
 
The policy document A New Tax System circulated by the Treasurer of the 
Australian Government in August 1998 spelt out the strategy for business 
tax reform.  Business was consulted on the goal of moving from a 36% to a 
30% company tax rate subject to maintaining revenue neutrality.  The task 
of business tax reform was contracted out to the private sector under the 
chairmanship of John Ralph, a director of a number of Australian listed 
companies.  The report of the Ralph review committee was released by the 
Treasurer on 21 September 1999 (Commonwealth of Australia, 1999).  Tax 
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changes legislated over the following three years are summarised in Table 
3.2 showing the date of effect of these changes.  Although the overriding 
brief of these changes was sustainment of company tax revenue, the changes 
provided opportunities for windfall tax savings for companies. 
 
Table 3.2: Timing of company business tax reforms 
 
 21 
September 
1999 
30 
September 
1999 
1 
July 
2000 
1 
July 
2001 
1 
July 
2002 
Replacement of 
accelerated 
depreciation and 
removal of balancing 
charge rollover relief 
     
Removal of depreciable 
assets from Capital 
Gains Tax regime 
     
Removal of 13 month 
rule for prepayments 
     
Prevention of loss asset 
transfers within a 
company group 
     
Indexation of capital 
gains frozen – 
replacement discount 
regime not applicable 
to companies 
     
Company tax rate falls 
to 34% for 2000-2001 
year 
     
Removal of inter-
corporate dividend 
rebate on unfranked 
dividends received by 
public companies 
     
Commencement of 
10% Goods and 
Services Tax and Pay 
As You Go regime 
     
Company tax rate falls 
to 30% from 2001-
2002 year 
     
New tax law for all 
depreciating assets 
     
Tax consolidation 
introduced 
     
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3.6.1 Company tax rate 
The key change to business tax accepted and legislated by the government 
was to lower the company tax rate from 36% to 34% for the 2000-2001 
income year, and to 30% from the 2001-2002 income year.  Given this 
window of opportunity, companies might shift taxable income from a higher 
tax year to a lower tax year.  
 
However, lowering the tax rate was accompanied by tax law changes.  One 
of these changes was the removal of accelerated depreciation for plant and 
equipment. 
 
3.6.2 Capital allowance regime 
A new uniform capital allowance system based on the effective life of assets 
was applied to all depreciable assets acquired or constructed from 1 July 
2001.  Rates of depreciation applied between 21 September 1999 and 1 July 
2001 were the rates applying to assets under the new regime, i.e., 100% 
divided by effective life of the item for prime cost (straight line) method, or 
150% divided by effective life for diminishing value (reducing balance) 
method.  Accelerated annual depreciation rates that existed from 1992 until 
21 September 1999 were based on effective life adjusted by a 20% loading 
and were broadbanded into one of seven rates.  Under this regime the 
effective life estimate could not be varied.  For depreciable assets acquired 
after 21 September 1999, taxpayers are permitted to re-assess effective life 
and these must be recalculated if the cost of the asset increases by at least 
10% during any income year.  This means that if an asset is expected to 
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have a shorter effective life than originally thought, the rate of depreciation 
can be increased from the time of the reassessment. 
 
3.6.3 Capital gains tax 
Indexation of the cost base of company assets was frozen on 30 September 
1999.  Although a 50% capital gains tax discount was introduced for 
individuals it was denied to companies.  The removal of indexation 
effectively removed the advantage of capital gains over ordinary income 
profits for companies.  Another change was the changed tax treatment of 
dividends received by companies. 
 
3.6.4 Dividend rebate 
The 1987 imputation system replaced the classical system of taxing 
company profits twice by imputing to non-corporate shareholders the 
company tax already paid on the dividend received.  The section 46 rebate 
(s.46 ITAA36), however, exempted from tax all dividends received by public 
companies, whether tax had been paid by the company paying the dividend 
or not.  Changes to business tax announced on 21 September 1999 included 
the phased removal of this inter-corporate dividend rebate.  It no longer 
applies to unfranked dividends paid outside wholly-owned company groups 
after 30 June 2000 or to franked dividends after 30 June 2002.  From 1 July 
2002 company recipients of franked dividends, like other taxpayers, gross 
up the dividend received by the franking credit in assessing income and 
receive a tax offset equal to the amount of the franking credit in calculating 
liability.  However, company shareholders are not entitled to refund of 
excess franking credits, unlike individual shareholders (s 67-25(1C), (1D) 
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ITAA97).  Companies are, however, able to convert their excess franking 
credits into tax losses (s 36-55 ITAA97).  These can be used to offset profits 
in future income years.   
 
3.6.5 Prepayment of expense  
Since 1988, taxpayers must amortise prepayments for services lasing longer 
than 13 months over the lower of the period of the services and 10 years.  
Taxpayers were able to incur an expense in the last month of the tax year 
and immediately deduct the part of the outgoing relating, not only to June, 
but to the remaining 12/13ths that related to the following tax year.  The 
business tax reforms announce in September 1999 saw amendment to this 
13-month prepayment rule from 1 July 2001.  No immediate deduction for 
prepayments is available.  They must be apportioned over the service period 
to which they relate.   
 
The business reform measures described above were announced in 
September 1999 before their implementation.  The changes were phased in 
giving ample opportunity for tax planning.  With tax rates falling in future 
years and generous tax regimes closing, the more tax strategic companies 
could ensure they took every opportunity to limit their tax liability.  One 
way to do this was to defer income and accelerate deductions in tax years 
before the tax rate fell. 
 
3.7 Differentiating aggressive and conservative tax strategies 
A tax strategy that defers income and accelerates deductions may affect 
taxable income and accounting profit to the same extent as they are based on 
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the same set of economic transactions.  They may therefore leave ETRs as 
the proxy for tax strategy unchanged.   However, this only happens if 
permanent and timing differences change in the same proportion as the 
shifts in income/profit.  This will not necessarily be the case as explained by 
Wilkie (1988). Where permanent and timing differences are not 
proportionally related to accounting profit, ETR can change simply because 
accounting profit changes. 
 
Further, an aggressive tax policy will not only defer income to the lower 
taxed year but will also opportunistically implement one-off transactions to 
reduce tax.  For example, undertaking investments to derive income that is 
concessionally taxed, results in a permanent difference.  Similarly, some 
transactions can be undertaken to generate immediate deductions for tax and 
future expenses for accounting purposes will result in negative timing 
differences in the year of the transactions.  Both these arrangements will 
magnify the tax savings and this will be reflected in the tax strategy 
measures.  Past losses will be most effective if they are purchased in merger 
and acquisitions in higher taxed years.  If tax strategy measures are observed 
to fall in years before STR falls, this will be indicative of a more aggressive, 
rather than a conservative tax strategy.  A study over years when the STR 
falls gives an opportunity to inform on the relative tax strategies of 
companies, using ETR measures as the indicators. 
 
Given the use of ETR as a reliable proxy measure of assessing tax strategy, 
the degree of relative aggression or conservatism can be traced by a 
company’s use of permanent and timing differences between accounting 
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profit and taxable income.  This is because the difference in tax strategy 
explains to a certain extent why ETRs may differ between companies. 
 
3.8 Summary  
This chapter describes the institutional tax environment in which large, 
profitable Australian companies operate.  Important factors associated with 
this environment include, first, a dividend imputation system of company 
tax, where company profit is taxed once, not twice as in the classical 
system.  Incentives to aggressively avoid tax may therefore be mitigated in 
this environment.  A second factor is the income tax assessment Acts 
operating in Australia, giving strong audit powers to the tax collecting body.  
Of importance to this study are the STR changes implemented in the period 
1999-2003, providing an opportunity for companies to make windfall tax 
savings.   
 
ETRs are used in prior empirical studies to assess tax strategies and 
differentiate the tax conservative from the tax aggressive companies.  The 
institutional settings in which Australian companies operate are outlined in 
this chapter.  ETRs are also used in this study as a way of assessing the tax 
strategy of companies, particularly in years when the tax rate falls.  
Variability in tax strategy of Australian listed companies over the period 
1999-2003 is investigated in this study using ETR measures to do so.  The 
next chapter develops hypotheses to test explanations of this variability in 
terms of managerial incentives with reference to the institutional 
environment outlined in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 – HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Research questions emerging from prior literature discussed in Chapter 2 
suggest management incentives may play a role in explaining different tax 
strategies between companies.  It also suggests that management may have 
different incentives to avoid tax in a classical system of company taxation 
compared to a dividend imputation system.  The institutional environment 
for Australian companies outlined in Chapter 3 therefore places these 
incentives in context.  These questions include the following.  In a dividend 
imputation system of company tax, what is the effect on tax strategy of: 
1. dividend payout ratio and franking percentage of dividends; 
2. tax office scrutiny; 
3. managerial remuneration based on share options, and 
4. company tax rate changes? 
 
This chapter develops four testable hypotheses to answer these questions for 
the Australian institutional environment.  In particular, these hypotheses test 
incentives for companies to pursue aggressive or conservative tax strategies 
in a period of company tax rate changes.  These four hypotheses provide the 
focus of the remaining chapters of this thesis. 
 
4.2 The relation between dividend payout, extent of franking and tax 
strategy 
Company profits are not legally required to be distributed to shareholders as 
dividends.  Dividend payout policy is a financial decision dependent on a 
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number of factors, including available cash, financing choices and 
investment opportunities. Shareholders invest for a return in the form of 
dividend income during the holding period and capital gain when 
shareholdings are realized.   
 
In a perfect capital market (i.e., investors behave rationally, there are no 
transaction costs or taxes, and information is available to all), shareholders 
have no preference for a dividend income or a capital gain.  The total cash 
flow of the investment is the same.  The explanation for this is that when 
profits are distributed as dividends there is less in retained profits to build 
future profits and capital gains.  If no dividend payments are made, more 
retained earnings are left, leading to greater capital gains.  Overall 
shareholder wealth is unchanged (Modigliani & Miller 1958; Miller & 
Modigliani 1961).   
 
When tax is introduced as a friction in this perfect capital market, 
shareholder preference for dividends can be affected.  One reason is 
differential taxation of dividends and capital gains.  In a classical system of 
company taxation, company profits are taxed.  When after-tax profit is 
distributed as dividends, shareholders again pay tax on their dividend 
income.  In other words, company profits distributed as dividends are taxed 
twice. To ensure maximum returns to shareholders, managers of companies 
have incentives to treat company tax as a cost and maximise after-tax profits 
for the benefit of shareholders.  This creates incentives for managers to 
engage in aggressive tax strategies.   
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A dividend imputation system eliminates the double taxation of company 
profits distributed as dividends and thus reduces management incentives to 
pursue aggressive tax strategies (Wilkinson, Cahan & Jones, 2001).  If a 
company listed on the ASX makes $1 pre-tax profit, it pays tax at the 
corporate tax rate (tc), leaving an after-tax profit of 1 – tc.  If the whole after-
tax profit is paid out as a franked dividend, it carries an imputation credit of 
(1 – tc) x [tc/(1 – tc)] = tc which is the corporate tax paid.  A resident 
shareholder who receives a franked dividend includes both the dividend 
received (1 – tc) and the imputation credit (tc) as assessable income and pays 
tax at their marginal tax rate (ti), then claims the imputation credit as a tax 
offset.  The net tax payable by the shareholder is: 
[(1 – tc) + tc] x ti – tc = ti – tc  
and the total income tax of company and shareholder is: 
tc + ti – tc = ti 
which is the tax at the marginal tax rate of the shareholder alone.  This 
means that company profits are ultimately only taxed at the shareholders’ 
marginal rates of tax. 
 
Therefore, in a dividend imputation system such as Australia, company tax 
is a temporary withholding tax and has no impact on after-tax returns (1 - ti) 
of shareholders.  Tax paid by a company in this system is a pre-payment of 
shareholders’ income tax and not a real cost as in the classical system.  
Managers will therefore maximise before-tax profit and should have no 
incentives to implement costly aggressive tax strategies.  Companies that 
have paid Australian income tax have incentives to distribute profits as 
franked dividends as soon as possible to allow shareholders to maximise the 
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present value of imputation credits.  Franked dividends are therefore 
preferred to capital gains as a return on investment since if taxable capital 
gains are realized when shares are sold, shareholders are taxed without any 
offset by imputation credits. In other words, double taxation may apply to 
capital gains, but not dividends. 
 
A strategy adopted by companies to counter the lower level of retained 
earnings due to increased dividend distributions is to use dividend 
reinvestment plans to raise new equity capital.  Bellamy (1994) and 
Pattenden and Twite (2008) provide evidence for the increased use of 
dividend reinvestment plans after the dividend imputation system was 
introduced. 
 
To maximise the present value of imputation credits to shareholders, 
companies have incentives to distribute franked dividends as soon as 
possible.  Bellamy (1994) and Pattenden and Twite (2008) found evidence 
that companies paying dividends with imputation credits increased their 
payout ratios to ensure that imputation credits were passed on to 
shareholders.  Shareholders also prefer franked dividends (dividends paid 
out of taxed earnings) to unfranked dividends (dividends paid out of untaxed 
earnings) not only because franked dividends carry imputation credits but 
also because company earnings that are taxed are perceived by investors to 
be more persistent than earnings that are not (Hanlon, 2005). 
 
Further, empirical evidence shows that companies, especially mature 
companies with sustainable earnings, do have defined dividend policies and 
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that these policies are put in place for the long term with managers opting 
for a stable dividend policy.  This is because shareholders perceive 
fluctuating dividends negatively (Brav, Graham, Harvey & Michaely, 
2005).  Therefore, companies that distribute franked dividends in one year 
have incentives to adopt a conservative tax strategy to ensure that they pay 
sufficient tax to frank dividends in the following year.  This leads to 
hypothesis H1. 
H1: Companies that distribute franked dividends adopt a more 
conservative tax strategy than companies distributing unfranked 
dividends or not distributing dividends. 
 
4.3 The relation between tax office scrutiny and tax strategy 
Tax audit activity and the powers of the ATO under tax legislation are 
outlined in Chapter 3.  Almost two-thirds of company tax is paid by large 
corporations, defined by the ATO as corporate groups with a turnover 
exceeding $100 million (Carmody, 2005).  Around 34% of net tax office 
collections are paid by large business (Granger, 2006).  To protect this 
revenue, the ATO has a Large Business and Tax Compliance program.  The 
program is due to the large size of tax revenue collected from this sector, the 
complexity of its business transactions and the competitive and ever-
changing global environment in which it operates.  The intense scrutiny in 
risk assessment and audit of large company groups is justified by the ATO 
because “we continue to finalise income tax audits with some significant 
compliance adjustments” (Granger, 2006, p. 2).  This supports evidence 
documented in Chapter 2 that companies do pursue aggressive tax strategies 
(Desai, 2003; Braithwaite, 2005). 
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The ATO publishes results of its past year audit program and releases its 
annual compliance program to ensure large companies are aware of its 
plans.  The financial press also reports these releases in the public interest.  
For example, 89% of the top 100 listed companies were under some kind of 
audit in 2003-2004 (AFR, 5 Aug 2005).  The audit program yielded $1.6 
billion in revenue from large corporations. 
 
For large listed companies, the risk of an unfavourable tax audit carries with 
it the potential payment of additional tax, fines and unfavourable publicity.  
All these can lead to additional cash outflows, downward profit forecasts 
and lower share prices.  It follows that the risk of tax audit and its 
consequences give incentives to targeted companies to temper an aggressive 
tax strategy. 
 
Companies subject to high levels of government or public scrutiny are also 
more likely to suffer higher political costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Companies under high risk of tax office audit have cost pressures that will 
influence the tax strategy adopted.  In an effort to avoid additional payments 
to the tax office in extra tax and fines, potential loss of reputation, fall in 
share price and future inflow of resources, companies will want to signal a 
more conservative tax strategy than companies not subject to the Large 
Business and Tax Compliance program. 
 
The response of large companies to the increased tax scrutiny by the ATO 
and the media is likely to be a rise in tax risk management and perhaps to 
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pursue a more risk averse strategy.  Factors taken into account by the ATO 
in their audit risk process include variation in income tax from industry 
patterns or past years, a history of aggressive tax planning by the group and 
low ETRs (Granger, 2003). 
 
There is prior evidence from the literature that companies use accounting 
accruals to increase ETRs to avoid scrutiny (Wong, 1988; Northcut & 
Vines, 1998).  The effect of scrutiny on ETRs has not been tested using 
Australian companies.  The wide powers of the Commissioner of Taxation 
under the Income Tax Assessment Act and the activity of the Large 
Business and Tax Compliance division in the ATO are likely to affect 
managers’ incentives to pursue aggressive tax strategies.  This leads to 
hypothesis H2. 
H2: Companies under close scrutiny by the ATO have a more 
conservative tax strategy than companies that are not under close 
scrutiny by the ATO. 
   
4.4  The relation between remuneration based on share options and tax 
strategy 
Under the classical system of company tax, tax is a cost and managers have 
incentives to minimise tax on company profit if their remuneration is based 
on after-tax profit.  A more aggressive tax strategy will ensue.  Rewards 
based on performance in achieving after-tax, rather than before-tax profit, is 
an attempt to align the interests of shareholders and managers as saving tax 
results in a greater share of profits accruing to investors. 
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The imposition of income tax on company profit diminishes the return to 
shareholders so it follows that if remuneration is based on after-tax profit, 
managers have incentives to adopt a tax strategy that minimises income tax 
(Phillips, 2003).  In a classical institutional setting where company profit is 
taxed in both company and shareholder hands it is logical to minimise tax 
and to reward managers for doing so.  There is evidence that equity based 
compensation (an after-tax profit metric) is positively associated with tax 
aggressiveness (Rego & Wilson, 2010). 
 
In a dividend imputation system, the incentive to minimise company tax is 
mitigated because company tax is not a real cost and shareholders expect 
fully franked dividends.  For Australian resident shareholders, company tax 
is a pre-payment of tax on their dividend income.  They prefer companies to 
distribute profits with imputation credit rather than retain them.  If profits 
are retained and they sell their shares and realise taxable capital gains, they 
are taxed on these gains, without imputation credit as tax offset. 
 
Managers of companies distributing franked dividends maximise before-tax 
profit, rather than after-tax profit as in the classical system of company 
taxation.  Since payment of company tax is valued by shareholders, 
investors are more likely to pay a higher price for shares in companies that 
pay franked dividends out of taxed earnings.  To align the interest of 
managers with that of the shareholders, companies reward managers by 
equity based remuneration such as share options. For the purpose of 
attracting investors to increase the value of their share options, managers 
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adopt conservative tax strategies to ensure companies pay tax to frank 
dividends.  This leads to hypothesis H3. 
H3: In a dividend imputation system, companies that reward managers 
with share options adopt conservative tax strategies. 
 
4.5 The relation between company tax rate falls and tax strategy 
When tax is considered a cost, the ultimate tax strategy is to minimise 
taxable income and minimise tax liability.  Since the underlying economic 
transactions are often the same for tax and accounting, reducing taxable 
income often also reduces accounting earnings and results in financial 
reporting costs.  Empirical evidence suggests that companies give earnings 
management a priority as maximising accounting income has a favourable 
capital market outcome (Kasznik & McNichols, 2002; Erickson, Hanlon & 
Maydew, 2004).   
 
When tax rates fall, empirical evidence using US data shows that companies 
have incentives to minimise tax liabilities prior to the tax cut.  This is called 
tax-induced earnings management since both accounting earnings and 
taxable income are minimised (Guenther, 1994).  This result suggests that 
when tax rates fall, minimising tax takes precedence over the financial 
reporting costs since the one off saving in tax cash flow is perceived as a 
benefit to shareholders. Timing of transactions is the single most responsive 
strategy to change the incidence of tax liability.  If it is known that income 
will be taxed at a lower rate in the following year, companies will defer 
income to the lower taxed year and accelerate expenses and losses to the 
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higher taxed present year.  This earnings management of current accruals 
will reduce both accounting earnings and tax expense. 
 
The announcement of a fall in the company tax rate from 36% to 34% for 
the 2000-2001 income year, and 30% for the 2001-2002 income year 
provides an opportunity to test tax-induced earnings management using 
Australian data.  Under a dividend imputation system, tax is not a real cost 
but a prepayment of shareholders’ tax.  Hence companies are unlikely to 
undertake costly arrangements to shift income and deductions across time.  
Further, future shareholders’ imputation credits will fall in line with the tax 
rate falls.  Companies may therefore have incentives to maximise 
imputation credits to shareholders before the tax rate fall.   This leads to 
hypothesis H4. 
H4: In a dividend imputation system, tax strategy is not significantly 
more aggressive in the years preceding falls in the statutory tax rate. 
 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter develops four testable hypotheses for companies operating in 
the Australian institutional environment in the years 1999-2003.  They 
predict:  
1. that companies paying fully franked dividends adopt more 
conservative tax strategies than companies paying unfranked 
dividends or no dividends; 
2. that companies under close scrutiny by the tax office adopt more 
conservative tax strategies than companies that are not; 
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3. that companies rewarding managers with share options adopt 
conservative tax strategies, and  
4. that companies do not use aggressive tax strategies to take advantage 
of opportunistic windfall tax savings arising from falls in the 
company tax rate in years before the tax rate falls. 
Chapter 5 describes the research design and the data collected to test the 
four hypotheses developed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 – RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This thesis undertakes an empirical analysis of the managerial incentives 
affecting corporate tax strategy of Australian listed companies over the 
period 1999 to 2003.  The research method used to test the hypothesised 
relationships developed in Chapter 4 is described in this chapter.  The 
selected sample of companies used for testing is outlined.  The dependent 
and independent variables in the multiple regression models used to test the 
hypotheses are described in detail.  A brief summary concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2 Research method 
This thesis predicts relationships between tax strategy and incentives arising 
from dividend payout policy, tax office scrutiny, remuneration based on 
share options and company tax rate falls.  The primary analysis uses an 
ordinary least squares regression method to test the hypotheses outlined in 
Chapter 4.  The dependent variable, tax strategy, is not directly observable 
and is estimated using three alternate ETR measures based on total tax 
expense, current tax expense and tax paid in a year, expressed as a 
proportion of accounting profit before tax.  The independent variables to test 
hypotheses one to four are the payout ratio and franking percentage of 
dividends, risk of tax office scrutiny, share option remuneration paid to 
executives, and years, respectively. 
 
In addition, previous research has shown that ETRs can vary with size, 
foreign operations, research and development expense, capital intensity, 
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profitability and industry.  The analysis in this thesis includes the above 
variables to control for these known determinants of ETRs which are used 
as proxies for tax strategy. 
 
5.3 Sample selection 
Since corporate tax returns are confidential between the tax office and 
corporate taxpayers, the effects of dividend payout policy, tax office 
scrutiny, management remuneration based on share options, and tax rate 
falls on corporate tax strategy is tested using publicly available corporate 
financial reports.  The sample comes from databases of large Australian 
listed companies with publicly available, annual, full financial statements.  
In particular, data was collected from annual reports of Australian 
companies listed on the ASX for the period 1999-2003 from the Aspect and 
Connect4 databases.  In total, 984 companies were identified from Aspect 
matching the condition of a market capitalisation of greater than $30 
million.  This cut-off represented 70% of listed companies and 99% of the 
total value of listed companies on the ASX.  This initial list was compared 
with the BRW top 500 companies in 2003 to ensure inclusion in the sample 
of all major companies.  The BRW top 500 covered the largest Australasian 
listed companies, by market capitalisation based on close of trade on April 
11, 2003.  This comparison resulted in only three additional companies 
being added, ensuring all BRW top 500 Australian companies were included 
in the sample. 
 
Foreign companies were removed because only a small portion of their 
profits are subject to Australian tax.  Residency is defined in section 6(1), 
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ITAA 1936 to include companies incorporated, or having their central 
management and control, in Australia.  Resident companies pay Australian 
tax on income from worldwide sources and are entitled to foreign tax 
credits.  Foreign companies only pay Australian tax on income sourced in 
Australia. 
 
Listed trusts were also removed.  Trusts are not taxpayers; trust income is 
taxed in the hands of beneficiaries or unit holders of the trust, under sections 
95-102, ITAA 1936. 
 
Companies reporting accounting losses in all years of the research period 
were also removed as tax is only paid on taxable income derived in any 
year.  Losses can be carried forward and used to offset future taxable 
income, but cannot be carried backward and do not give rise to any refund 
of prior years’ tax as in the US. 
 
Data was missing for some companies because they were newly listed but 
had not operated for a full year and annual reports were absent.   
 
This procedure resulted in 491 companies with data available for analysis.  
A summary of the procedure is shown in Table 5.1.   
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Table 5.1: Summary of sample selection criteria 
 Number of 
companies 
Companies identified from 
Aspect and BRW 
987 
Exclusions: 
Foreign companies 
  
( 80) 
Trusts ( 88) 
Losses in all years (288) 
No data available ( 40) 
Number of companies remaining 
in the final sample 
 
491 
      
Company names and ASX codes of companies analysed in this thesis are 
included in Appendix C (pp. 201-210). 
 
Data was not available for all these companies in all years as some were 
delisted or became new listings during the period.  Others were subject to 
mergers and acquisitions.  Deletions were made for years of no data and in 
years with accounting losses.  (Loss companies were previously deleted 
from the sample if there were losses in every year.)  Years of no tax expense 
were also deleted as this research is limited to companies with a tax liability 
in any of the five years of interest.  The final sample after these adjustments 
includes 1669 company-year observations for the 491 companies.   
 
The analysis includes three proxy measures of tax strategy.  All tax strategy 
measures are based on variants of ETRs described in Chapter 3. The sub-
sample using an ETR calculated (a) with total tax expense, consisted of 
1669 observations, (b) with current tax expense, 1483 observations (as 
current tax expense is unable to be calculated for some years), and (c) with 
tax paid, 1457 observations (as tax paid in a year was not available for all 
years).  These sub-samples were examined for extreme values and the tax 
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strategy variables trimmed at the high end.  Very large ETRs can result 
mathematically because accounting profit can be relatively small in 
comparison to tax, due for example, to non-deductible expenses and losses.  
All three tax strategy measures with a value greater than or equal to two 
were eliminated from the sub-samples.  The three sub-samples used in the 
analysis are presented in Table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2: Summary of sub-samples for each measure of tax strategy 
 Total tax 
expense ETR 
(ETR1) 
Current tax 
expense ETR 
(ETR2) 
Tax paid 
ETR 
(ETR3) 
Total observations in 
sub-sample 
 
1669 
 
 
1483 
 
1457 
ETR ≥ 2 discarded    53 
 
   91  108 
Number of 
observations in sub-
sample analysed 
 
 
1616 
 
 
 
1392 
 
 
1349 
 
The years covered in the analysis are 1999 to 2003, a period of tax rate 
changes.  Only 150 companies (31% of the total) have observations in each 
of these years.  However, company-year observations are relatively evenly 
distributed over the five year period.  Table 5.3 shows the distribution of 
company-year observations in each year of the study. 
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Table 5.3: Frequency of observations by year 
 
 Total tax 
expense ETR 
(ETR1) 
Current tax 
expense ETR 
(ETR2) 
Tax paid 
ETR 
(ETR3) 
1999 307 
 
255 256 
2000 340 
 
290 284 
2001 329 
 
284 270 
2002 315 
 
278 258 
2003 325 
 
285 281 
Total number of 
company-year 
observations 
 
1616 
 
 
1392 
 
1349 
 
The restrictions described above limit the sample to those companies that 
derive taxable income in a full financial year and publish annual reports.  
The resulting sample represents listed large and profitable companies.  The 
results of the empirical analysis must therefore be interpreted with this 
sample selection bias in mind. 
 
5.4 Measurement of variables 
5.4.1 Dependent variables 
Tax strategy is not directly observable and is represented in this thesis by 
three variants of ETR expressed as a proportion of the STR.  Since the STR 
changed over the sample period, and pooled observations are used, this 
relative measure allows tax strategy to be compared over the years of the 
sample period. Thus, the proxies for tax strategy are: 
Ratio 1 = ETR1/STR      (1)  
where ETR1 = total tax expense/accounting profit before tax 
Ratio 2 = ETR2/STR      (2)  
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where ETR2 = current tax expense/accounting profit before tax  
Ratio 3 = ETR3/STR       (3) 
where ETR3 = tax paid in any year/accounting profit before tax 
and where STR = statutory tax rate in any year. 
 
The first measure, Ratio 1, uses total tax expense ETR to highlight the effect 
of permanent differences between accounting profit and taxable income as a 
tax strategy.  If there are no permanent differences, Ratio 1 equals unity. 
When Ratio 1 is lower (higher) than unity, accounting earnings are greater 
(smaller) than taxable income due to net positive (negative) permanent 
differences. A positive permanent difference is more valuable than a 
positive timing difference as tax is permanently avoided.  A prior research 
study illustrates that permanent differences generate most of the aggressive 
tax strategies in the sample used (Wilson, 2009).  The measure is also used 
in other ETR studies (Frank, Lynch & Rego, 2009; Tran & Yu, 2008; Yin, 
2003; Tran & Porcano, 1997).  However, it does not take into account 
deferring tax to the future.  Therefore prior research also uses a measure 
reflecting both permanent and timing differences between accounting profit 
and taxable income. 
 
Inclusion of deferral of tax expense to a future date leads to a second 
measure of tax strategy.  Ratio 2 uses current tax expense ETR to measure 
the effect of timing differences, as well as permanent differences, between 
reported profit and taxable income.  This measure is generally thought to be 
a more comprehensive measure of tax strategy as it includes both permanent 
and timing differences in tax strategy (Tran & Yu, 2008; Rego, 2003; Harris 
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& Feeny, 2003; Mills, Erickson & Maydew, 1998).  A problem with this 
measure is that timing differences reverse over time and the measure may 
reflect earnings management rather than taxable income management.  An 
ETR measure based on tax actually paid, rather than accrued tax expense, is 
therefore likely to provide additional insight. 
 
This third measure has recently appeared in the literature.  Dyreng, Hanlon 
& Maydew (2008) measure tax strategy using long term cash ETR, being 
sum of tax paid over a ten-year period divided by accounting profit before 
tax over the same period.  It is argued that cash taxes paid annually is an 
imperfect measure of tax strategy because it includes tax paid for the 
previous year.  This is because tax payments are lagged.  Over long periods 
(5 to 10 years) however, tax paid will be better matched with the income it 
relates to with the distortion of time lags greatly reduced.  It is therefore 
argued that this measure can be used to measure strategy in the long run.  
Because tax payments are lagged, tax paid in any year is not equal to the 
current tax liability due for that year.  However, annual cash ETR using tax 
paid in a year can still proxy for tax strategy because companies can vary 
the amount of quarterly instalment payments based on their earnings 
estimation to generate the imputation credit they need to frank their 
dividends.  Ratio 3, using cash ETR, thus provides a proxy for tax strategy 
supplementary to Ratio 1 and Ratio 2.  
  
As the STR fell in two stages over the sample period, the ETRs in each year 
were divided by the appropriate STR to enable comparison across years.  
The STR varied between 36% and 30% over the study period.  Where there 
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are small differences between accounting profit and taxable income, ETRs 
will approach the STR.  If ETR is divided by STR in each year to ensure 
comparison, the ratio will approach unity.  It therefore follows that if there 
are no permanent differences ETR1/STR will be 1.  If there are no 
permanent and timing differences ETR2/STR will be 1.  The larger the 
relative size of book-tax income differences the further away will the ratios 
depart from unity.  A conservative tax strategy is identified as one where the 
ratios approach 1.  The more aggressive the corporate tax strategy, the 
greater will be the gap that the ratios fall below 1.  In other words, the 
smaller the ratio, the more aggressive is the tax strategy. 
 
ETR1 is calculated by (tax expense + tax on abnormals)/ (pre-tax 
accounting profit + abnormals) provided from Aspect database.  ETR1 is 
then divided by the appropriate STR in each year to give Ratio 1 as a proxy 
for tax strategy. 
 
Current tax expense is a “may”, rather than a “must” be disclosed in 
AASB1020: Accounting for Income Tax (Tax-Effect Accounting) and is not 
separately disclosed by all companies.  Current tax expense, when not 
disclosed, can be estimated from disclosures of tax information in the 
financial statements.  Current tax expense can be estimated by the difference 
between total tax expense (disclosed in the income statement) and deferred 
tax expense (brought to account as deferred tax assets and liabilities in the 
balance sheet).  It can also be estimated as the amount brought to account in 
the current year in the current tax liability account (disclosed in the balance 
sheet).  This account also changes during the year as tax paid/refunded is 
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brought to account.  Tax paid/refunded is disclosed in the statement of cash 
flows.  Calculations for current tax expense (CTE) are represented in 
equation form below: 
CTE = Tax expense (in income statement) – Deferred tax expense 
(increase in net deferred tax liability in balance sheet) (4) 
Where "increase in net deferred tax liability" = (non-current and current 
"provision for deferred income tax" - non-current and current "future 
income tax benefit") at current year end – the corresponding amount at prior 
year end;  
CTE = Tax paid (in statement of cash flows) + Increase in net 
current tax liability (in balance sheet)   (5) 
Where "increase in net current tax liability" = (current tax liability - current 
tax asset) at current year end - (current tax liability - current tax asset) at 
prior year end. 
 
Conceptually, equations (4) and (5) should hold, but in practice they may 
not because of subsequent adjustments to prior year current and deferred tax 
liabilities and assets at tax return time (some months after release of prior 
year financial reports).   
 
For the sample period current tax expense was disclosed for only 43% of 
data.  Current tax expense was calculated using both the equations above 
and matched with disclosed current tax expense for a random sample of 79 
companies.  The correlation coefficient for equation (4) was 23% compared 
with 88% for equation (5).  Equation (5) was therefore used to calculate 
current tax expense where unreported.  Results of these calculations were 
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matched with actual current tax expense where disclosed (627 
observations).  The results of statistical analyses are that the estimate is very 
closely correlated with a correlation coefficient greater than 96% and the 
differences are not statistically significant using the paired-sample t-test.  
This gives confidence that equation (5) is a reliable estimate of current tax 
expense. 
 
In summary, ETR2 was calculated using current tax expense disclosed in 
the tax note of annual reports or equation (5) above.  ETR2 was then divided 
by the statutory rate in each year to give the second ratio measure of tax 
strategy.  
 
ETR3 was calculated using tax paid divided by (pre-tax accounting profit + 
abnormals) provided from Aspect data.  From 1 July 2000 the PAYG 
instalment system replaced the company tax instalment system (Taxation 
Administration Act 1953 Sch1 Pt 2-10 Div 45).  Under both instalment 
systems, large companies pay tax instalments quarterly for any year in 
October, January, April and July.  Each quarterly payment represents an 
estimated or notional amount of the tax liability for that year.  In annual 
reports, disclosed tax paid includes three quarterly instalments of current 
year tax, one quarterly instalment relating to the previous year, and the final 
balance for the previous year.  This means the tax paid element of ETR3 is 
an inexact measure of tax paid for the current accounting period.  However, 
where income is relatively stable from year to year the inexactness 
diminishes.  ETR3 was then divided by the STR in each year to give the 
third ratio measure of tax strategy. 
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Data was deleted in years when the ETR was zero or negative.  If the ETR 
was zero, companies had used past losses to eliminate any tax liability 
arising from reported earnings in the current year.  If ETR was negative, 
accounting earnings were positive (negative) and were close to zero but tax 
expense was negative (positive) due to permanent and/or timing differences.  
Negative ETRs are meaningless. Tax is assessed on an annual basis and this 
analysis is limited to companies having reported earnings and a tax liability 
in any year. 
 
The three tax strategy variables described above reflect the complexity of 
measurement when tax return information is confidential and financial 
statement tax disclosures are used to impute it.  Each of these three 
dependent variables uses a different aspect of tax liability (total tax expense, 
current tax expense, or tax paid) and all inform about the tax strategy of 
companies. 
 
5.4.2 Independent variables 
5.4.2.1 Dividend payout and franking percentage 
Hypothesis H1 predicts companies distributing franked dividends will have 
tax strategies significantly different from companies distributing unfranked 
dividends or not distributing dividends.  Companies distributing fully 
franked dividends are expected to have a more conservative tax strategy 
indicated by a positive relation with the dependent variable.  These 
companies have paid tax and will pass this on as tax credits to shareholders.  
There are two relevant factors in testing this hypothesis: the extent of 
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distribution of profit and the extent to which the dividends are franked.  
Dividend payout ratio and level of franking are included as variables.  
However, it is the combined effect (interaction) of these two variables that is 
predicted to have an unambiguous effect on tax strategy. An interaction 
variable of franking percentage multiplied by the payout ratio is therefore 
used to test the hypothesis.  It is only companies distributing relatively high 
proportion of earnings in the form of fully franked dividends that are 
expected to have more conservative tax strategies.     
 
Table 5.4 outlines the 2 x 2 possible combinations of payout ratio and 
franking percentage and the expected impact on tax strategy. 
 
Table 5.4: Payout ratio and franking combinations 
 High payout ratio Low payout ratio 
High franking Conservative tax 
strategy 
Aggressive tax strategy 
Low franking Aggressive tax strategy Aggressive tax strategy 
 
Companies that distribute relatively high proportion of earnings as 
dividends that are fully franked must have paid tax on earnings to generate 
imputation credits to do so. Managers in these companies must have 
maximised profit before-tax and have pursued conservative tax strategies.  
Companies that have low payout ratios and/or low percentage of franking 
their dividends have not paid sufficient tax on profits to pass on to 
shareholders.  Managers are likely to have pursued relatively more 
aggressive tax strategies.  Table 5.4 also shows that payout ratio and 
franking percentage must be considered together (hence the interaction 
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term) to make meaningful prediction about tax strategy. Payout ratio and 
franking percentage considered separately can have a positive or negative 
relation with tax strategy.  
 
 Payout ratio and franking percentage are available in the dividend note in 
annual reports.  If there is no dividend, the combined effect will be 0, the 
same as if the dividend is unfranked.  Data for the interaction variable 
payout ratio multiplied by dividend percentage was collected directly from 
Aspect.  Payout ratios of greater than 100% were recorded as 100% 
following Wilkinson, Cahan & Jones (2001). 
 
5.4.2.2 Tax office scrutiny 
Annual report data, based on consolidated data for a corporate group, are 
used for this research.  Large business has been described by the Tax 
Commissioner as “broadly corporate groups with a turnover exceeding $100 
million” (Carmody, 2005, p.1).  Large businesses are subject to close 
scrutiny by the tax office. An indicator variable is used to test hypothesis 
H2.  If gross revenue is greater than $100 million this variable has a value of 
1, otherwise variable takes a value of zero.  Gross revenue was directly 
downloaded from Aspect. 
 
5.4.2.3 Executive remuneration 
Hypothesis H3 tests the validity of findings in prior US research of a 
connection between executive remuneration in the form of share options and 
aggressive tax avoidance.  It is predicted that in a dividend imputation 
environment prior research findings based on data from a classical system 
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do not hold.  If an option to buy shares in the future at a specified price 
forms part of executive remuneration, managers have incentives to 
maximise future share price.  Share price should equal the present value of 
the stream of future dividends plus the expected selling price when shares 
are sold.  Because dividends and future capital gains depend on earnings, 
the price-earnings ratio is used to value shares.  Under a classical system, 
tax is a cost and earnings after tax is used for share valuation.  Managers 
therefore have incentives to pursue aggressive tax strategies to maximise 
earnings after tax.  Under a dividend imputation system, franked dividends 
and imputation credit are valued by shareholders, so there is no reason why 
investors do not use profit before tax in share valuation.  Hypothesis H3 
predicts that in a dividend imputation system, when managers are 
remunerated with share options, they maximise profit before tax, pay 
corporate tax as required by laws to frank dividends, and are therefore 
unlikely to pursue an aggressive tax strategy as under a classical system.  
Shareholders are willing to pay a higher price for shares in a company that 
pays franked dividends out of taxed earnings, so managers have incentives 
to adopt conservative tax strategies if remunerated with share options.   
 
Disclosures in annual reports (including directors’ report, notes to financial 
statements and corporate governance report) do not always disclose the 
proportion of share options in management remuneration.  Given this lack 
of information, an indicator variable was used for executive remuneration, 
based on information disclosed in each annual report.  This variable takes a 
value of 1 if share options form part of the remuneration package of 
executives.  Otherwise, the indicator variable takes the value of 0.  This 
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indicator variable was used to test Hypothesis H3.  Data on executive 
remuneration was hand collected by examining annual reports in Connect4 
and Aspect company databases. 
 
5.4.2.4 Years preceding tax rate falls 
An indicator variable for each sample year (excluding the first year 
1998/1999) is used to test hypothesis H4.  Data for all variables was 
collected for the five years 1998/1999 to 2002/2003.  Hypothesis 4 predicts 
that in a dividend imputation system, managers did not adopt an aggressive 
tax strategy in the years preceding a fall in the STR.  Although the tax rate 
fell in the years 2001 and 2002 the prediction is that managers are unlikely 
to engage in management of current accruals to save tax in 2000 and 2001 
as observed under a classical system. 
 
     STR  YEAR 
1999/2000  36%  before tax rate fall 
2000/2001  34%  tax rate fall and  
before further tax rate fall 
2001/2002  30%  tax rate fall 
 
Indicator variables for years 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 are used.  The 1999 
year is the base year to be compared with the other years.  If managers 
engage in aggressive tax strategies to reap windfall tax savings from the tax 
rate falls, a negative relation between tax strategy and the indicator variables 
for 2000 and 2001 would result compared to the base year.  However, 
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Hypothesis H4 predicts a non-negative relation between tax strategy and the 
year indicator variables for 2000 and 2001. 
 
A complication in data collection is that tax is assessed on a 1 July to 30 
June financial year basis and companies may have annual report dates that 
do not match.  With the Tax Commissioner’s permission, a substituted 
accounting period may be adopted (section 18, ITAA1936).  If the 
accounting period ends on or before 30 November, it substitutes for the year 
ending on the previous 30 June.  If the accounting period ends after 30 
November, tax is paid at the STR for the year ending on the following 30 
June.  The databases used for data collection classify annual reports on a 
calendar basis.  This means an annual report classified for 2003 may have a 
2004 tax year if its substituted accounting period ends on 31 December.  
There are a significant number of companies (12% of total sample 
companies) where this occurs and it was important in this study to ensure 
data was collected and classified into the appropriate year.  This 
necessitated data being collected for the 1997-98 year for those companies 
with a substituted accounting period ending on 31 December.  Companies 
with substituted accounting periods are listed in Appendix D (pp. 211-212). 
 
5.4.3 Control variables 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a number of factors have been found from prior 
research to explain variation in ETRs.  These variables therefore need to be 
included in any test of the hypotheses outlined in this thesis to explain 
variation in ETRs not explained by the hypotheses. 
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5.4.3.1 Size and foreign operations 
There is a competing argument that mitigates the effect of ATO scrutiny 
imposed on large companies implicit in hypothesis H2.  Large companies 
have greater opportunities to be tax strategic.  Prior research finds 
companies that are larger and more profitable have more resources available 
for tax consulting services (Mills, Erickson & Maydew, 1998).  These 
companies can invest more heavily in tax consulting services and have 
lower ETRs.   
 
Similarly, companies operating globally have greater opportunities to 
arrange transactions between related parties in different countries resulting 
in favourable tax outcomes.  There is evidence from prior research that 
companies with extensive foreign operations, have lower ETRs (Rego, 
2003). 
 
Given the above, it is important to control for both foreign operations and 
size of companies.  Results from previous studies, presented in Table 5.5 
below, indicate a positive, negative or no significant relation between size 
and ETRs, although Australian research suggests a negative relation 
between large companies and ETRs.  This is explained by the fact that 
larger companies have greater access to resources to invest in tax-favoured 
investment (Tran & Porcano, 1997; Tran & Yu, 2008). 
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Table 5.5: Summary of previous research documenting a relation 
between ETR and company size 
 
Study Country Proxies for 
Size  
Result 
Stickney and 
McGee (1982) 
 
US Sales, total 
assets 
No relation with ETR 
Zimmerman 
(1983) 
US Sales 50 companies with 
highest sales had higher 
ETR than others 
Gupta and 
Newberry (1997) 
US Log total 
assets 
Mixed results, both 
positive and negative 
relations with ETR in 
different time periods 
Holland (1998) UK Sales, Assets Mixed results, size 
effects confounded with 
industry and political 
costs 
Wilkinson, 
Cahan and Jones 
(2001) 
New 
Zealand 
(only 37 
companies) 
Log total 
assets 
No significant results 
with ETR 
Harris and Feeny 
(2003) 
 
Australia Log total 
assets 
Negative relation with 
ETR 
Tran and Porcano 
(1997); Tran and 
Yu (2008) 
 
Australia Total assets, 
profit 
Negative relation with 
ETR 
 
Size is variously measured by total assets, gross income or sales and market 
capitalisation.  Australian studies have used total assets.  In this study total 
assets are used as a size variable as total revenue is used in other another 
variable (indicator variable for tax office scrutiny).  Data was directly 
downloaded from Aspect for total assets.  Total assets were transformed by 
natural log to reduce the potential impact of extreme values on the analysis.  
 
Some researchers argue that the extent of foreign operations is potentially 
correlated with size and exclude it from analysis (Gupta & Newberry, 
1997).  This is surprising given the complexity of international taxation.  
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Global tax rates vary such that some will be greater or less than domestic 
rates and will depend on whether there is a double tax agreement between 
countries.  Additionally, the transfer pricing arrangements in place are often 
flexible or uncertain.  Controlling for foreign operations is an attempt to 
isolate the effect on ETR from size in general.  Results from previous 
research have been mixed.  Stickney and McGee (1982) find no significant 
association.  Harris and Feeny (2003) use the ratio of net foreign income 
and total income to measure extent of foreign operations.  There is a 
significant negative association in two of the four years of their study, 
suggesting companies may use foreign operations to lower their domestic 
ETRs. 
 
Tax havens are estimated to hold 26% of the world’s financial assets.  US 
companies are estimated to keep 30% of their profits there.  The ATO 
estimates that $5 billion flowed from Australia to 41 designated tax havens 
in 2001/2002 (Carmody, 2005).  Companies may not necessarily operate 
globally to reduce tax but foreign operations give opportunities to do so.  
Given the investment of the tax office in controlling transfer pricing 
arrangements, controlling for foreign operations is likely to prove insightful. 
 
Companies deriving foreign income are likely to pay foreign tax.  This 
means insufficient Australian tax credit can be imputed with dividends.  
Including a variable for foreign operations may therefore also affect 
predictions in hypothesis H1.  Companies with relatively large foreign 
income are less likely to distribute fully franked dividends and are therefore 
more likely to pursue an aggressive tax strategy. 
 - 111 -
 
 
The extent of foreign operations is measured by foreign sales, foreign assets 
or foreign profit.  These three types of disclosures are those outlined in 
AASB1005: Segment Reporting and are found in the segment note in the 
annual report.  The current applicable accounting standard for segment 
reporting is AASB114 Segment Reporting but AASB1005 was the 
accounting standard for the years of data collection.  Segment data discloses 
information about geographical and business segments with more 
information disclosed for the primary segment.  For those companies where 
the geographical segment is the secondary, rather than the primary segment, 
data collection is limited.   
 
In prior studies foreign operations has been indicated by the ratio of foreign 
income to total income (Stickney & McGee, 1982 and Harris & Feeny, 
2003).  An indicator variable for foreign assets or foreign income is used by 
Rego (2003).  Although it is profit that is taxed, rather than income, foreign 
income indicates extent of operations so a ratio of foreign income compared 
to total gross income was constructed from the segment note in annual 
reports in both Aspect and Connect4 databases.   
 
5.4.3.2 Research and development 
Companies engaged in research and development (R&D) are given 
favourable treatment in tax law and given accounting policy choices under 
accounting standards.  Expenditure on R&D can be both a permanent 
difference and/or a timing difference in the reconciliation of accounting 
 - 112 -
 
profit and taxable income.  R&D is controlled for in testing hypotheses in 
this thesis as not all companies were engaged in R&D. 
 
Preferential tax treatment is granted to companies under section 73B 
“Certain expenditure on research and development activities” of ITAA1936.  
Specifically subsection 73B(13)  states that … “the amount of that 
expenditure multiplied by 1.25 is an allowable deduction to the company for 
the year of income”.  Companies using this provision will have a permanent 
difference of 25% of eligible R&D tax deductions in their tax reconciliation, 
reducing their tax expense.  
 
Expenditure on R&D may also lead to a timing difference for tax purposes.  
Since 1983, Australia has had an accounting standard on R&D that 
differentiates expenditure on research and expenditure on development.  
While research is expensed, development may be capitalised as an 
intangible asset, and amortised “to the extent that such costs……are 
expected beyond any reasonable doubt to be recoverable” (AASB 1011 
para.31).  With the adoption of International Accounting Standards from 1 
January 2005, the Australian accounting standard on R&D has been 
subsumed into AASB 138 ‘Intangible Assets’.  However, AASB 1011: 
Accounting for Research and Development Costs was the applicable 
standard during the period of this study.  The capitalisation method, allowed 
when R&D expenditure is judged to be beyond reasonable doubt of being 
recouped, results in a timing difference.   
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When development expenditure is expensed for tax purposes and capitalised 
for accounting purposes, a timing difference arises because tax expense is 
deferred.  This deferral will be reversed over the expected life of the 
intangible asset (development costs).  The effect of any permanent or timing 
differences arising from R&D expenditure on the ETRs of companies is 
therefore controlled for. 
 
The only prior study using R&D as a separate explanatory variable 
predicted and confirmed that R&D has a significant negative association 
with ETR (Harris & Feeny, 2003).  This is expected since R&D is a directly 
deductible permanent difference.  Harris and Feeny (2003) used the ratio of 
R&D expense to total income as an indicator variable of R&D investment.  
They had access to this data because they used tax returns as their data 
source.  In this study annual reports are the source of data.  As 25% of R&D 
is a permanent difference, where this is disclosed as a material item in the 
tax note in annual reports, it is possible to gross this up to 100% and use the 
ratio of R&D expenditure to total revenue/income as a proxy variable for 
this type of investment.  Data were hand collected from the income tax note 
in annual reports from the Aspect and Connect4 data bases.  Where 
disclosed as a permanent difference, the tax-effected amount was used to 
calculate the R&D expense using the formula below. 
 
R&D expense = Tax effect of R&D permanent difference ÷ 25% (to gross 
up to 100%) ÷ STR (to convert from tax amount to expense amount)    (6) 
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A ratio of R&D expense divided by total revenue was included as a variable 
to proxy for investment in research and development. 
 
5.4.3.3 Capital intensity  
Several prior research studies control for the effects of capital intensity, or 
company investment in non-current depreciable assets.  The reducing 
balance method, results in greater tax deductions in earlier years of asset use 
compared to the straight-line depreciation method (both are available in tax 
law).  To maximize the present value of tax depreciation deductions, most 
taxpayers adopt the reducing balance method for tax purposes, while 
adopting the straight-line method for accounting depreciation. This results 
in a timing difference between accounting earnings and taxable income. 
 
During the economic recession in the early 1990s, accelerated tax 
depreciation rates were introduced in Australia in 1992 to encourage 
investment in capital assets and their timely replacement when new 
technology and growth opportunities presented themselves.  For example, 
plant with an effective life less than three years could be expensed 
immediately for tax purposes; plant with an effective life between three and 
fewer than five years could be depreciated at a straight-line rate of 40 
percent, or a reducing balance rate of 60 percent. Accelerated tax 
depreciation increased the timing differences between accounting earnings 
and taxable income. However, the generous accelerated tax depreciation did 
not apply to assets acquired after 21 September 1999 following amendments 
to tax legislation. 
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When depreciable assets are written off using an accelerated rate and the 
reducing balance method for tax purposes and a normal straight line rate for 
accounting purposes, timing differences will mean tax liability is deferred to 
future periods, reversing over the effective life of the asset.  The effect of 
this timing difference needs to be controlled for since the degree of capital 
intensity varies across companies. 
 
Gupta and Newberry (1997) and Harris and Feeny (2003) find strong 
support for a negative association between capital intensity and ETR.  
Company investment in capital intensive assets can be indicated by the 
expense or asset aspect.  Both have been used in prior studies.  Harris and 
Feeny (2003), with access to tax return data used the ratio of depreciation 
deductions to total income.  Gupta and Newberry (1997) used data from 
financial statements and proxy capital intensity by the ratio of net property, 
plant and equipment to total assets.  This thesis uses the second alternative.  
Property, plant and equipment (PP&E) net of accumulated depreciation was 
collected from Aspect.  A ratio of PP&E to total assets was then calculated 
for a variable that proxies capital intensity. 
 
5.4.3.4 Industry 
Further tax deductions for capital allowances are available for particular 
activities in particular industries.  The R&D deduction is one example.  
Others are for primary producers and other landholders (subdivision 40-G), 
gold mining (s159GZZG-159GZZZBI), uranium mining (s23D), mining and 
exploration (subdivision 40-H) and capital works (Division 43).  This 
suggests that different industries may have different ETRs because they can 
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take advantage of tax deduction for capital expenditure.  Where accounting 
and tax treatment differ, this difference is exacerbated.     
 
Stickney and McGee (1982) found tentative support for the hypothesis that 
natural resource involvement led to lower ETRs.  The mining and 
exploration industry is a large sector of Australia’s capital market.  Australia 
has a specific accounting standard AASB1022: Accounting for the 
Extraction Industries for the sector.  Although this standard was replaced by 
AASB 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources in December 
2004, both standards allow exploration and evaluation costs to be capitalised 
to future periods, rather than immediately written off.  Although a sizeable 
number of mining companies were originally downloaded, they have largely 
been eliminated from the analysis because they are loss companies or 
because they have used past tax losses to eliminate any tax liability.  In 
addition, exploration is not a large part of consolidated results for large 
diversified companies.  For these reasons, the mining industry is not singled 
out as an industry to control for. 
 
Tran and Porcano (1997) and Tran and Yu (2008) found that investment and 
financial services companies had ETRs significantly lower than companies 
in other industries.  The reasons driving their results were not favoured tax 
deductions but income exemptions.  The two main sources of income of 
investment and financial services companies are dividends and capital gains. 
Capital gains on investments purchased prior to 20 September 1985 (the day 
on which capital gains tax was introduced) were exempt from income tax. 
For investments acquired between 20 September 1985 and 21 September 
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1999 (the day after which indexation of cost base was abolished), capital 
gains were taxed in a concessional way due to indexation of cost base in 
computing capital gains. 
 
 The dividend rebate (s46 ITAA1936) available for company to company 
dividends until September 1999 exempted dividend income of investment 
companies.  After this date, dividend income received by companies follows 
dividend imputation rules formerly applying only to individual taxpayers.  
Receipts of franked dividend income by companies remain tax-free when 
dividends are fully franked.  Companies where franked dividend income 
forms a substantial part of income are classified in the “diversified 
financials” subgroup of the financial classification in the Aspect data base.  
This subgroup is likely to receive exempt income.  This was the only 
industry controlled for by using an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if 
the company is a diversified financial or 0 if not.  It is predicted that 
companies classified as diversified financials will have a negative 
association with the dependent variables as they derive tax exempt income. 
 
5.4.3.5 Profitability 
Reconciliation items (permanent differences) do explain differences in 
ETRs across companies.  However, Wilkie (1988) predicted that the level of 
income was a confounding factor when “tax preferences”, as he called 
reconciliation items, were not perfectly correlated with income.  Where tax 
preferences are not proportionally related to accounting profit, ETR can 
change simply because accounting profit changes.  This is because tax 
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preferences become relatively smaller as income increases so the numerator 
increases relatively more than the denominator of ETR. 
   
Empirical results show that both income level and tax preferences must be 
taken into account when measuring the variability in ETRs.  When tax 
preferences are held constant and profitability increases, the ETR will also 
increase.  Since this work, studies of ETR have included a measure of 
profitability. 
   
Gupta and Newberry (1997), Wilkinson, Cahan & Jones (2001) and Harris 
and Feeny (2003) all find the predicted positive association between return 
on assets and ETRs.  Following this prior research, profitability is included 
as a control variable in this thesis. 
 
Profitability of companies is controlled for using the return on assets ratio 
(ROA), that is, profit before interest and tax divided by total assets.  This 
ratio indicates the profit generated from assets employed and has been used 
in all the above studies to control for profitability.  The ROA ratio was 
downloaded from the Aspect data base. 
 
5.5 Regression model 
To test the hypotheses, I estimate the following OLS regression equations: 
 
ETR1/STR =  β0 + β1FR + β2PO + β3FR*PO + β4ATO+ β5REM + β6-
9YEAR +β10SIZE + β11FOR+ β12R&D + β13CAP + β14DF + 
β15ROA + ε 
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ETR2/STR =   β0 + β1FR + β2PO + β3FR*PO + β4ATO+ β5REM + β6-
9YEAR+β10SIZE + β11FOR+ β12R&D + β13CAP + β14DF + 
β15ROA + ε 
 
ETR3/STR =   β0 + β1FR + β2PO + β3FR*PO + β4ATO+ β5REM + β6-
9YEAR +β10SIZE + β11FOR+ β12R&D + β13CAP + β14DF + 
β15ROA + ε 
Where: 
ETR1   = Total tax expense / Pre-tax accounting profit    
ETR2   = Current tax expense / Pre-tax accounting profit 
ETR3   = Tax paid / Pre-tax accounting profit   
STR              = Statutory tax rate 
FR  = Franking percentage of dividends 
PO  = Payout ratio (dividends per share/earnings per share) 
FR*PO = Product of franking percentage of dividends and payout 
   ratio 
ATO  = 1 if total revenue > $100 million, or 0 if not 
REM  = 1 if management remunerations include share options, or 0 
   if not 
YEAR  = 1 for each year 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 respectively, or 0 if 
   not 
SIZE  = Logarithm of total assets 
FOR  = Foreign revenue/ Total revenue 
R&D  = Research and development expenditure/Total revenue 
CAP  = Net property, plant and equipment/ Total assets 
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DF  = 1 if diversified financial industry, or 0 if not 
ROA  = Earnings before interest and tax/ Total assets 
 
Each of the three regression models has a different dependent variable, 
being a variant of ETR.  All dependent variables are proxies for tax strategy.  
All three regression models have the same independent variables, 
representing aspects expected to be associated with variations in tax 
strategy.  In particular, the hypotheses predict that under a dividend 
imputation system, companies distributing fully franked dividends that are 
at risk of tax office close scrutiny, and have managers in receipt of share 
option remuneration, are more likely to adopt conservative tax strategy even 
in a period of tax rate falls.  Hence, the signs of the regression coefficients 
for the main explanatory variables are predicted to be positive. As for the 
control variables, a negative relation is predicted between tax strategy and 
companies that are large in size measured in terms of total assets, that have 
foreign operations, that receive R&D tax concessions, that have substantial 
depreciable asset investments and that receive substantial exempt income.  
A positive relation is predicted between tax strategy and company 
profitability.   
 
5.6 Summary 
Chapter 5 describes the empirical research method undertaken to test the 
four hypotheses predicting tax strategy of Australian companies during a 
five-year period that involved two reductions in STR.  This chapter includes 
a description of the sample of large, listed companies collected, the ordinary 
least squares models of tax strategy and its determinants and the 
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measurement of variables selected and used in the regression equations.  
The three dependent variables are ratios of three ETR measures and the 
STR.  The independent variables consist of measures to test the four 
hypothesised predictions of tax strategies, and control variables shown to be 
associated with ETRs in prior research studies.  Chapter 6 provides results 
of the analysis using the models and data described herein. 
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CHAPTER 6 – RESULTS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the results of multiple regression analysis used to 
predict tax strategy of Australian companies using the independent variables 
described in Chapter 5.  The statistical software package SPSS (Version 
16.0) was used to undertake the analysis.  The sample company-year 
observations were collected into three separate sub-samples matching the 
three dependent variables used as proxies for tax strategy (total tax expense 
ETR, current tax expense ETR and tax paid ETR).  Descriptive statistics for 
the three sub-samples are presented and discussed.  Output from the 
statistical package for each sub-sample indicates that assumptions of the 
regression model are largely met and that multicollinearity between the 
independent variables does not limit the reliability of results.   
 
Regression results suggest that all four hypotheses are strongly supported.  
In particular, results indicate that under a dividend imputation system, 
companies distributing franked dividends have conservative tax strategies 
and that close scrutiny by the ATO is effective. The results also suggest that 
unlike a classical system, when managers are remunerated with share 
options in a dividend imputation system, tax strategies are not aggressive.  
In addition, in a period of tax rate reductions, managers of Australian 
companies do not engage in aggressive tax strategies to reap windfall tax 
savings.  Some results of prior research are also confirmed in the analysis.  
In particular, large companies, research and development investors and 
companies classified in the diversified financials industry sector are able to 
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use concessional tax provisions resulting in lower ETRs.  The chapter ends 
with a brief summary. 
 
 6.2 Descriptive statistics 
This section of the chapter presents and discusses the descriptive statistics of 
the continuous and dichotomous variables constructed for the three 
dependent and fifteen independent variables used in the regression 
equations.  The continuous variables are the dependent variables and eight 
independent variables.  These include franking percentage, payout ratio, 
interaction of franking percentage and payout ratio, size, foreign operations, 
research and development expenditure, capital intensity and profitability.  
Statistics collected for these continuous variables are the minimum and 
maximum values, the mean and median, the standard deviation, skewness 
and kurtosis. 
 
There are seven dichotomous variables, namely tax office scrutiny, 
remuneration type, diversified financial industry classification, and four 
indicator variables for years.  Frequency tables for these variables show the 
numbers of company observations that take the value of 1 or 0.  The year 
variables show the number of observations in each of the five years included 
in the analysis. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the continuous and dichotomous variables for the 
three sub-samples are presented in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. 
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Table 6.1: 
Descriptive statistics – Ratio 1 (Total tax expense ETR) sub-sample 
(a) Continuous variables 
 
Data Item N M
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n 
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ETR1/STR 1616 0.00 1.99 0.89 0.97 0.34 -0.56 0.91 
FR 1616 0.00 1.00 0.77 1.00 0.40 -1.26 -0.28 
PO 1616 0.00 1.00 0.56 0.60 0.32 -0.41 -0.87 
FR*PO 1616 0.00 1.00 0.51 0.55 0.34 -0.20 -1.18 
SIZE (log) 1616 14.40 26.71 19.35 18.99 1.99 0.81 0.88 
FOR 1616 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.00 0.25 2.05 3.32 
R&D 1616 0.00 0.31 0.01 0.00 0.02 7.21 62.68 
CAP 1616 0.00 0.97 0.28 0.26 0.22 0.60 -0.31 
ROA 1616 0.00 0.67 0.09 0.07 0.07 2.95 14.02 
 
 
(b) Dichotomous variables 
 
Variable Code Frequency Percent 
ATO 1 
0 
955 
661 
59.1 
40.9 
REM 1 
0 
1194 
422 
73.9 
26.1 
DF 1 
0 
168 
1448 
10.4 
89.6 
YEAR 1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
307 
340 
329 
315 
325 
19.0 
21.0 
20.4 
19.5 
20.1 
 
ETR1/STR is defined as total tax expense ETR divided by the STR. 
FR is franking percentage of dividends. PO is payout ratio, i.e., 
dividends per share/earnings per share, SIZE is log of total assets. 
FOR is foreign revenue/total revenue. R&D is research and 
development expenditure/total revenue. CAP is net property, plant 
and equipment/total assets. ROA is earnings before interest and 
tax/total assets. ATO is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if 
total revenue > $100 million, REM is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 if management remuneration includes share options; and 
DF is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if in the company is in 
the diversified financial industry.    
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6.2.1 Ratio 1 sub-sample 
Table 6.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the Ratio 1 sub-sample.  The 
dependent variable was trimmed so that values ranged between zero and 2, 
with a mean of 0.89.  Extreme values are excluded to reduce the impact of 
uncharacteristic calculations of ETRs on the distribution.  Most values are 
close to 1, the value that results if a company’s ETR equals the STR.  The 
median is closer to this value at 0.97.  The distribution is highly peaked as 
shown by the kurtosis statistic and negatively skewed.  This is not 
uncommon when business information is used.  The sample consists of 
large, public, tax paying companies.  It is expected that a majority would 
have ETRs less than the STR and also that this majority would not have 
large ETR variation between them. 
 
Observations representing the level of dividend franking, extent of foreign 
operations and R&D expenditure have unusual distributions.  For these 
variables there are large clusters at the minimum and/or maximum values 
and a spattering of values in between these extremes.  Most companies 
distribute fully franked dividends. Most do not have foreign operations and 
for companies that do, foreign revenue is a relatively small proportion of 
their total revenue.   The majority of companies also do not have 
expenditure for research and development.  For these variables the skewness 
and kurtosis statistics reflect these characteristics.  The variables are all ratio 
measures between 0 and 1 and transformation does not spread their values 
as the range is so small. 
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Values for the payout ratio show similar clustering at their extreme values 
of 0 and 1, with more distributing no dividends than distributing all profits.  
Mean dividend payout ratio is 56% with median higher at 60%.  However, 
the range of values is denser than the franking percentage variable, reflected 
in the kurtosis statistic and is negatively skewed.  The interaction variable 
between franking percentage and payout ratio generates a slightly lower 
mean and median than the payout ratio, reflecting the extreme values of 
franking percentage.   
 
 The size variable is a log transformation of total assets.  Descriptive 
statistics for raw total assets indicate dense clustering at a very high point 
and flat, right skewed histogram.  Total asset values range from a minimum 
of $1.7 million to a maximum of $397,471 million, with a mean of $4,626 
million and a median of $178 million.  A log transformation gives a more 
even distribution of data, although still pointy.  This is expected for this 
sample of large companies. 
 
Capital intensity is a ratio measure.  The variable has a minimum of zero 
reflecting companies with no net investment in property, plant and 
equipment.  The maximum is 0.97 and the mean 0.28.  The distribution is 
positively skewed and flat. 
 
Return on assets (ROA) is also a ratio measure with a minimum of 0 for 
unprofitable companies and a maximum of 0.67.  The mean return on assets 
is 8.8%.  The distribution is positively skewed but peaked, with high 
numbers of profitable companies with relatively small returns on assets. 
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The frequency table for dichotomous variables shows 59% of sample 
observations are under tax office scrutiny and 73.9% remunerate their 
managers with share options.  Only 10.4% of the sample is classified as 
diversified financials.  There is a relatively even spread of observations 
across the five years. 
 
Table 6.2: 
Descriptive statistics – Ratio 2 (Current tax expense ETR) sub-sample 
(a) Continuous variables 
 
Data Item N M
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ETR2/STR 1392 0.00 1.99 0.84 0.89 0.42 -0.04 -0.27 
FR 1392 0.00 1.00 0.81 1.00 0.37 -1.58 0.71 
PO 1392 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.62 0.30 -0.51 -0.60 
FR*PO 1392 0.00 1.00 0.54 0.58 0.32 -0.31 -0.99 
SIZE (log) 1392 15.00 26.71 19.44 19.06 2.02 0.84 0.77 
FOR 1392 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.00 0.24 1.99 3.12 
R&D 1392 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.02 7.70 74.96 
CAP 1392 0.00 0.97 0.28 0.26 0.22 0.61 -0.18 
ROA 1392 0.00 0.67 0.09 0.07 0.07 3.06 15.04 
 
(b) Dichotomous variables 
 
Variable Code Frequency Percent 
ATO 1 
0 
847 
545 
60.8 
39.2 
REM 1 
0 
1029 
363 
73.9 
26.1 
DF 1 
0 
148 
1244 
10.6 
89.4 
YEAR 1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
255 
290 
284 
278 
285 
18.3 
20.8 
20.4 
20.0 
20.5 
         
        ETR2/STR is defined as current tax expense ETR divided by the 
        STR.  All other variables are as defined in Table 6.1. 
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6.2.2 Ratio 2 sub-sample 
Descriptive statistics for the sub-sample with Ratio 2 as the dependent 
variable are presented in Table 6.2.  This dependent variable was also 
trimmed so that values ranged between a minimum of zero and maximum of 
1.99. The mean is 0.84 and the median 0.89.  Both these statistics are further 
away from 1 than mean and median of Ratio 1, indicating a current ETR 
further away from the STR.  Both permanent and timing differences 
between tax and accounting income are taken into account with this 
dependent variable and this explains the differences.  Strategies that defer 
tax to the future reduce present current ETRs.  The distribution is only very 
slightly negatively skewed and is peaked but not as much as Ratio 1.  The 
spread of observations is also more evenly distributed. 
 
The same independent variables were used in this sub-sample and 
descriptive statistics for the independent variables are similar.  They vary 
only because there are a slightly reduced number of observations (1392 
compared with 1616). 
   
6.2.3 Ratio 3 sub-sample 
The third sub-sample uses tax paid ETR as the dependent variable.  The 
descriptive statistics for Ratio 3 presented in Table 6.3 show a mean of 0.78 
and median of 0.78.  As tax paid in a year consists of tax paid (first three 
quarterly instalments) for the current year and tax paid (the fourth quarterly 
instalment and the final balance) for the previous year, there is a larger 
average gap between Ratio 3 and one, compared to Ratio 1 and Ratio 2.  
This indicates that earnings increased over time during the study period. The 
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distribution has a slight positive skew and is relatively unpeaked compared 
to Ratio 1.  All independent variables regressed were the same as the two 
sub-samples discussed above.  The descriptive statistics shown in Table 6.3 
for these independent variables vary only because there are a reduced 
number of observations compared with the other two dependent variables 
(1349 compared with 1392 for Ratio 2 and 1616 for Ratio 1). 
 
Table 6.3: 
Descriptive statistics – Ratio 3 (Tax paid ETR) sub-sample 
(a) Continuous variables 
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ETR3/STR 1349 0.00 1.99 0.78 0.78 0.47 0.31 -0.52 
FR 1349 0.00 1.00 0.82 1.00 0.36 -1.66 1.00 
PO 1349 0.00 1.00 0.59 0.62 0.30 -0.52 -0.54 
FR*PO 1349 0.00 1.00 0.54 0.58 0.32 -0.32 -0.94 
SIZE (log) 1349 15.00 26.71 19.53 19.22 2.02 0.79 0.75 
FOR 1349 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.00 0.25 1.90 2.74 
R&D 1349 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.02 7.90 78.09 
CAP 1349 0.00 0.97 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.61 -0.21 
ROA 1349 0.00 0.67 0.09 0.07 0.07 3.10 15.60 
 
(b) Dichotomous variables 
 
Variable Code Frequency Percent 
ATO 1 
0 
846 
503 
62.7 
37.3 
REM 1 
0 
1004 
345 
74.4 
25.6 
DF 1 
0 
135 
1214 
10 
90 
YEAR 1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
256 
284 
270 
258 
281 
19.0 
21.1 
20.0 
19.1 
20.8 
         
         ETR3/STR is defined as tax paid ETR divided by the STR. 
         All other variables are as defined in Table 6.1. 
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In summary, examining descriptive statistics for the three dependent 
variable sub-samples disclosed in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, gives confidence 
that there are no unexpected measurements of variables for the sample of 
large profitable companies. 
 
6.3 Multicollinearity 
Regression analysis tests whether there is correlation between the dependent 
variable and any or all of the independent variables.  If any of the 
independent variables are highly correlated with each other this may prevent 
some of the correlated independent variables from having statistically 
significant regression coefficients.  Regression analysis may therefore give 
an unreliable result.  Pearson correlation coefficients between variables in 
the model with Ratio 1 as dependent variable is shown in Table 6.4.   
 
The interaction term (franking percentage * payout ratio) has high 
correlation with the franking percentage and the payout ratio with a Pearson 
correlation coefficient of 0.790 and 0.896 respectively.  Critics speculate 
that this may affect the quality of the coefficients in a regression model 
(Friedrich, 1982).  Correlations above 0.80 or 0.90 are thought to be high 
(Field, 2009).  However, regression assumptions suggest that it is only when 
there is perfect collinearity that the model estimation is unable to produce 
results. Franking percentage and payout ratio have significant correlation 
(0.631) suggesting that companies distributing a high proportion of their 
earnings as dividends tend to frank their dividends.  The variables ATO and 
SIZE have a correlation coefficient of 0.613 because the tax office scrutiny 
variable is based on gross revenue which is correlated with total assets as 
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both are measures of size. None of the significant Pearson correlation 
coefficients show high levels of correlation between other independent 
variables.   
 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient is a non-parametric correlation.  Since 
some of the independent variables were categorical, this statistic was also 
generated.  The matrix is similar to the Pearson correlation, with only the 
interaction term and its constituent variables, and the tax office scrutiny 
variable and size variable, showing relatively high correlations. 
   
Correlations between variables in the model for Ratio 2 are shown in Table 
6.5.  Again, there is high correlation between the interaction term FR*PO 
and FR (0.756) and PO (0.901), between FR and PO (0.587), and between 
SIZE and ATO (0.674).  Spearman’s correlations are similar. 
 
Correlations between variables in the model for Ratio 3 are shown in Table 
6.6.  Franking percentage and dividend payout ratio have a Pearson 
correlation coefficient of 0.573, the interaction term FR*PO and FR a 
correlation of 0.746, FR*PO and PO a correlation of 0.900, and SIZE and 
ATO a correlation of 0.601.  Similar values result for Spearman’s 
correlation coefficients. 
 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) is a collinearity diagnostic indicating 
whether an independent variable has a strong linear relationship with the 
other independent variables.  Myers (1990) suggests a VIF greater than 10 is 
worrying while Menard (1995) suggests if the tolerance statistic (the 
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reciprocal 1/VIF) is less than 0.2 (i.e., VIF is greater than 5), this means 
multicollinearity may be biasing the regression results.  The regression 
results for the three models shown in Panel A of Tables 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 
confirm that the VIFs or reciprocal fall far short of these extremes, except 
for the collinearity between the interaction term and its constituent 
variables.  As explained in Chapter 5 , especially Table 5.4, for the purpose 
of testing hypothesis H1, the main variable of interest is the interaction term 
FR*PO which captures the effect of dividend imputation and is predicted to 
have an unambiguous positive relation with tax strategy. Franking 
percentage and payout ratio separately do not have an unambiguous relation 
with tax strategy. Therefore, Panel B of Tables 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 report the 
regression results where franking percentage (FR) and payout ratio (PO) are 
excluded from the three regression models to resolve the problem of 
multicollinearity. 
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Table 6.4: Ratio 1 (Total tax expense ETR) sub-sample  
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 Significance (2-tailed) 
   
ETR1 
 
FR PO 
FR * 
PO 
 
ATO 
 
REM 2000 2001 2002
 
2003 
 
SIZE 
 
FOR 
 
R&D 
 
CAP
 
DF 
 
ROA 
ETR1 1.00                
FR .095 1.00               
  .000                
PO .081 .631 1.00              
  .001 .000               
FR* 
PO 
.119 .790 .896 1.00             
  .000 .000 .000              
ATO .115 .147 .134 .105 1.00            
  .000 .000 .000 .000             
REM .130 .002 -.017 -.024 .285 1.00           
  .000 .948 .500 .329 .000            
2000 -.082 -.034 -.056 -.037 -.031 .006 1.00          
  .001 .166 .023 .140 .218 .804           
2001 .005 -.020 .009 -.014 -.023 -.014 -.261 1.00         
  .829 .432 .704 .574 .351 .566 .000          
2002 .060 .018 .034 .019 .019 .026 -.254 -.249 1.00        
  .017 .461 .173 .442 .456 .300 .000 .000         
2003 .051 .017 .017 .019 .022 -.004 -.259 -.254 -.247 1.00       
  .040 .499 .506 .455 .382 .873 .000 000 .000        
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SIZE -.021 .144 .200 .148 .613 .230 -.030 -.005 .022 .018 1.00      
  .402 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .236 .837 .371 .469       
FOR -.020 -.105 -.117 -.164 .137 .115 -.038 .005 .044 .043 .212 1.00     
  .416 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .122 .849 .079 .083 .000      
R&D -.100 -.042 -.074 -.090 -.038 .042 -.016 .000 .019 .009 -.037 .182 1.00    
  .000 .091 .003 .000 .126 .094 .509 .983 .446 .723 .132 .000     
CAP .087 -.031 -.009 -.053 .150 .102 -.012 -.008 -.012 -.024 .068 .055 .009 1.00   
  .000 .213 .709 .033 .000 .000 .639 .740 .625 .339 .006 .028 .720    
DF -.257 .071 .130 .160 -.282 -.222 .003 .029 .012 -.019 -.136 -.153 -.048 -.321 1.00  
  .000 .004 .000 .000 .000 .000 .896 .241 .643 .442 .000 .000 .055 .000   
ROA -.017 -.057 -.158 -.142 -.195 .061 .035 -.018 -.002 .018 -.398 -.024 .107 -.024 .017 1.00 
  .492 .022 .000 .000 .000 .014 .155 .475 .926 .467 .000 .334 .000 .326 .498  
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Table 6.5: Ratio 2 (Current tax expense ETR) sub-sample  
Pearson Correlation Coefficients  
Significance (2-tailed) 
 
   
ETR2 
 
FR PO 
FR * 
PO 
 
ATO 
 
REM 2000 2001
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
SIZE 
 
FOR 
 
R&D 
 
CAP
 
DF 
 
ROA 
ETR2 1.00                
FR .174 1.00               
  .000                
PO .125 .587 1.00              
  .000 .000               
FR*PO .177 .756 .901 1.00             
  .000 .000 .000              
ATO .050 .097 .103 .060 1.00            
  .062 .000 .000 .026             
REM .114 .011 -.012 -.022 .298 1.00           
  .000 .679 .654 .410 .000            
2000 -.019 -.035 -.065 -.039 -.038 .019 1.00          
  .489 .195 .015 .147 .158 .487           
2001 -.002 -.022 .011 -.022 -.018 -.012 -.260 1.00         
  .937 .411 .682 .408 .513 .656 .000          
2002 .062 .005 .018 .008 .018 .031 -.256 -.253 1.00        
  .021 .853 .507 .752 .506 .253 .000 .000         
2003 .067 .007 -.006 .008 .013 -.003 -.260 -.257 -.253 1.00       
 .013 .795 .827 .764 .626 .918 .000 000 000        
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SIZE -.104 .024 .149 .089 .674 .229 -.031 -.008 .017 .015 1.00      
  .000 .378 .000 .001 .000 .000 .249 .764 .534 .587       
FOR .006 -.162 -.106 -.174 .242 .196 -.014 .008 .015 .031 .260 1.00     
  .820 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .609 .766 .582 .249 .000      
R&D .003 -.019 -.027 -.037 .100 .154 .009 -.022 -.008 -.004 .067 .208 1.00    
  .913 .483 .311 .162 .000 .007 .736 .417 .764 .884 .012 .000     
CAP .040 -.042 -.042 -.078 .192 .145 .007 -.004 -.012 -.032 .109 .137 .195 1.00   
  .136 .120 .121 .004 .000 .000 .792 .870 .651 .235 .000 .000 .000    
DF -.144 .086 .163 .182 -.282 -.220 -.011 .028 .014 -.019 -.119 -.209 -.091 -.365 1.00  
  .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .695 .300 .596 .477 .000 .000 .001 .000   
ROA .056 .010 -.218 -.177 -.143 .110 .005 .005 .001 .034 -.402 -.029 .115 .118 -.053 1.00 
  .038 .703 .000 .000 .000 .000 .846 .856 .958 .199 .000 .285 .000 .404 .047  
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Table 6.6: Ratio 3 (Tax paid ETR) sub-sample  
Pearson Correlation Coefficients  
Significance (2-tailed) 
 
   
ETR3 
 
FR PO 
FR * 
PO 
 
ATO 
 
REM 2000 2001 2002
 
2003 
 
SIZE 
 
FOR 
 
R&D 
 
CAP
 
DF 
 
ROA 
ETR3 1.00                
FR .240 1.00               
  .000                
PO .208 .573 1.00              
  .000 .000               
FR*PO .254 .746 .900 1.00             
  .000 .000 .000              
ATO .089 .081 .076 .037 1.00            
  .001 .003 .005 .179             
REM .112 .027 .001 -.011 .314 1.00           
  .000 .316 .983 .675 .000            
2000 -.135 -.024 -.047 -.022 -.030 .003 1.00          
  .000 .386 .086 .425 .263 .923           
2001 .134 -.027 .003 -.030 -.043 .000 -.258 1.00         
  .000 .330 .916 .264 .111 .994 .000          
2002 .030 .029 .043 .024 .036 .026 -.251 -.243 1.00        
  .275 .293 .115 .384 .188 .343 .000 .000         
2003 .048 -.002 -.013 .001 .022 .004 -.265 -.257 -.249 1.00       
 .076 .950 .644 .966 .424 .894 .000 .000 .000        
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SIZE -.013 .070 .148 .082 .601 .251 -.018 -.013 .027 .008 1.00      
  .627 .011 .000 .003 .000 .000 .506 .621 .320 .783       
FOR .005 -.181 -.161 -.220 .148 .130 -.029 .020 .049 .023 .214 1.00     
  .846 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .283 .468 .070 .391 .000      
R&D -.029 -.031 -.071 -.073 -.042 .039 -.026 .009 .017 .021 -.058 .177 1.00    
  .287 .253 .009 .007 .120 .153 .346 .741 .528 .435 .034 .000     
CAP .061 -.039 -.009 -.065 .170 .115 .006 -.005 -.006 -.042 .048 .054 -.014 1.00   
  .025 .147 .738 .017 .000 .000 .827 .863 .835 .124 .075 .048 .619    
DF -.132 .056 .142 .174 -.300 -.235 -.015 .018 .014 -.013 -.133 -.155 -.036 -.314 1.00  
  .000 .040 .000 .000 .000 .000 .590 .500 .615 .636 .000 .000 .184 .000   
ROA .045 -.031 -.129 -.111 -.216 .048 .004 -.004 .016 .042 -.417 -.015 .166 .007 .015 1.00 
  .097 .250 .000 .000 .000 .077 .886 .897 .557 .119 .000 .580 .000 .788 .588  
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6.4 Regression results 
Three regression models were developed in Chapter 5 to test the hypotheses 
H1 to H4.  This section presents the regression results.    The estimates of 
regression coefficients for each of the three equations are shown in Tables 
6.7, 6.8 and 6.9.  Each model measures tax strategy using a different variant 
of the ratio of ETR to STR.  The first model uses Ratio 1, the total tax 
expense ETR/STR, as a proxy for tax strategy.  The second model uses 
Ratio 2, the current tax expense ETR/STR, to proxy for tax strategy.  The 
third model uses Ratio 3, the tax paid ETR/STR, to proxy for tax strategy.  
All three models have similar independent variables.   
 
R2 is a measure of how much of the variability in tax strategy is accounted 
for by the predictor variables.  For the model using Ratio 1, R2 is 0.130, for 
the model using Ratio 2, R2 is 0.110, and R2 for the model using Ratio 3 is 
0.151.  Previous research studies using ETR as a dependent variable show 
wide variation of R2 depending on the predictor variables included in the 
regression model.   
 
The F statistic measures the amount of systematic variance divided by the 
amount of unsystematic variance or how much the model has improved the 
prediction of tax strategy compared to the level of inaccuracy of the model.  
A good model will have a large F-ratio.  Each of the three models has a 
large F statistic and confirms the models have significant explanatory 
power.           
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The Durbin-Watson statistic informs whether the assumption of independent 
errors holds.    Serial correlation between errors can occur when adjacent 
residuals are correlated.  If the statistic has a value of 2, residuals are 
uncorrelated.  The Durbin-Watson statistic varies between 0 and 4 and it has 
been suggested that values less than 1 or greater than 3 are definitely cause 
for concern (Field, 2009).  Regression output shows a Durbin-Watson 
statistic of 1.975 for the Ratio 1 model, 2.009 for the Ratio 2 model and 
1.980 for the Ratio 3 model.  Since all three models show statistics 
approaching 2, it is concluded that the residuals are uncorrelated. 
 
A final check on assumptions of regression analysis is to determine whether 
the errors are random and that the variance of the residual terms is constant 
(homoscedasticity).  A plot of residuals against the predictors should look 
like a random array of dots evenly dispersed around zero.  This pattern 
confirms homoscedasticity has been met.  To test the normality of residuals 
a frequency histogram of residuals should look like a normal distribution.  
Normal probability plots show any deviations from normality.  Histograms 
and plots of distributed residuals from the 3 models were generated.  The 
resultant histograms show that residuals conform to normal distributions and 
errors are randomly and evenly dispersed around zero.  The plots and 
histograms therefore indicate the assumptions are satisfied.   
 
Overall, it is concluded from the above that the assumptions of multiple 
regression analysis are largely met by the three models used to predict 
variations in tax strategy between companies in the five year period 1999 to 
2003.  The next sections look at the tests of the individual hypotheses. 
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Table 6.7: Regression model summary – Ratio 1  
Panel A (includes FR and PO) 
Independent 
Variable 
Predicted
Sign 
 
Coefficient
Standard 
error 
t Statistic 
 
 
VIF 
Constant  1.329 .105 12.606***  
Test variables: 
FR ? -.057 .034 -1.664* 3.000
PO ? -.168 .059 -2.850*** 5.766
FR*PO + .359 .071 5.027*** 9.334
ATO + .067 .021 3.138*** 1.784
REM + .072 .019 3.735*** 1.158
2000 + -.021 .025 -.850 1.674
2001 + .047 .025 1.868** 1.663
2002 + .078 .026 3.047*** 1.648
2003 + .065 .025 2.557*** 1.660
Control variables: 
SIZE − -.029 .006 -5.196*** 1.985
FOR − -.011 .034 -.323 1.149
R&D − -1.415 .339 -4.172*** 1.055
CAP − .012 .038 .305 1.131
DF − -.299 .029 -10.256*** 1.273
ROA + -.161 .123 -1.305 1.265
Adjusted R2                             .134         F statistic    17.622 (.000) 
Durbin-Watson statistic        1.975 
Panel B (excludes FR and PO) 
Independent 
Variable 
Predicted
Sign 
 
Coefficient
Standard 
error 
t Statistic 
 
 
VIF 
Constant  1.335 .105 12.667***  
Test variables: 
FR*PO + .163 .025 6.598*** 1.111
ATO + .065 .021 3.020*** 1.773
REM + .075 .109 3.858*** 1.156
2000 + -.020 .025 -0.806 1.674
2001 + .044 .025 1.731** 1.658
2002 + .075 .026 2.923*** 1.644
2003 + .064 .025 2.509*** 1.659
Control variables: 
SIZE - -.031 .006 -5.576*** 1.957
FOR - -.015 .035 -0.429 1.148
R&D - -1.449 .339 -4.269*** 1.053
CAP - .004 .038 0.095 1.124
DF - -.297 .029 -10.181*** 1.268
ROA + -.180 .123 -1.472 1.249
Adjusted R2                                         .130           F statistic  19.568 (.000) 
Durbin-Watson statistic       1.974 
    *p between 0.1 and 0.05, ** p between 0.05 and 0.01, and *** p < 0.01 
Significance levels reported are one-tailed for variables with signs 
matching those predicted, two-tailed otherwise. 
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Table 6.8: Regression model summary – Ratio 2  
Panel A (includes FR and PO) 
Independent 
Variable 
Predicted
Sign 
 
Coefficient
Standard 
error 
t Statistic 
 
 
VIF 
Constant  1.134 .140 8.126***  
Test variables: 
FR ? .037 .048 0.779 2.718
PO ? -.197 .088 -2.235** 6.389
FR*PO + .436 .103 4.228*** 9.844
ATO + .042 .029 1.460* 1.767
REM + .089 .026 3.421*** 1.176
2000 + .090 .034 2.634*** 1.714
2001 + .117 .034 3.431*** 1.699
2002 + .158 .034 4.609*** 1.687
2003 + .156 .034 4.551*** 1.704
Control variables: 
SIZE - -.032 .007 -4.365*** 1.960
FOR - .069 .047 1.468 1.182
R&D - -.724 .520 -1.392* 1.065
CAP - -.008 .052 -0.145 1.137
DF - -.258 .039 -6.673*** 1.267
ROA + .014 .166 0.083 1.281
Adjusted R2                                         .110          F statistic   12.478 (.000) 
Durbin-Watson statistic       2.009 
Panel B (excludes FR and PO) 
Independent 
Variable 
Predicted
Sign 
 
Coefficient
Standard 
error 
t Statistic 
 
 
VIF 
Constant  1.164 .139 8.364***  
Test variables: 
FR*PO + .301 .035 8.679*** 1.114
ATO + .043 .029 1.495* 1.758
REM + .091 .026 3.485*** 1.175
2000 + .092 .034 2.710*** 1.709
2001 + .113 .034 3.308*** 1.696
2002 + .157 .034 4.555*** 1.686
2003 + .157 .034 4.576*** 1.702
Control variables: 
SIZE - -.034 .007 -4.685*** 1.924
FOR - .065 .047 1.376 1.180
R&D - -.725 .521 -1.391* 1.065
CAP - -.022 .052 -0.425 1.124
DF - -.263 .039 -6.819*** 1.260
ROA + .029 .165 0.173 1.264
Adjusted R2                                         .106          F statistic    13.747 (.000) 
Durbin-Watson statistic       2.009 
    *p between 0.1 and 0.05, ** p between 0.05 and 0.01, and *** p < 0.01 
Significance levels reported are one-tailed for variables with signs 
matching those predicted, two-tailed otherwise. 
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Table 6.9: Regression model summary – Ratio 3 
 Panel A (includes FR and PO) 
Independent 
Variable 
Predicted
Sign 
 
Coefficient
Standard 
error 
t Statistic 
 
 
VIF 
Constant  .831 .155 5.352***  
Test variables: 
FR ? .061 .053 1.147 2.657
PO ? -.191 .099 -1.936* 6.377
FR*PO + .559 .115 4.842*** 9.784
ATO + .076 .032 2.375*** 1.774
REM + .075 .029 2.574*** 1.186
2000 + -.041 .037 -1.113 1.676
2001 + .220 .038 5.848*** 1.665
2002 + .101 .038 2.643*** 1.646
2003 + .117 .037 3.149*** 1.682
Control variables: 
SIZE - -.026 .008 -3.180*** 1.967
FOR - .100 .051 1.960* 1.176
R&D - -.896 .548 -1.634* 1.068
CAP - .057 .058 0.988 1.142
DF - -.228 .044 -5.175*** 1.282
ROA + .298 .190 1.573* 1.303
Adjusted R2                                         .151           F statistic  17.035 (.000) 
Durbin-Watson statistic       1.980 
Panel B (excludes FR and PO) 
Independent 
Variable 
Predicted
Sign 
 
Coefficient
Standard 
error 
t Statistic 
 
 
VIF 
Constant  .874 .155 5.651***  
Test variables: 
FR*PO + .448 .039 11.519*** 1.108
ATO + .080 .032 2.478*** 1.767
REM + .077 .029 2.640*** 1.185
2000 + -.040 .037 -1.085 1.675
2001 + .215 .038 5.715*** 1.658
2002 + .097 .038 2.553*** 1.642
2003 + .117 .037 3.129*** 1.681
Control variables: 
SIZE - -.028 .008 -3.477*** 1.929
FOR - .092 .051 1.802* 1.172
R&D - -.864 .549 -1.573* 1.067
CAP - .042 .058 0.725 1.127
DF - -.235 .044 -5.340*** 1.270
ROA + .315 .189 1.666** 1.292
Adjusted R2                                         .148         F statistic  18.992 (.000) 
Durbin-Watson statistic       1.975 
    *p between 0.1 and 0.05, ** p between 0.05 and 0.01, and *** p < 0.01 
Significance levels reported are one-tailed for variables with signs 
matching those predicted, two-tailed otherwise. 
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6.5 Results for hypotheses testing 
The four hypotheses developed in Chapter 4 predict the relationships 
between particular company characteristics and tax strategy.  The predicted 
signs are summarised in Tables 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9, for the three models used to 
test the hypotheses.  Table 6.10 compares the predicted sign and the actual 
sign of the regression coefficient for each independent variable and shows 
the level of statistical significance where a regression coefficient is 
significantly different from zero. 
 
Table 6.10: Summary of coefficient signs and significance levels for all 
models 
 
Independent 
variable 
Predicted 
sign 
Ratio 1 
Sign 
(Significance 
level#) 
Ratio 2 
Sign 
(Significance 
level#) 
Ratio 3 
Sign 
(Significance 
level#) 
Test variables: 
FR*PO + + (0.01) + (0.01) + (0.01) 
ATO + + (0.01) + (0.1) + (0.01) 
REM + + (0.01) + (0.01) + (0.01) 
2000 + Not 
significant 
+ (0.01) Not 
significant 
2001 + + (0.05) + (0.01) + (0.01) 
2002 + + (0.01) + (0.01) + (0.01) 
2003 + + (0.01) + (0.01) + (0.01) 
Control variables: 
SIZE - - (0.01) - (0.01) - (0.01) 
FOR - Not 
significant 
Not 
significant 
+ (0.1) 
R&D - - (0.01) - (0.1) - (0.1) 
CAP - Not 
significant 
Not 
significant 
Not 
significant 
DF - - (0.01) - (0.01) - (0.01) 
ROA + Not 
significant 
Not 
significant 
+ (0.05) 
 
# Significance levels reported are one-tailed for variables with signs 
matching those predicted, two-tailed otherwise. 
   0.1 means between 0.1 and >0.05; 0.05 means between 0.05 and 
>0.01, and 0.01 means 0.01 or less. 
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6.5.1 Hypothesis H1 
 
Tables 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 consist of 2 panels.  Panel A includes both the 
interaction term FR*PO and its constituent variables FR and PO.  Panel B 
shows regression results with the interaction term only without FR and PO.  
The multicollinearity problem disappears in the results reported in Panel B 
and the F statistic increases with little change in the t statistics and statistical 
significance of the regression coefficients.  The interaction term FR*PO 
measures the degree of dividend imputation which is predicted to have a 
positive relation with tax strategy, that is, the more tax credit a company 
passes on to its shareholders through dividend imputation, the more 
conservative will the company’s tax strategy be.  In Panel A, when both PO 
and FR*PO are included in the model, FR*PO will capture the variation of 
franked dividends on tax strategy because FR*PO is zero when FR is zero.  
The payout ratio PO will then capture the variation of unfranked dividends 
on tax strategy.  Hence, in Panel A of Tables 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9, PO has a 
significant negative relation with tax strategy, and FR*PO a significant 
positive relation with tax strategy in all three models.  If the dividend is 
fully franked to 100%, then a positive relation is predicted.  If the dividend 
is unfranked, shareholders have no imputation credits to use and a negative 
relation is predicted.  Franking percentage (FR) only has meaning when a 
dividend is paid.  Panel A shows a marginally significant (at the 0.1 level) 
negative relation with tax strategy only for the model for Ratio 1 (Table 
Companies that distribute franked dividends adopt a more 
conservative tax strategy than companies distributing unfranked 
dividends or not distributing dividends. 
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6.7).  This result illustrates the importance of testing hypothesis H1 using 
FR*PO that captures the interaction of dividend payout and franking 
percentage.  
 
Results for the interaction term PO*FR are robust.  They indicate a highly 
significant positive relation with tax strategy in all three models as 
predicted, with or without FR and PO in the models.  These results are 
consistent with hypothesis H1.  Companies distributing franked dividends 
are more likely to have a higher ETR than companies paying unfranked 
dividends, no matter whether ETR is based on total tax expense, current tax 
expense, or tax paid.  This is consistent with adopting a conservative tax 
strategy. 
 
6.5.2 Hypothesis H2 
 
There is a significant positive association between ATO and tax strategy at 
the 0.01 level of significance in the Ratio 1 and Ratio 3 models, and at the 
0.1 level in the Ratio 2 model.  Hypothesis H2 is therefore supported by 
these results.  Companies under close scrutiny by the ATO are likely to be 
more conservative in their tax strategies than those not under close scrutiny.  
Since for the majority of company-year observations, current tax expense is 
not disclosed and is estimated from other tax information in the financial 
Companies under close scrutiny by the ATO have a more 
conservative tax strategy than companies that are not under close 
scrutiny by the ATO. 
 147
 
reports, the estimation error of the dependent variable of the Ratio 2 model 
may have influenced results. 
 
6.5.3 Hypothesis H3 
 
The executive remuneration variable (REM) has a highly significant t 
statistic in all three models at the 0.01 level.  Results indicate a highly 
significant positive relation between share option remuneration and tax 
strategy.  Hypothesis H3 is supported.  It was predicted that companies 
rewarding managers with share options are unlikely to minimise tax 
liabilities, contrary to the prediction in a classical system of company 
taxation.  This is because managers are more likely to maximise before-tax 
profit, rather than after-tax profit, to maximise share value.  If corporate tax 
is a pre-payment of shareholder tax, and taxed earnings are valued by 
investors, they will price-up shares.  Results confirm this assertion and show 
that managers rewarded with share options pursue a conservative tax 
strategy. 
 
6.5.4 Hypothesis H4 
 
Hypothesis 4 was based on the premise that although there are opportunities 
to save tax before known corporate tax rate falls are put in place, it is 
In a dividend imputation system, companies that reward managers 
with share options adopt conservative tax strategies. 
In a dividend imputation system tax strategy is not significantly 
more aggressive in the years preceding falls in the STR. 
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unlikely that tax strategies will change in a dividend imputation system 
because corporate tax is only a prepayment of investors’ tax and is not a real 
cost to the investors.  The hypothesis tests this supposition.  With the STR 
to fall in 2001 and 2002, managers were unlikely to change tax strategies in 
2000, compared to 2001 and 2001 compared to 2002.  This is because tax is 
not a cost and is valued by shareholders.  Regression results compare the 
years 2000, 2001 2002 and 2003 with 1999.  Results support a consistent 
conservative tax strategy over the test period. 
 
Two models show significant positive relationships between tax strategies 
and the year indicators for 2001, 2002 and 2003.  There is a negative 
coefficient for the year 2000 but the result is not statistically significant.  
The Ratio 2 model gives a highly significant positive relation between tax 
strategy and the year indicators for all years.  This model measures tax 
strategy with current tax expense.  Current tax expense would be affected if 
managers deferred current tax in 2000 to the following lower taxed year in 
2001 and/or deferred current tax in 2001 to the lower taxed year in 2002.  
The strongly significant results in this model therefore support the notion 
that managers continued to adopt conservative tax strategies in these years 
despite the opportunity to reap windfall tax savings. 
 
The general increase in ETRs in the years 2000 to 2003 compared to 1999 
may be explained by various changes in tax law that accompanied the falls 
in the STR.  One of the objectives of the Review of Business Taxation was 
that any recommended changes be revenue neutral. The announcement of 
the tax rate fall was accompanied by a series of tax reform measures, 
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following the release of the final report by the Treasurer on 21 September 
1999 (Commonwealth of Australia, 1999). These tax reform measures 
would increase revenue collection to offset the impact of corporate tax rate 
fall in two steps from 36% to 30% to achieve the revenue neutral objective.  
These tax law changes included the removal of accelerated depreciation for 
plant from 21 September 1999, the replacement of the 13-month 
prepayment rule with a time matching rule from 1 July 2001, and the 
abolition of indexation of the cost base for company assets in calculating 
capital gains after September 1999.  Disentangling the effect of these 
changes in tax laws from the effect of the tax rate falls was not part of the 
research design of this study and is acknowledged as a limitation of this 
study. Nonetheless, the predominantly significant positive regression 
coefficients for the year indicators for 2000 and 2001 provide support for 
hypothesis H4 that companies did not adopt aggressive tax strategy in the 
years preceding tax rate falls. 
 
Further regressions were undertaken using observations for each model 
where FR*PO equals zero, that is, including only those company-year 
observations with no dividend payouts or zero franking percentage.  The 
model with Ratio 1 as the dependent variable was the only model to indicate 
a result with negative coefficients for all years but significant at the 0.05 
level only for 2000 and 2003.  While this result suggests that companies 
distributing unfranked or no dividends might have adopted more aggressive 
tax strategies in 2000, this result is not consistent across all three models so 
is not reported in detail. 
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6.6 Control variables 
Control variables for size, foreign operations, research and development 
expenditure, capital intensity, diversified financial industry classification 
and profitability were included in the models to control for known 
determinants of ETRs.   
 
Size (SIZE) measured by total assets had a significant negative relation with 
tax strategy in all three models.  That is, the larger the size of a company, 
the lower is its ETRs. This confirms the results of other Australian studies 
(Tran & Porcano, 1997; Harris & Feeny, 2003; Tran & Yu, 2008).   
 
There is only a marginally significant positive relation between foreign 
operation (FOR) and tax strategy in one of the models and it is only 
significant at the 0.1 level.  A negative relation was predicted in line with 
previous research (Rego, 2003).  This may be explained by the sample of 
companies.  Most of this sample of Australian companies does not derive 
foreign income and for those companies that do, it is a small proportion of 
their total revenue.   Overall the evidence is not consistent with the 
proposition that companies with foreign operations would take advantage of 
the opportunities arising from foreign operations to avoid tax.  
 
Research and development (R&D) was significantly negatively related with 
tax strategy, confirming the findings of Harris & Feeny (2003), particularly 
in the first model where the significant level is 0.01.  The extra 25% 
deduction allowance for R&D is included as a permanent difference in this 
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model.  Results for the other two models show that R&D is negatively 
related with tax strategy but only at the 0.1 level of statistical significance.   
 
Capital intensity (CAP) was not significant in any of the models.  Australia 
does not have a large base of manufacturing companies and the sample 
reflects this.  Net property, plant and equipment do not form a large 
proportion of assets for many companies. The insignificant results may be 
explained by the abolition of accelerated tax depreciation from 21 
September 1999 which has the effect of aligning tax depreciation closer 
with accounting depreciation.  
 
The variable indicating companies classified as diversified financials (DF) is 
negatively associated with tax strategy at 1% statistical significance in all 
three models.  This result confirms prior Australian studies (Tran & 
Porcano, 1997; Tran & Yu, 2008).  Companies offering investment and 
financial services have large exempt income in the form of franked 
dividends and have low ETRs. Although the dividend income is taxable, the 
tax is offset by the franking credits attached to the dividends. 
 
Profitability (ROA) was included based on prior research.  As profitability 
increases, book-tax income differences are not expected to increase in the 
same proportion so a higher ETR is expected.  This prediction was 
confirmed in Australian research using data over the period 1994-1997 
(Harris & Feeny, 2003).  Only one model confirmed this result at the 0.05 
level of statistical significance.  Neither of the other models had significant 
results.   
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6.7 Summary 
Table 6.11: Summary of hypotheses, results and conclusions 
  
Hypothesis  Hypothesis Results Conclusions 
H1 Companies that 
distribute franked 
dividends adopt a 
more conservative 
tax strategy than 
companies 
distributing 
unfranked 
dividends or not 
distributing 
dividends 
Supported with 1% 
probability that 
this is a chance 
result across all 
three tax strategy 
ratio measures 
In a dividend 
imputation system 
companies 
distributing franked 
dividends are likely 
to maximise 
before-tax profit 
and therefore have 
conservative rather 
than aggressive tax 
strategies. 
H2 Companies under 
close scrutiny by 
the ATO have a 
more conservative 
tax strategy than 
those that are not 
under close 
scrutiny by the 
ATO 
Supported with 1% 
probability that 
this is a chance 
result using Ratio 
1 and Ratio 2 
measures of tax 
strategy and 
supported with 
10% probability 
using Ratio 2 
measure of tax 
strategy 
Companies at risk 
of tax audit are 
more likely than 
not to have 
conservative, rather 
than aggressive tax 
strategies to avoid 
close scrutiny by 
the ATO. 
H3 In a dividend 
imputation 
system, 
companies that 
reward managers 
with share options 
adopt conservative 
tax strategies. 
Supported with 1% 
probability that 
this is a chance 
result across all 
three tax strategy 
ratio measures 
Contrary to a 
classical system of 
company taxation, 
in a dividend 
imputation system 
managerial 
remuneration based 
on share options 
leads to 
conservative tax 
strategies. 
H4 In a dividend 
imputation 
system, tax 
strategy is not 
significantly more 
aggressive in the 
years preceding 
falls in the 
statutory tax rate. 
Supported with 1% 
probability that 
this is a chance 
result using Ratio 
2 in both 2000 and 
2001, and in 2001 
using Ratio 1 and 
Ratio 3 tax 
strategy measures. 
When the tax rate 
falls from one year 
to the next, 
companies are 
more likely than 
not to ignore the 
opportunity for 
windfall tax 
savings. 
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A summary of hypotheses, regression results and conclusions are presented 
in Table 6.11.  Considerable support was found for all four hypotheses 
examined in this study.  First, companies distributing franked dividends 
adopt a more conservative tax strategy than those that do not.  There is a 
positive relation between dividend imputation (i.e., companies transfer tax 
credits to shareholders through distributing franked dividends) and tax 
strategy in all three models, thus supporting hypothesis H1.  This confirms 
the theoretical argument that company tax is only a pre-payment of dividend 
income tax and is valued by company shareholders.  Managers therefore 
have incentives to maximise before-tax profit from which both dividends 
and company tax are paid, and have no incentives to engage in costly tax 
avoiding strategies.   
 
Second, there is considerable support for hypothesis H2.  The prediction that 
close scrutiny by the ATO leads to more conservative tax strategies was 
strongly supported in two models and supported in the third model.  
Managers can avoid financial risk of costly tax audits by pursuing 
conservative tax strategies.  This suggests the investment by the tax office in 
audit programs is likely to deter aggressive tax strategies by large 
companies. 
 
Third, hypothesis H3 is strongly supported in all models.  Managers 
remunerated with share options adopt conservative tax strategies.  This 
confirms that positive accounting theory predictions in a classical tax 
system do not necessarily hold in a dividend imputation system.  In this 
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environment it is before-tax profit that is maximised.  The results confirm 
that incentives to avoid tax vary depending on the institutional environment 
in which large companies operate.  In a dividend imputation system there is 
clear evidence that managers do maximise before-tax profit, not after-tax 
profit.  Results for hypotheses H1 and H3 clearly support this prediction. 
 
Fourth, hypothesis H4 was also supported in all three models.  Because 
managers maximise before-tax profit, they do not respond to opportunities 
to save tax in years before STR falls.   
 
Results confirmed some prior research findings of ETR studies.  In 
particular larger companies, research and development investors and 
diversified financials have lower ETRs.  Foreign operations do not have a 
negative relation with tax strategy, suggesting that companies operating 
globally do not make use of the opportunities arising from foreign 
operations to avoid tax.  Findings in the present study do not support prior 
research findings about the effect of capital intensity, perhaps due to the 
abolition of accelerated tax depreciation regime.  A positive relation 
between profitability and ETRs is only found in one model.   
 
This chapter presented the results of regression analysis testing four 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 4.  Three models were analysed, all three 
giving similar results.  Companies distributing franked dividends and under 
close scrutiny by the ATO are more likely to have a conservative tax 
strategy.  Aligning manager and shareholder interests in a dividend 
imputation environment mitigates the incentives to avoid tax since 
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maximisation of before-tax profit is the preferred option.  Managers 
remunerated with share options have incentives to adopt conservative tax 
strategies.  Changes in tax law that reduced the STR but limited tax 
deductions and allowances resulted in companies continuing to adopt 
conservative strategies rather than pursuing windfall tax savings.  The next 
chapter summarises this research study and its main findings, acknowledges 
its limitations, then draws conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis explores the managerial incentives to aggressively minimise tax 
in a dividend imputation system as opposed to a classical system of 
company tax.  This final chapter summarises the research undertaken and 
outlines its distinct contribution to empirical tax research.  Research 
hypotheses emerging from the literature review in Chapter 2 are revisited.  
The Australian institutional environment described in Chapter 3 is referred 
to in outlining the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4.  Implications are 
drawn for the results of testing these hypotheses, described and presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6.  Some limitations and implications for further research are 
outlined.  The chapter ends with a final summary of the research project. 
 
7.2 The research questions 
Empirical tax research focused on tax avoidance studies is largely US based 
and is limited in explaining the variation in ETRs used to assess the 
propensity to avoid tax (Dyreng, Hanlon & Maydew, 2010).  This thesis 
addresses this limitation in exploring the influence of managerial incentives 
to avoid tax in a non-classical and non-US setting.  Managerial incentives 
are likely to be different in Australia’s dividend imputation system of 
company tax and these different incentives have not been studied 
empirically.  This thesis contributes to this gap.  Prior research on the effect 
of dividend imputation is largely focused on its effect on capital market 
valuation of shares (Brown & Clarke, 1993), its effect on formation of 
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imputation dividend clienteles (Bellamy, 1994) and its effect on dividend 
payout policy of companies (Pattenden & Twite, 2008).   
 
Finance texts posit that tax is irrelevant for decision making by investors 
and managers, when its nature changes from that of a company cost in the 
classical system to a pre-payment of tax for the shareholder in a dividend 
imputation system (Peacock et al., 2003).  In a dividend imputation system, 
it is irrelevant who pays tax since the return to the shareholder is the same.  
However robust this argument may be, in reality it will not always hold.  
This is because the theory assumes all profits are distributed as dividends, 
all company income is derived in Australia and all shareholders can use the 
franking credits imputed to them with dividends.  It is expected that there 
are differences in these variables between companies.  These differences 
mean that managers of different companies face different incentives to 
avoid tax.  This thesis tests this assertion empirically.  Wilkinson, Cahan 
and Jones (2001) test the effect of the extension of dividend imputation to 
non-resident portfolio shareholders on the incentive to minimise tax for 37 
companies in the New Zealand dividend imputation environment.  This 
thesis extends this line of research in testing for differences in managerial 
incentives to avoid tax for 491 large profitable Australian companies in a 
period of tax rate changes. 
 
The reasoning that in a dividend imputation system, company income tax is 
no longer a cost to be managed by profitable, listed Australian companies 
with predominately Australian source income and Australian shareholders, 
implies that managers of these companies do not have the incentives to 
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aggressively avoid tax.  This forms the focal point of the study in this thesis.  
In particular this thesis examines whether incentives to avoid tax are 
different depending on (a) whether dividends distributed are franked or 
unfranked, (b) whether the companies are subject to close scrutiny by the 
tax office, and (c) whether managerial remunerations include share options.  
Finally this thesis also examines whether company tax strategy changes 
when the opportunity arises to make wind-fall tax savings due to reductions 
in the company tax rate.   
 
7.3 The hypotheses 
 Although Australia’s dividend yield is high by world standards (BRW, 
2004), there is wide variation in dividend payout policy.  For the sample of 
491 companies used in this thesis, the distribution of observed payout 
percentages (discussed in Chapter 6) shows clusters at the two extremes, 0% 
and 100%, and a flat distribution in between.  The mean is 56% and the 
median 60%.  The distribution of observed franking percentage of these 
dividends also has clusters at both ends and few observations in between.  
Most companies either fully frank or do not frank dividends.  The majority 
of the dividends are fully franked. It follows that there are good reasons to 
test predictions about managerial incentives dependent on dividend payout 
ratio and franking percentage of dividends.  Those companies distributing 
franked dividends must pay company tax to accrue tax credits to impute to 
shareholders.  They are therefore more likely to maximise before-tax profit, 
rather than after-tax profit and are thus predicted to have more conservative, 
or less aggressive, tax strategies. This is the first hypothesis that has been 
tested in this thesis. 
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 Annual company tax collections represent around 25% of income tax 
revenue in Australia (ATO, 2005, p. 9).  To protect this source of revenue, 
the tax collection agency in Australia devotes resources to audit programs 
particularly targeted at large corporate groups.  Its published audit success 
ensures large companies are aware of risks of aggressive tax avoidance.  
The second hypothesis in this thesis tests the success or otherwise of this 
program in its effect on managerial incentives to avoid tax.  While audit 
success may justify taxpayer funded programs in dollar terms, audit activity 
may have further value in mitigating incentives for risky tax avoidance.  The 
second hypothesis aims to test this prediction.  Large companies with a 
known risk of tax audit are more likely to temper aggressive tax strategies to 
avoid in-depth scrutiny by tax auditors. 
 
In large corporations where ownership and control are separate, managers 
control resources provided by shareholders and lenders.  Agency theory 
suggests that alignment of the interests of the agents (managers) with those 
of the principals (capital providers) is of benefit to the principals (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).  Basing managerial remuneration on share value is one 
way to protect the capital from possible exploitation or neglect by managers.  
In a classical company tax environment performance remuneration in the 
form of share options gives incentives to managers to maximise future share 
value by maximising after-tax profit.  Thus, remuneration based on 
performance of after-tax profit or share value is likely to result in incentives 
to aggressively avoid tax. 
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However, in a dividend imputation system, company tax is no longer a cost; 
it is a prepayment of shareholder tax on dividend income.  Managers have 
incentives to maximise before-tax profit rather than to aggressively avoid 
company tax.  Further, distribution of franked dividends is valued by 
shareholders because of the imputed tax credits and investors are therefore 
willing to pay a higher price for shares in companies that pay franked 
dividends.  It is thus likely that remuneration based on share options 
provides incentives for managers to adopt conservative tax strategy, i.e., to 
pay company tax as required by law to frank dividends.  The frequency 
distribution of the indicator remuneration variable (presented in Chapter 6) 
shows 74% of company-year observations have share option remuneration.  
This thesis tests the hypothesis that managers rewarded with share options 
do not have incentives to aggressively avoid tax.   
 
The time frame for this study is the five years of tax rate changes following 
a government enquiry into business tax (Commonwealth of Australia, 
1999).  Company tax rate was reduced from 36% to 30% over a two year 
period.  Those companies able to quickly implement deferral of taxable 
income would accrue windfall tax savings.  While adoption of aggressive 
tax strategy to defer taxable income is expected in a classical system, it is 
not expected in a dividend imputation system where company tax is a pre-
paid shareholder tax.  Companies are therefore less likely to aggressively 
pursue windfall tax savings in years before tax rate falls.  In fact there may 
even be incentives for companies to accelerate recognition of taxable 
income and franked dividend payout to distribute as much franking credits 
as possible before the tax rate fall, as shareholders prefer more franking 
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credits than less.  The fourth hypothesis tests whether managers pursued 
more aggressive tax strategies in years before tax rate fall.  It predicts that 
managers do not have incentives to do so.  Setting this study between the 
years 1999 and 2003 provides an opportunity to test this hypothesis. 
 
7.4 Results of hypotheses testing and implications 
As reported in Chapter 6, predictions of all hypotheses were supported with 
high levels of statistical significance.  The variable used to test the extent of 
dividend payout and franking had a positive relation with tax strategy.  This 
means that the more franked dividends are distributed, the closer the ETR 
will be to the STR, and the more conservative company tax strategy will be 
observed.  This result provides empirical support for the notion that a 
dividend imputation system of company tax mitigates the incentives of at 
least some publicly-traded companies to avoid tax.   
 
Results for the second hypothesis show that the indicator variable for close 
tax office scrutiny has a significant positive relation with tax strategy.  This 
confirms that the risk of close scrutiny by the tax office affects company tax 
strategy.  Those company groups with revenue above the threshold of $100 
million are more likely to have ETRs approaching the STR, suggesting they 
are less likely to pursue aggressive tax strategies.  This is an interesting 
result as the negative regression coefficients for the size variable in the same 
regression models show that larger companies have lower ETRs, consistent 
with the findings of prior Australian studies by Harris and Feeny (2003), 
and Tran and Yu (2008).  The proxy for firm size in all Australian studies is 
total assets.  One implication from the results of this study is that an 
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indicator variable based on total revenue and a continuous variable based on 
total assets can be used to measure different company characteristics despite 
correlation between revenue and total assets.   The result of a positive 
relation between close tax office scrutiny and tax strategy also implies that 
ATO large company audit strategies are effective in protecting company tax 
revenue.    
 
The third hypothesis that managers in receipt of share option remuneration 
pursue conservative tax strategies is also supported by the results of this 
study.  The remuneration indicator variable has a highly significant positive 
relation with tax strategy in contrast to the negative relation found in US 
studies in a classical tax system.  This is an exciting result as it clearly 
illustrates that the incentive effects of share option remuneration are 
different in different institutional environments.   
 
The positive and significant regression coefficients for the year indicator 
variables for 2000 in one model, and for 2001, 2002 and 2003 in all three 
models suggest the lack of aggressive tax strategy adopted in these years 
compared with 1999, and provide evidence that companies gave up the 
opportunity to save tax when company tax rate fell in two steps in 2001 and 
2002.  The results can be contrasted with the findings by Guenther (1994) in 
the classical tax system.   
 
7.5 Implications for further research  
The results of this research project suggest directions for future research.   
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Due to the lack of readily available data, this study does not test the impact 
of foreign shareholdings in Australian public companies on the tax 
strategies of these companies. It may be possible for the extent of foreign 
shareholding to be estimated from the top 20 shareholders disclosed in 
corporate financial reports, and from data obtainable from major stock 
exchanges overseas where Australian companies are also listed. For 
example, it may be possible to find out the proportion of an Australian 
company’s shares that are held as American Depository Receipts from the 
New York Stock Exchange if the company is listed on both the ASX and the 
New York Stock Exchange. If the proportion of foreign shareholding can be 
estimated, studies of company tax strategies in an imputation system can be 
extended to test the impact of foreign ownership. 
 
In a dividend imputation system, tax management strategy is more than tax 
avoidance.  Australian companies with foreign income and foreign 
shareholders also have incentives to ensure that the imputation credits 
generated by Australian tax paid can be fully utilised by domestic 
shareholders.  As a result, dividend streaming arrangements such as stapled 
securities have been devised to distribute franked dividends to domestic 
shareholders and unfranked dividends to foreign shareholders. Companies 
that have paid Australian tax and accumulated imputation credits but do not 
have the cash resources to pay dividends also have incentives to “sell” their 
imputation credits. The existence of provisions in the tax legislation to 
attack dividend-streaming and imputation-credit-trading schemes indicates 
the prevalence of these activities.  This is a potential area for future 
research.  
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The proposition that the imputation system mitigates the incentives of 
companies to avoid Australian tax may only hold true for Australian 
publicly-traded companies with predominantly domestic ownership. 
Australian subsidiaries of foreign multinationals (e.g., oil companies, car 
manufacturers) and private or proprietory companies may still have strong 
incentives to avoid tax. The tax strategies of Australian subsidiaries of 
foreign multinationals and private or proprietory companies are interesting 
areas for future research. However, due to the lack of publicly available 
financial reports, different research designs and data collection techniques 
(e.g., interviews) have to be adopted. 
 
Remuneration in the form of share options for managers of companies in a 
dividend imputation system results in a less aggressive tax strategy.  This 
area may also benefit from further research. 
 
7.6 Limitations  
 Taxable income of companies and income tax paid based on taxable 
income are unobservable.  Company tax information used in this study has 
been taken from tax disclosures in publicly available annual reports.   Tax 
strategy of a company is proxied by the ratio of its ETR to the STR, and the 
difference of this ratio from unity indicates the book-tax income gap (i.e., 
permanent and timing differences between pre-tax accounting profit and 
taxable income, expressed as a fraction of pre-tax accounting profit). Book-
tax income gap can be explained by the differences between financial 
reporting rules and tax rules, by tax strategy, and by earnings management. 
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Therefore, when ETR or book-tax income gap is used as a proxy for tax 
strategy in this study (as well as in many other studies conducted in the US), 
an implicit assumption is that rule differences and earnings management are 
assumed to be constant in the study period. This assumption does not always 
hold, so the findings should be interpreted with this limitation in mind. 
 
This study has used a sample of large, profitable, publicly-traded Australian 
companies, so the findings may not apply to listed companies with operating 
losses, to private or proprietary companies, or to foreign companies 
operating in Australia. Due to lack of information, the extent of foreign 
ownership has not been included in this study as an explanatory variable, so 
it is unknown how foreign ownership affects the tax strategy of companies 
in a dividend imputation system. 
 
The time frame of this study was the five years from 1999 to 2003 because 
one of the purposes of this study was to test whether companies adopted 
aggressive tax avoiding strategies when opportunities arose from reductions 
in tax rate in 2001 and 2002. The presence of tax law changes concurrently 
with tax rate reductions in this period may have confounded the results, 
although some effects of tax law changes might have been captured by 
inclusion of control variables. For instance, the inclusion of capital intensity 
variable might have captured the effect of removal of accelerated 
depreciation, and the inclusion of the indicator variable for the diversified 
financials industry might have captured some effect of removal of 
indexation in computing capital gains (from investments). 
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Global and economic factors over the period 1999 to 2003 may have 
impacted the operating, investing and financing decisions of companies in 
the sample of companies used in this research project over that period.  An 
overview of the economic environment during these years shows that, 
although the world economy was relatively eventful, Australia’s economy 
and financial markets grew strongly (Reserve Bank of Australia, 1999-
2003).  Economic factors excluded from the analysis and relevant to tax 
strategy that may affect implications derived from results of the study are 
acknowledged. 
 
7.7 Overall conclusions 
Literature about the propensity of companies to avoid tax is largely confined 
to the US classical tax system.  The important findings of this thesis are that 
this prior literature is not necessarily relevant to a non-classical dividend 
imputation environment.  In particular, this thesis predicts that managers 
have incentives to maximise profit before-tax, rather than profit after-tax, 
and this is likely to mitigate aggressive tax avoidance.  Results of analysis 
show that where franked dividends are distributed, tax strategies are 
conservative, including where managers receive share options as part of 
their remuneration.  Even in a period of tax rate falls when there is 
opportunity to make windfall tax savings, tax strategy remains conservative. 
One important policy implication of the findings from this study is that it 
provides empirical support for the notion that Australia’s dividend 
imputation system protects the integrity of corporate tax revenue.  This is an 
advantage compared to the classical system that taxes profits twice. 
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Appendix A: Summary of selected literature from tax and accounting research about the relation between managerial 
incentives and tax strategy 
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research 
question 
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period  
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Book-tax gap literature in a classical company tax system – measurement of tax avoidance 
 
Manzon & Plesko The Tax Law 
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magnitude and 
sources of book-
tax gap 
1988-99 Regression analysis Book-tax 
difference 
Change in sales, 
PP&E, goodwill, 
intangibles, income, 
foreign income 
Gap due to a small 
number of factors; 
these have not 
changed over time and 
largely due to tax 
favoured investment. 
Mills, Newberry 
& Trautman 
Tax Notes (2002) Comparison of 
financial 
statement data to 
tax return data to 
assess reasons for 
gap 
1991-98 Trend of gap over 
time  
Book-tax return 
disclosed gap 
Industry, global 
operations, 
profitability 
Greatest difference for 
multi-nationals in the 
financial services 
industry & commun-
ications and with 
positive taxable 
income. 
Gap grew over time. 
 
Desai Tax Policy and 
the Economy 
(2003) 
Reasons for book-
tax gap 
1982-00 Econometric 
modelling, 
regression 
Book income Taxable income Difference in book-tax 
treatment of options 
does account for some 
of growing gap but 
not all. 
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assets 
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shelters use less debt 
on average than do 
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sheltering important 
 economically. 
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Book-tax gap literature in a dividend imputation company tax system – measurement of tax avoidance 
Tran Australian Tax 
Forum (1998) 
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book-tax income 
gap to address the 
book-tax 
alignment issue 
1984-93 Detailed analysis 
of tax notes in 
annual reports of 
46 firms 
Book-tax gap Reconciliation items 
identified or not in 
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non-deductibles, non-
taxable capital gains, 
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dividend income, 
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tax rate differences. 
Timing differences do 
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time. 
 
Effective tax rate literature in a classical company tax system – relative measurement of tax efficiency/avoidance 
Stickney & 
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Journal of 
Accounting & 
Public Policy 
(1982) 
Neutrality of 
corporate income 
tax 
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Cluster analysis of 
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timing differences) 
Capital intensity, 
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natural resources, 
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Capital intensity, 
leverage and natural 
resource firms 
important in reducing 
ETR and foreign 
operations, size less 
important. 
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Conclusions 
Zimmerman Journal of 
Accounting & 
Economics (1983) 
Firm size as a 
proxy for political 
costs 
1947-81 Time series and 
cross-sectional 
analysis 
Total tax 
expense/operating 
cash flows 
Size (sales) 50 largest US firms 
have greater ETR 
than other firms. 
 
 
Wilkie Journal of the 
American Tax 
Association 
(1988) 
Effect of 
profitability on 
ETR research 
findings 
1980-84 Cross-sectional and 
inter-temporal 
analysis 
Current tax 
expense/accounting 
profit 
Pre-tax accounting 
profit, size (assets) 
Profitability is a 
determinant of ETR 
Omer, Molloy & 
Ziebart 
Journal of the 
American Tax 
Association 
(1991) 
Comparison of 
ETR measures 
from previous 
research 
1980 and 
1983 
Comparison of 
means, max, min of 
5 ETR measures 
  There are significant 
differences so use 
more than one ETR 
measure for 
robustness. 
Wilkie & Limberg Journal of the 
American Tax 
Association 
(1993) 
Assessment of 
ETR as measure 
of tax burden 
 
1968-85 Sample analysis 
with alternative 
measure 
Average rates  ETR imperfect 
measure  
Callihan Journal of 
Accounting 
Literature (1994) 
Literature review 
of ETR research 
 Tables prior studies   Different 
methodologies 
produce conflicting 
results 
Gupta & 
Newberry 
Journal of 
Accounting & 
Public Policy 
(1997) 
Determinants of 
variability in 
corporate ETRs 
1982-85 
1987-90 
Pre and post 
tax reform 
Multivariate OLS 
regression 
estimation using 
longitudinal 
company data 
Current tax 
expense/pre-tax 
profit 
Current tax 
expense/pre-tax 
operating cash flow 
Size, capital 
structure, asset mix 
(capital intensity, 
inventory and R&D), 
profitability 
 
No distinct relation to 
size, negative 
association with 
capital intensity and 
profitability. 
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research 
question 
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Method 
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RHS variables 
 
 
Conclusions 
Mills, Erickson & 
Maydew 
Journal of the 
American Tax 
Association 
(1998) 
Returns of 
investment in tax 
planning 
(minimisation) 
1990-92 
average for 
ETR 
1991 for 
variables 
Survey, then 
analysis of returns 
to tax planning 
Current tax 
expense/pre-tax 
income 
Tax planning costs, 
size, foreign 
operations, capital 
and inventory 
intensity, number of 
entities, leverage, 
industry 
 
Negative relation 
between tax planning 
and ETR. 
Holland Journal of 
Business Finance 
& Accounting 
(1998) 
Relationship 
between firm size 
and ETR 
UK data 
1968-93 
Statistical 
comparison of 
deciles 
Current tax 
expense/accounting 
income 
Size measured by 
sales and assets 
Positive relation 1968-
79, weaker in 1980-93 
and negative in 1978 
and 1982. 
 
Yin Virginia Law 
Review (2003) 
Longitudinal 
change in ETR of 
S&P 500 
1995 - 2000 Comparison of 
sample averages 
Current tax 
expense/accounting 
income 
 ETRs fell throughout 
the 6 year period, 
mainly due to stock 
option accounting & 
tax law differences. 
 
 
Rego Contemporary 
Accounting 
Research (2003) 
Effect of larger, 
more profitable, 
multinational 
companies and 
ETR 
1990-97 Multivariate OLS 
regression 
estimation 
Current tax 
expense/accounting 
income 
Size, income, foreign 
operations, industry, 
year, geographical 
location 
Large companies have 
positive relation with 
ETR while those with 
foreign operations and 
greater profit have 
negative relation. 
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Journal & date 
Motivation/ 
research 
question 
 
Sample 
period  
 
 
Method 
 
 
LHS variable 
 
 
RHS variables 
 
 
Conclusions 
Plesko Journal of 
Accounting & 
Economics (2003) 
Reliability of ETR 
calculated from 
numbers in 
financial 
statements 
Matched 
sample of 
tax return 
and 
financial 
statement 
data for 
1992 
 
Correlation 
statistics of 2 
samples in 
multivariate setting 
Various ETRs used 
in prior research 
 Different measures 
but ETR from 
financial statements 
useful when used by 
managers to make 
decisions. 
Lisowsky The Journal of the 
American 
Taxation 
Association 
(2009) 
Reliability of 
using ETR from 
financial 
statements 
2000-04 Regression analysis total tax per tax 
return 
Current tax expense, 
foreign income, R&D 
expense, size, 
leverage, industry, 
and other financial 
disclosures 
Reliable estimates of a 
tax position as strong 
positive relation 
between current tax 
expense and total tax 
liability. 
 
 
 
Dyreng, Hanlon & 
Maydew 
The Accounting 
Review (2008) 
Develop and 
describe cash ETR 
as long run 
measure of tax 
minimisation 
1995-2004 Cross sectional 
distributional 
analysis of  cash 
ETR 
Regression of one 
year and 10 year 
ETRs 
Average cash tax 
paid/ accounting 
profit 
Industry, market 
value 
Annual cash ETR not 
a good predictor of 
long run ETR, 
significant proportion 
(26.3% of sample) 
have persistently low 
cash ETR, not 
explained by industry. 
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Author 
 
Journal & date 
Motivation/ 
research 
question 
 
Sample 
period  
 
 
Method 
 
 
LHS variable 
 
 
RHS variables 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Effective tax rate literature in a dividend imputation company tax system – relative measurement of tax efficiency/avoidance 
Tran  Australian Tax 
Forum (1997) 
Measure book-tax 
gap caused by 
permanent 
differences to 
address the book-
tax alignment 
issue 
1983-93 Regression analysis Average ETR Industry, size Gold, investment 
companies and 
financial services 
industries had lower 
ETR than other 
industries; large 
companies had lower 
ETR than smaller 
companies measured 
by both assets and 
profits. 
 
 
 
 
Tran & Porcano  Pacific 
Accounting 
Review (1997) 
Equity dimension 
of Australian tax 
system using 
ETRs 
1983-93 Regression analysis Average ETR Industry, size Significant negative 
relation between size 
and ETR because 
large firms are better 
able to use tax 
incentives. 
Shows tax inequity. 
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Author 
 
Journal & date 
Motivation/ 
research 
question 
 
Sample 
period  
 
 
Method 
 
 
LHS variable 
 
 
RHS variables 
 
 
Conclusions 
Wickerson, 
Reddan & Khan  
Tax 
Administration in 
the 21st Century 
(2001) 
Macro-level 
trends and patterns 
of ETR calculated 
from tax returns 
1992-98 Trend analysis Tax payable/ Total 
assets, 
Tax payable/ 
Total profit, 
Tax payable/ Sales, 
Tax payable/ EBIT, 
Tax payable/ Total 
profit 
Year General upward trend 
in ETRs over the 
period 
Downward trend in 
ETR over period for 
tax payable/total 
profit and volatile 
around 1996 (tax rate 
increase). 
Harris & Feeny  Applied 
Economics (2003) 
Modelling large 
company ETRs 
using ATO data 
1994-97 Regression analysis Current tax 
payable/Profit 
before tax 
Capital intensity, 
leverage, size, 
foreign operations, 
ROA, R&D 
Size, foreign 
operations, R&D 
expense, capital 
intensity associated 
with lower ETR. 
ETR also exhibits 
habit persistence. 
 
Tran & Yu  Australian Tax 
Forum (2008) 
Comparison of 
ETR of companies 
before and after 
business tax 
reforms following 
the Review of 
Business Taxation 
1994-04 Regression analysis Total tax 
expense/accounting 
profit 
Current tax 
expense/ 
accounting profit 
Industry, size, time 
period 
Industry differences 
in ETR, medium sized 
companies have 
higher ETR than top 
20 companies and 
smallest companies, 
difference between 
ETR and STR has 
narrowed after 
business tax reforms. 
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Author 
 
Journal & date 
Motivation/ 
research 
question 
 
Sample 
period  
 
 
Method 
 
 
LHS variable 
 
 
RHS variables 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Incentive effect of dividend distribution literature in a classical company tax system 
Modigliani & 
Miller 
The American 
Economic Review 
(1958) 
Deriving  theory 
that value of firm 
is independent of 
capital structure 
 Static, partial 
equilibrium 
analysis 
  Average cost of capital 
is a constant for all 
firms carrying the 
same risk and 
independent of capital 
structure. 
Relation between 
return and capital 
structure is linear. 
 
 
 
Miller & 
Modigliani 
The Journal of 
Business (1961) 
Deriving theory 
that value of firm 
is independent of 
dividend payout  
policy 
 algebra   Dividend policy is 
irrelevant for the 
determination of 
market prices (in the 
absence of taxes). 
 
 
Peacock, Martin, 
Burrow, Petty, 
Keown, Scott & 
Martin 
Financial 
Management text 
book, 3rd edition 
(2003) 
Chapter on 
dividend policy 
    Dividend policy 
determined by 
internal investment 
and financing 
opportunities and 
constraints. 
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Author 
 
Journal & date 
Motivation/ 
research 
question 
 
Sample 
period  
 
 
Method 
 
 
LHS variable 
 
 
RHS variables 
 
 
Conclusions 
Dhaliwal, 
Erickson & 
Trezevant 
National Tax 
Journal (1999) 
Tests theory of tax 
clienteles for 
dividend policies 
US  
1982-95 
Examines changes 
in ownership after 
dividend policy 
changes 
Change in 
institutional 
ownership 
Dividend initiation, 
change in MV, ROA, 
size 
Increase in 
institutional 
ownership after 
initiation of dividend. 
Provides evidence that 
investors choose 
shares suited to tax 
preference. 
 
Graham The Review of 
Financial Studies 
(2003) 
Review of tax 
literature on how 
tax affects 
company 
decisions-
dividends, 
financing, 
investing 
M&M to 
2000 
Discussion of 
propositions and 
findings from prior 
literature 
Tax liability Financing, payout, 
remuneration policy, 
interaction of these 
Supports hypothesis 
that high tax rate 
firms pursue policies 
that provide tax 
benefits. Questions 
remain: why not more 
aggressively pursued? 
 
 
Brav, Graham, 
Harvey & 
Michaely 
Journal of 
Financial 
Economics (2005) 
Determination of 
factors that drive 
dividend decisions 
 Survey of 384 
executives of US 
cos. 
  Payout policy has little 
impact on investor 
clientele. Not used as a 
tool to alter 
ownership. Tax 
considerations play a 
secondary role. 
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Author 
 
Journal & date 
Motivation/ 
research 
question 
 
Sample 
period  
 
 
Method 
 
 
LHS variable 
 
 
RHS variables 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Incentive effect of dividend distribution literature in a dividend imputation company tax system 
Poterba & 
Summers 
The Journal of 
Finance (1984) 
British data used 
to study effect of 
tax on dividends 
and share price 
1955-81 After-tax CAPM 
model 
After-tax return Dividends and capital 
gains 
Tax on dividends 
reduces their relative 
valuation by investors. 
Thus valuation of 
dividends depends on 
tax regimes. 
 
 
Hamson & Ziegler Accounting & 
Finance (1990) 
Impact of 
dividend 
imputation on 
financial decisions 
of a company 
1985 
onwards 
Analysis of 
dividend, financing 
and investing 
decisions of 
company 
 
 
  Dividend clienteles 
expected to change to 
those who can and 
cannot use company 
tax credits. 
Nicol Australian 
Accounting 
Review (1992) 
Analysis of 
dividend payout 
policy of 422 
Australian 
companies 
following 
dividend 
imputation 
1982-90 Analysis of 
dividend policies 
of company paying 
franked & 
unfranked 
dividends 
Dividend payout 
ratio 
 Increase in payouts of 
franked dividends, 
decrease in unfranked 
payouts (mainly in 
resources sector). 
Shows difference in 
payouts between 
companies. 
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Anderson JASSA (1993) Post imputation do 
institutional 
investors prefer 
dividends to 
capital gains? 
Post 2000 Survey to 37 
investment 
managers (26 
responses) 
Relationship of 
dividends and 
share price 
Importance of 
investors to dividend 
payout policy 
Dividends are 
important to share 
price, no clear 
preference for 
dividend or capital 
gains, companies do 
take dividend 
preferences into 
account. 
 
 
Brown & Clarke Australian Journal 
of Management 
(1993) 
Share pricing 
before and after 
dividend 
imputation 
1973-91 Share price 
modelling before 
and after dividend 
imputation 
Return before 
dividend payout 
Return after payout Support for existence 
of a clientele effect 
across dividend yield 
pre-imputation but 
reject after. Investors 
preferred capital 
gains even after tax 
changes. 
 
 
Bellamy Asia Pacific 
Journal of 
Management 
(1994) 
Investigates 
development of 
dividend clienteles 
following 
imputation 
1985-92 Regression analysis Normal (average 
1985-87)  dividend 
payout 
Level of  franking, 
years 
Increase in franked 
dividend payouts 
relative to unfranked 
payouts. Supports 
existence of dividend 
clienteles. 
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Lasfer Journal of 
Banking & 
Finance(1996) 
Effect of company 
and personal tax 
on dividend 
payout 
adjustments and 
share price 
1973-83 
British data 
Modelling dividend  
payout – 
generalised least 
squares regression 
Dividend payout EPS, company ETR, 
personal income tax 
rate 
Tax affects both 
payout policy and ex-
day returns. No 
evidence of tax-
induced dividend 
clientele effect. 
Support P&S. 
Dividend policy is 
affected by 
shareholder’s tax 
position. 
 
 
Kenny Australian 
Dividend 
Handbook (2001) 
 
 
Table and graph 
of dividend payout 
 
1987-2001    Average payout is 
60%. 
Wilkinson, Cahan 
& Jones 
Journal of 
International 
Accounting, 
Auditing & 
Taxation (2001) 
Effect of dividend 
imputation on tax 
minimisation 
NZ data 
1991-95 
Multivariate OLS 
regression 
estimation 
Current tax 
expense/accounting 
income 
Size profitability, 
leverage, capital 
intensity, payout 
ratio, foreign 
ownership 
Negative relation 
between companies 
with high foreign 
ownership & high 
dividend payouts but 
less so after FCT 
extended to foreign 
shareholders. 
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Pattenden & Twite Journal of 
Corporate Finance 
(2008) 
Examines changes 
in dividend policy 
around the 
introduction of a 
dividend 
imputation tax 
system. 
1982-97 Regression analysis Gross dividend 
payout 
ETR, imputation, 
franking, 
profitability, 
operating risk, 
tangible assets,  
market-to-book ratio, 
leverage, size 
Dividends increased 
following imputation, 
positive relation with 
franked dividends and 
ETR. 
 
Incentive effect of tax office scrutiny (accounting policy choice literature) 
Jensen & 
Meckling 
Journal of 
Financial 
Economics (1976) 
Develops a theory 
of ownership 
structure 
 Econometric 
modelling 
Optimisation for 
firm value and 
wealth 
Agency costs, Creditors and 
investors ensure 
managers operate in 
their interests with 
contracts in place. 
 
Zimmerman Journal of 
Accounting & 
Economics (1983) 
Firm size as a 
proxy for political 
costs 
1947-1981 Time series and 
cross-sectional 
analysis 
Total tax 
expense/operating 
cash flows 
Size (sales) 50 largest U.S. firms 
have greater ETR 
than other firms. 
Wong Journal of 
Accounting & 
Economics (1988) 
Examines effect of 
political costs on 
accounting choice 
Listed NZ 
companies 
in 1984  
Statistical 
differences in a 
two-sample design 
Choice of 2 
accounting 
methods 
ETR, export tax 
credit, sales 
Politically sensitive 
companies adopt 
method of accounting 
for export tax credits 
that raises their 
reported ETR to that 
of non-politically 
sensitive companies. 
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Northcut & Vines The Journal of the 
American 
Taxation 
Association 
(1998) 
Investigates 
whether political 
scrutiny of ETRs 
influences 
accounting policy 
choice 
 
1981-84 Cross-sectional 
regression analysis 
Change in deferred 
tax expense 
(increase is proxy 
for low book-tax 
conformity) 
ETR, change in PPE, 
change in income tax, 
leverage, size (assets) 
Political scrutiny of 
ETRs causes 
companies with low 
ETRs to choose 
income-decreasing 
accruals with low 
book-tax conformity. 
 
Mills Journal of 
Accounting 
Research (1998) 
Relation between 
IRS adjustments 
and book-tax 
differences 
1982-92 Regression analysis IRS adjustments Book-tax differences, 
net PP&E, foreign 
income, industry 
Positive relation 
between adjustments 
and book-tax 
differences. 
 
Cho, Wong & 
Wong 
Journal of 
Business Finance 
& Accounting 
(2006) 
Relation between 
IRS adjustments 
and book-tax 
differences 
NZ data 
1991-00 
Regression analysis IRS adjustments Book-tax differences, 
net PP&E, foreign 
income, industry 
Positive relation 
between adjustments 
and book-tax 
differences. 
 
Wickerson, 
Reddan & Khan  
Tax 
Administration in 
the 21st Century 
(2001) 
Macro-level 
trends and patterns 
of ETR calculated 
from tax returns 
1992-98 Trend analysis Tax payable/Total 
Assets 
Tax payable/ 
Total profit 
Tax payable/sales 
Tax payable/EBIT 
Tax payable/total 
profit 
 
year General upward trend 
in ETRs over the 
period 
Downward trend in 
ETR over period for 
tax payable/total 
profit and volatile 
around year of tax 
rate increase (1996). 
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Braithwaite Markets in Vice, 
Markets in Virtue 
(2005) 
Book describing 
tax avoidance 
services 
 Interviews with 
accounting firms 
offering tax 
avoidance advice 
Description of 
ATO large 
company and 
transfer pricing 
audits. 
 Documented cost of 
avoidance. 
Carmody Large Business 
and Tax 
Compliance 
(2005) 
Address to 
international CFO 
Forum, Sydney 
2003-05 2/3 corporate tax 
collected from 
large corporate 
groups  
Audits of those 
showing low ETRs, 
aggressive tax 
planning 
Large are defined as 
groups with 
turnover>$100m 
Tax realized in audits 
of $3b in 2002/3, 
2003/4 & 2004/5 
Granger CA Charter 
(2003) 
Interviewed about 
when ATO will 
investigate a large 
company audit 
  Audits of those 
showing low ETRs, 
aggressive tax 
planning 
 
 
  
 
Incentive effect of remuneration based on after-tax profit literature 
Watts & 
Zimmerman 
Positive 
Accounting 
Theory (1986) 
Political cost 
hypothesis 
 Analytical 
discussion 
Presence of 
political costs 
Affects managers 
behaviour 
Transfer of resources 
is avoided by managed 
disclosure. 
Phillips The Accounting 
Review (2003) 
Investigation of 
whether 
compensating 
CEOs and tax 
managers using 
after-tax measures 
is associated with 
lower ETRs 
1995-97 Survey of 
corporate 
executives 
ETR = total tax 
expense/ 
Accounting profit 
After-tax 
remuneration, foreign 
operations, leverage, 
size, ROA, industry, 
capital intensity, tax 
planning expense 
 
Compensating BU 
managers on after-tax 
measures decreases 
ETR but not CEOs. 
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Desai & 
Dharmapala 
Journal of 
Financial 
Economics (2006) 
Influence of 
managerial 
incentives on tax 
avoidance (book-
tax difference) 
1993-01 Econometric 
regression 
modelling 
Book-tax 
difference not 
explained by  
accruals 
Incentive 
compensation, year, 
firm fixed effects, 
size, level of 
corporate governance 
Stock option 
incentives are 
associated with lower 
levels of tax sheltering 
but not in well 
governed firms. 
Shares priced down. 
 
Robinson, Sikes & 
Weaver 
The Accounting 
Review (2010) 
Investigate 
association 
between tax dept 
as a profit centre 
and ETR 
1999 Survey of CFOs ETR = Total tax 
expense/ 
Accounting profit 
Profit centre, 
leverage, capital 
intensity, foreign 
operations, R&D, 
size, ROA, industry, 
growth 
Profit centre 
companies are 
associated with 
significantly lower 
ETRs. 
Dyreng, Hanlon & 
Maydew 
The Accounting 
Review (2010) 
Association 
between 
individual top 
executives and 
ETR 
1992-2006 Track 908 
executives across 
firms over time 
using regression 
analysis 
ETR = Total 
tax/Acc. profit 
ETR = Tax 
paid/Acc. profit 
Firm, year, executive, 
control variables 
vector 
Top executives explain 
variation in ETRs 
across firms, “tone at 
the top” effect and 
economically large. 
 
 
Rego & Wilson Working paper, 
(2010) 
Examines 
association 
between tax 
aggressiveness 
and equity-based 
compensation 
 
 Regression analysis Equity 
compensation 
Equity compensation, 
economic variables, 
board of directors 
characteristics 
Tax aggressiveness 
positively associated 
with level of CEO and 
CFO compensation. 
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Incentives to manage earnings when tax law changes  from the tax trade-off literature 
Scholes, Wilson & 
Wolfson 
Journal of 
Accounting 
Research (1992) 
Document extent 
of taxable income 
shifting and 
discuss cross-
sectional 
differences in 
doing so 
 
 
1986-88 Experimental 
estimate of tax 
savings compared 
with actual 
 Gross margin and 
Ratio of selling, 
general & admin 
expenses to sales 
 Gross margin (sales) 
deferred but not 
expenses in quarter 
before but significant 
over the longer phase 
–in period. 
 
 
 
 
Matsunaga, 
Shevlin & Shores 
Journal of 
Accounting 
Research (1992) 
Document that 
some firms forego 
tax savings by not 
disposing of 
incentive stock 
options to avoid 
reductions in 
reported 
accounting  
income 
1982-91 Regression model Parametric non-
disqualifying or 
disqualifying firms 
Net tax benefits, 
interest and dividend 
coverage, leverage, 
ratio of share price to 
exercise price 
Strong support for net 
tax benefits and 
financial reporting 
costs hypotheses. 
Employers trade off 
net tax benefits of a 
deduction for 
compensation with 
financial reporting 
costs of lower earnings 
associated with 
disqualifications. 
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Guenther The Accounting 
Review (1994) 
Do firms defer 
income in 
response to tax 
rate change of 46 
to 34%?  
Sample 
from 1990 
1972-88 
data 
Prediction 
period 
1985-88 
Earnings 
management 
models 
Current 
accruals/assets 
Changes in 
sales/assets 
Results show lower 
current accruals for 
large firms for the 
year prior to the tax 
rate reduction. 
Confirm Scholes et al. 
 
Lopez, Regier & 
Lee 
The Journal of the 
American 
Taxation 
Association 
(1998) 
Do tax aggressive 
firms take greater 
advantage of tax 
rate change? 
1985-88 Earnings 
management model 
Parametric variable 
of 1 if discretionary 
current accruals are 
negative 
Size, long-term debt, 
tax aggressive firm or 
not, ownership, carry 
forward losses 
Association between 
tax aggressiveness 
(favourable tax status) 
and income shifting in 
prior period to tax 
rate fall. Positive 
relation between 
magnitude of rate 
change and magnitude 
of discretionary 
accruals. 
 
Healy & Wahlen Accounting 
Horizons (1999) 
Review of 
earnings 
management 
literature to 
provide insight to 
standard setters 
Evidence 
that some 
firms do 
manage 
earnings  
To avoid reporting 
a loss, an earnings 
decline or fail to 
meet investors’ 
expectations 
  EM does exist to 
influence share 
market perceptions, to 
increase 
compensation, avoid 
violating debt 
covenants and 
regulation. 
 
 194
 
 
 
Author 
 
Journal & date 
Motivation/ 
research 
question 
 
Sample 
period  
 
 
Method 
 
 
LHS variable 
 
 
RHS variables 
 
 
Conclusions 
Dechow & 
Skinner 
Accounting 
Horizons (2000) 
Discuss disparity 
between 
practitioner and 
academic 
perceptions about 
EM 
Little 
academic 
proof of 
rampant EM 
Can EM be 
measured? 
Academics should 
focus on capital 
market effects of 
EM 
Discuss that EM is 
not fraud but 
accounting can be 
conservative or 
aggressive to 
smooth income 
Managers have 
strong incentives to 
“beat benchmarks” so 
desire to manage 
earnings 
Managers of firms 
issuing equity have 
strong incentives to 
boost share price and 
hence engage in 
earnings management. 
 
Shackelford & 
Shevlin 
Journal of 
Accounting & 
Economics (2001) 
Details empirical 
book-tax trade-off 
literature from 
micro 
economics 
 Methodological 
problems with 
studies as no 
control vectors for 
financial reporting 
incentives  
  Suggestions for future 
research more related 
to share market 
effects of managerial 
actions to avoid tax. 
 
Kasznik & 
McNichols 
Journal of 
Accounting 
Research (2002) 
How important is 
is for firms to 
meet earnings 
expectations? 
1986-93 Regression analysis return Expectation met, 
positive error, 
negative error, 
premium 
Firms meeting 
expectations have 
significantly higher 
earnings forecasts and 
realized earnings than 
firms that do not. 
Market assigns higher 
value to firms that 
consistently meet 
expectations. 
Erickson, Hanlon 
& Maydew 
The Accounting 
Review 
(2004) 
Do firms pay tax 
on fraudulent 
(overstated)  
earnings 
1996-02 Sample of 27 
actual 
“restatements” of 
earnings 
Difference between 
real and inflated 
Calculation of tax on 
this difference 
$320m paid in tax on 
false earnings to hide 
overstatement of 
financial earnings. 
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Yin & Cheng Review of 
Accounting & 
Finance (2004) 
Contrasts EM of 
profit firms and 
loss firms when 
tax rate changes 
1986-88 EM model, same as 
Guenther but 
extends this to 2 
samples (profit and 
loss) 
 Profit firms use 
negative current 
accruals to take 
advantage of tax 
benefits because the 
non-tax costs are 
lower. 
Tax rate reductions 
have little impact on 
tax avoidance of loss 
firms. Non-tax 
incentives explain 
more variations in 
current accruals. 
 
 
 
Graham, Harvey 
& Rajgopal 
Journal of 
Accounting & 
Economics (2005) 
Interviews to 
determine factors 
that drive reported 
earnings and 
disclosure 
decisions 
2003 survey 
2003-05 
Interview of 
22 CFOs 
Survey of 400 
executives 
Earnings 
management and 
voluntary 
disclosure 
78% of sample 
sacrifice long-term 
value to smooth 
earnings. 
Short term focus on 
reported earnings 
 
Earnings, not cash 
flows most important. 
56% defer valuable 
long-term projects to 
meet targets. 
 
 
Davenport & Tran Australian Tax 
Forum (2004) 
Using stock 
valuation choice 
to save tax when 
tax rate increases 
1994-97 Difference of 
means statistical t-
test. 
FITB 
difference/total 
assets 
Current ratio, interest 
expense/TL, tax loss 
firms 
Firms with inventory 
shifted taxable income 
from 1996 to 1995. 
Liquidity, interest cost 
and tax losses did not 
inhibit the shifting. 
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Tran & Yu  Australian Tax 
Forum (2008) 
Comparison of 
ETR of companies 
before and after 
business tax 
reforms following 
the Review of 
Business Taxation 
1994-04 Regression analysis Total tax 
expense/accounting 
profit 
Current tax 
expense/ 
accounting profit 
Industry, size, time 
period 
Industry differences 
in ETR, medium sized 
companies have 
higher ETR than top 
20 companies and 
smallest companies, 
difference between 
ETR and STR has 
narrowed after 
business tax reforms. 
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Appendix C: Companies included in study 
 
 
AAC Australian Agricultural Company Limited 
AAP AAPT Limited 
AAS Asian Pacific Limited 
AAT Autron Corporation Limited 
AAU Adcorp Australia Ltd 
ABB ABB Grain Ltd 
ABC Adelaide Brighton Limited 
ABG Abigroup Limited 
ABS A.B.C. Learning Centres Limited 
ABX Abelle Limited 
ADB Adelaide Bank Limited 
ADG Adtrans Group Limited 
ADZ Adsteam Marine Limited 
AEC Ammtec Limited 
AEO Austereo Group Limited 
AFG Allco Finance Group Limited 
AFI Australian Foundation Investment Company Ltd 
AGL Australian Gas Light Company (The) 
AGX Agenix Limited 
AHD Amalgamated Holdings Limited 
AHS Atlas Group Holdings Limited 
AHX Australian Hospital Care Limited 
AIE A.I. Limited 
AJL AJ Lucas Group Limited 
ALL Aristocrat Leisure Limited 
ALN Alinta Ltd 
ALR Aberdeen Leaders Limited 
ALS Alesco Corporation Limited 
ALU Altium Limited 
ALZ Australand Property Group 
AMC Amcor Limited 
AMH AMCIL Limited 
ANC Angus & Coote (Holdings) Limited 
ANE Auspine Limited 
ANN Ansell Limited 
ANZ ANZ Banking Group Ltd 
AOG Australian Oil And Gas Corporation Ltd 
AOR AurionGold Limited 
APE AP Eagers Limited 
API Australian Pharmaceutical Industries Limited 
APN APN News and Media Ltd 
APY Asia Pacific Specialty Chemicals Limited 
ARG Argo Investments Limited 
ARP ARB Corporation Limited 
ASB Austal Limited 
ASL Ausdrill Limited 
ASX ASX Limited 
AUD Ausdoc Group Limited 
AUI Australian United Investment Company Limited 
AUO Austral Coal Limited 
AUS Auselect Limited 
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AVJ AVJennings Limited 
AVR Avatar Industries Limited 
AWB AWB Limited 
AWC Alumina Limited 
AWE Australian Worldwide Exploration Ltd 
AZZ Antares Energy Limited 
BAM British American Tobacco Australasia Limited 
BAX Baxter Group Limited 
BBG Billabong International Limited 
BCL Betcorp Limited 
BDL Brandrill Limited 
BDS Bridgestone Australia Limited 
BEN Bendigo Bank Limited 
BHP BHP Billiton Limited 
BIR Burswood Limited 
BKL Blackmores Limited 
BKW Brickworks Limited 
BLD Boral Limited 
BNK Banksia Wines Limited 
BOL Boom Logistics Limited 
BOQ Bank of Queensland Limited 
BPC Burns 
BPT Beach Petroleum Limited 
BRK BreakFree Limited 
BRL BRL Hardy Limited 
BRS Bristile Limited 
BRW Breakaway Resources Limited 
BRZ Brazin Limited 
BSA BSA Limited 
BSG Bolnisi Gold NL 
BSL Bluescope Steel Limited 
BTC BioTech Capital  Limited 
BTY Bounty Investments Limited 
BUL Blue Energy Ltd 
BWA Bank of Western Australia Limited 
BXB Brambles Limited 
BYI Beyond International Limited 
CAA Capral Aluminium Limited 
CAB Cabcharge Australia Limited 
CAD Carillon Development Limited 
CAF Centrepoint Alliance Limited 
CAI Casinos Austria International Limited 
CAL CITIC Australia Trading Limited 
CBA Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
CBI Cambooya Investments Limited 
CCL Coca-Cola Amatil Limited 
CCP Credit Corp Group Limited 
CCV Cash Converters International 
CCZ Combined Communications Network Limited 
CDA Codan Limited 
CDC Child Care Centres Australia Limited 
CDO Colorado Group Limited 
CDR Commander Communications Limited 
CDX CDS Technologies Limited 
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CEQ Central Equity Limited 
CEW Cranswick Premium Wines Limited 
CEY Centennial Coal Company Limited 
CFG Challenger Financial Services Group 
CFI Colonial First Private Capital Limited 
CGH Colonial Limited 
CGJ Coles Group Ltd 
CHD Chandler Macleod Limited 
CHL CCI Holdings Limited 
CHO Choiseul Investments Limited 
CHQ Chiquita Brands South Pacific Limited 
CHV CMG CH China Investments Limited 
CIA Cinema Plus Limited 
CIN Carlton Investments Limited 
CIX Calliden Group Limited 
CIY City Pacific Limited 
CLA Clarity International Limited 
CLH Collection House Limited 
CLI Challenger International Limited 
CLO Clough Limited 
CLT Cellnet Group Limited 
CMC Comalco Limited 
CMI CMI Limited 
CMK Cumnock Coal Limited 
CMW Cromwell Corporation Limited 
CNA Coal & Allied Industries Limited 
CNB Canberra Investment Corporation Limited 
CND Candle Australia Limited 
CNG Central Norseman Gold Corporation Limited 
COA Coates Hire Limited 
COF Coffey International Limited 
COH Cochlear Limited 
COU Count Financial Limited 
CPB Campbell Brothers Limited 
CPI CPI Group Ltd 
CPK CP1 Limited 
CPU Computershare Limited 
CRG Crane Group Limited 
CRS Croesus Mining NL 
CRT Consolidated Rutile Limited 
CRU Catalyst Recruitment Systems Limited 
CSH Concept Hire Limited 
CSL CSL Limited 
CSM Consolidated Minerals Limited 
CSR CSR Limited 
CTL Citect Corporation Limited 
CTX Caltex Australia Limited 
CTY Country Road Limited 
CVC CVC Limited 
CWO Cable & Wireless Optus Limited 
CWP Cedar Woods Properties Limited 
CXP Corporate Express Australia Limited 
CYG Coventry Group Limited 
DEL Delfin Limited 
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DGD Delta Gold Limited 
DJS David Jones Limited 
DJW Djerriwarrh Investments Ltd 
DKS Danks Holdings Limited 
DLS Drillsearch Energy Limited 
DOR Dome Resources NL 
DOW Downer EDI Limited 
DTL Data3 Limited 
DUI Diversified United Investment Limited 
DVC DCA Group Limited 
DVN Devine Limited 
EAC East African Coffee Plantations Limited 
EAM Eastern Aluminium Limited 
EDI Evans Deakin Industries Limited 
ELX Ellex Medical Lasers Limited 
EML Email Limited 
ENE Energy Developments Limited 
ENG Engin Limited 
EOS Electro Optic Systems Holdings Limited 
EQI Equigold NL 
EQT Equity Trustees Limited 
ERA Energy Resources of Australia Limited 
ERG ERG Limited 
ESV Eservglobal Limited 
EZL Euroz Limited 
FAF Five Arrows Australia Fund Limited (The) 
FAN Fantastic Holdings Limited 
FCL Futuris Corporation Limited 
FEA Forest Enterprises Australia Limited 
FFL Freedom Group Limited 
FGL Foster's Group Limited 
FKP FKP Property Group 
FLT Flight Centre Limited 
FMH Finemore Holdings Limited 
FOA Foodland Associated Limited 
FPS Fiducian Portfolio Services Limited 
FRI Finbar Group Limited 
FST First Australian Building Society Limited 
FUN Funtastic Limited 
FWD Fleetwood Corporation Limited 
FXJ Fairfax Media Limited 
GAP Gale Pacific Ltd 
GFD Green's Foods Limited 
GLB Globe International Limited 
GLI Goldlink Incomeplus Limited 
GMF Goodman Fielder Ltd 
GNC Graincorp Limited 
GNS Gunns Limited 
GOW Gowing Brothers Ltd 
GRD GRD Limited 
GTP Great Southern Limited 
GUD GUD Holdings Limited 
GWT GWA International Limited 
GZL Gazal Corporation Limited 
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HAM Hamilton Island Limited 
HFY Hill 50 Limited 
HHL Hunter Hall International Limited 
HIC Huntley Investment Company Limited 
HIH HIH Insurance Limited 
HIL Hills Industries Limited 
HLD Headline Group Limited 
HME Home Building Society Limited 
HNG HGL Limited 
HPX HPAL Limited 
HSP Healthscope Limited 
HVN Harvey Norman Holdings Ltd 
HWE Henry Walker Eltin Group Limited 
HWI Housewares International Limited 
HWT Harvey World Travel Group Limited 
IAG Insurance Australia Group Limited 
IAM IAMA Limited 
IBC Ironbark Capital Limited 
ICT Incitec Limited 
IDT Institute of Drug Technology Aust. Ltd 
IFM Infomedia Limited 
IIN iiNET Limited 
ILU Iluka Resources Limited 
IMD Imdex Limited 
ION ION Limited 
IPH Ipoh Limited 
IPR Ipernica Limited 
IRE Iress Market Technology Limited 
IRI Integrated Research Limited 
IWF Integrated Group Limited 
IWL IWL Limited 
JBH JB Hi Fi Limited 
JBM Jubilee Mines NL 
JDV JDV Limited 
JJS Just Jeans Holdings Limited 
JUP Jupiters Limited 
KAZ KAZ Group Limited 
KCN Kingsgate Consolidated Limited 
KIC King Island Company Limited (The) 
KOV Korvest Limited 
KSC K&S Corporation Limited 
KYC Keycorp Limited 
LCL Lighting Corporation Limited 
LDW Ludowici Limited 
LEI Leighton Holdings Limited 
LLC Lend Lease Corporation Limited 
LMC Lemarne Corporation Limited 
LRL Leyshon Resources Limited 
LSG Lion Selection Group Limited 
MAG Magellan Petroleum Australia Limited 
MAH Macmahon Holdings Limited 
MAP Macquarie Airports 
MBF MBf Carpenters Limited 
MBL Macquarie Bank Limited 
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MCC Macarthur Coal Limited 
MCP McPherson's Limited 
MCR Mincor Resources NL 
MDC McConnell Dowell Corporation Limited 
MGM Macquarie Goodman Management Ltd 
MGW AVGMcGuigan Simeon Wines Limited 
MIA MIA Group Limited 
MIM M.I.M. Holdings Limited 
MIR Mirrabooka Investments Limited 
MLB Melbourne IT Limited 
MLT Milton Corporation Limited 
MND Monadelphous Group Limited 
MNS Milnes Holdings Limited 
MPB Mackay Permanent Building Society Limited 
MPM MPI Mines Limited 
MRE Minara Resources Limited 
MRM Mermaid Marine Australia Limited 
MSF Maryborough Sugar Factory Limited (The) 
MSX Mineral Securities Limited 
MTL Metalcorp Limited 
MTS Metcash Limited 
MTX Metals Exploration Limited 
MXI Maxitrans Industries Limited 
MYO MYOB Limited 
NAB National Australia Bank Limited 
NBL Noni B Limited 
NCI National Can Industries Limited 
NCM Newcrest Mining Limited 
NEV Neverfail Springwater Limited 
NFD National Foods Limited 
NFM Normandy NFM Limited 
NHC New Hope Corporation Limited 
NHH Newhaven Hotels Limited 
NHL Nova Health Limited 
NHR National Hire Group Limited 
NIX Nautronix Limited 
NLX Nylex Limited 
NMW Normans Wines Limited 
NOL National 1 Limited 
NPX Nuplex Industries Limited 
NUF Nufarm Limited 
NVS Novus Petroleum Limited 
NWS News Corporation 
NYY Newmont Yandal Operations Limited 
OCA Oil Company of Australia Limited 
OCL Objective Corporation Limited 
OFG Over Fifty Group Limited 
OKN Oakton Limited 
OMP OAMPS Limited 
ONE One.Tel Limited 
OPS OPSM Group  Limited 
ORG Origin Energy Limited 
ORI Orica Limited 
ORL OrotonGroup Limited 
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OST OneSteel Limited 
PBB Pacifica Group Limited 
PBD Port Bouvard Limited 
PBL Publishing and Broadcasting Limited 
PBV Pipers Brook Vineyard Limited 
PBY Parbury Limited 
PCG PCH Group Limited 
PDR Port Douglas Reef Resorts Limited 
PEM Perilya Limited 
PHY Pacific Hydro Limited 
PLF Prime Life Corporation Limited 
PLM Petaluma Limited 
PLW Peter Lehmann Wines Limited 
PMC Platinum Capital Limited 
PME Pro Medicus Limited 
PMG Peppercorn Management Group 
PML PacMin Mining Corporation Limited 
PMM Portman Limited 
PMP PMP Limited 
PMT Permanent Trustee Company Ltd 
PMV Premier Investments Limited 
PNI Pioneer International Limited 
PPH Pan Pharmaceuticals Limited 
PPK PPK Group Limited 
PPR Promentum Limited 
PPT Perpetual Limited 
PPX PaperlinX Limited 
PRG Programmed Maintenance Services Ltd 
PRK Patrick Corporation Limited 
PRL Pirelli Cables Australia Limited 
PRT Prime Television Limited 
PRY Primary Health Care Limited 
QAN Qantas Airways Limited 
QBE QBE Insurance Group Limited 
QCH Queensland Cotton Holdings Limited 
QRL QCT Resources Limited 
RAL Recruiters Australia Limited 
RBS Roberts Limited 
RCL Repco Corporation Limited 
RCR RCR Tomlinson Limited 
REB Rebel Sport Limited 
REG RG Capital Radio Limited 
REH Reece Australia Limited 
RGS Ranger Minerals Limited 
RHC Ramsay Health Care Limited 
RHD Ross Human Directions Limited 
RHL Ruralco Holdings Limited 
RIC Ridley Corporation Limited 
RIN Rinker Group Limited 
RIO Rio Tinto Limited 
ROC Roc Oil Company Limited 
ROK The Rock Building Society Limited 
RPC Repcol Limited 
RPD RP Data Limited 
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RSG Resolute Mining Limited 
RSM Ross Mining NL 
RUP Rural Press Limited 
SAQ Sydney Attractions Group Limited 
SBC Southern Cross Broadcasting Ltd 
SBE Sabre Group Limited 
SCP Spicers Paper Limited 
SDG Sunland Group Limited 
SDI SDI Limited 
SDR Sundowner Motor Inns Limited 
SDS SDS Corporation Limited 
SEL S8 Limited 
SEV Seven Network Limited 
SFC Schaffer Corporation Limited 
SFE SFE Corporation Limited 
SFH Specialty Fashion Group Limited 
SFL Snack Foods Limited 
SGB St. George Bank Limited 
SGM Sims Group Ltd 
SGN STW Communications Group Limited 
SGW Sons of Gwalia Limited 
SHL Sonic Healthcare Limited 
SHR John Shearer (Holdings) Limited 
SHV Select Harvests Limited 
SID Siddons Ramset Limited 
SIG Sigma Company Limited 
SIP Sigma Pharmaceuticals Limited 
SKD Stockford Limited 
SKE Skilled Group Limited 
SMI Howard Smith Limited 
SNX SecureNet Limited 
SOL Washington H. Soul Pattinson and Co. Ltd 
SOT SP Telemedia Limited 
SPC SPC Ardmona Limited 
SPS Spotless Services Limited 
SPT Spotless Group Limited 
SRI Sipa Resources Limited 
SRP Southcorp Limited 
SRV Servcorp Limited 
SSE Scientific Services Limited 
SSR Southern Star Group Limited 
SSS Sam's Seafood Holdings Limited 
SSX Smorgon Steel Group Limited 
STO Santos Limited 
STR Service Stream Ltd 
STS Structural Systems Limited 
STV Sunraysia Television Limited 
SUN Suncorp- Metway Limited 
SWS Simeon Wines Limited 
SYB Symbion Health Limited 
SYL Sylvastate Limited 
SYM Symex Holdings Limited 
TAB TAB Limited 
TAH Tabcorp Holdings Limited 
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TAN Tandou Limited 
TAP Tap Oil Limited 
TCA Telecasters Australia Limited 
TDG TDG Logistics Limited 
TEM Tempo Services Limited 
TEN Ten Network Holdings Limited 
TGG Templeton Global Growth Fund Ltd 
TIM Timbercorp Limited 
TKR Triako Resources Limited 
TLA Tourism Asset Holdings Ltd 
TLS Telstra Corporation Limited 
TMN Telemedia Networks International Limited 
TNE Technology One Limited 
TOL Toll Holdings Limited 
TOR Ticor Limited 
TPX Tasmanian Perpetual Trustees Limited 
TRG Treasury Group Limited 
TRS The Reject Shop Limited 
TRU Trust Company Limited 
TRY Troy Resources NL 
TSE Transfield Services Limited 
TWD Tamawood Limited 
TXT Text Media Group Limited 
UEC Uecomm Limited 
UEL United Energy Limited 
UGL United Group Limited 
UOS United Overseas Australia Limited 
USC Utility Services Corporation Limited 
UTB UNiTAB Limited 
VEA Veda Advantage Limited 
VGL Volante Group Limited 
VKI Viking Industries Limited 
VLS Vita Life Sciences Limited 
VPG Valad Property Group 
VRL Village Roadshow Limited 
VSL Vision Systems Limited 
VWD Villa World Limited 
WAK Wakefield Investments (Australia) Limited 
WAM WAM Capital Limited 
WAN West Australian Newspapers Holdings Ltd 
WAT Waterco Limited 
WBA Webster Limited 
WBB Wide Bay Australia Ltd 
WBC Westpac Banking Corporation 
WDP Wadepack Limited 
WEG George Weston Foods Limited 
WES Wesfarmers Limited 
WFL Willmott Forests Limited 
WHF Whitefield Limited 
WHG WHK Group Limited 
WJM Joe White Maltings Limited 
WKC Walker Corporation Limited 
WOR WorleyParsons Limited 
WOW Woolworths Limited 
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WPL Woodside Petroleum Limited 
WSF Westfield Holdings Limited 
WTP Watpac Limited 
WWA Wridgways Australia Limited 
WWM Wentworth Holdings Limited 
WYL Wattyl Limited 
YTS Arthur Yates & Co. Limited 
ZTL Zenyth Therapeutics Limited 
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Appendix D: Companies with substituted accounting periods 
 
ASX Code Company Name End Year 
ABC Adelaide Brighton Limited 31/01 
ALL Aristocrat Leisure Limited 31/01 
ALN Alinta Ltd 31/12 
ALZ Australand Property Group 31/01 
APE AP Eagers Limited 31/12 
APN APN News and Media Ltd 31/12 
APY Asia Pacific Specialty Chemicals Limited 31/12 
AUO Austral Coal Limited 31/12 
AWC Alumina Limited 31/12 
BAM British American Tobacco Australasia Limited 31/12 
BDS Bridgestone Australia Limited 31/12 
BRL BRL Hardy Limited 31/12 
BWA Bank of Western Australia Limited 31/12 
CAA Capral Aluminium Limited 31/12 
CAI Casinos Austria International Limited 31/12 
CAL CITIC Australia Trading Limited 31/12 
CCL Coca-Cola Amatil Limited 31/12 
CMK Cumnock Coal Limited 31/12 
CNA Coal & Allied Industries Limited 31/12 
CNB Canberra Investment Corporation Limited 31/12 
CNG Central Norseman Gold Corporation Limited 31/12 
CRT Consolidated Rutile Limited 31/12 
CTL Citect Corporation Limited 31/12 
CTX Caltex Australia Limited 31/12 
CXP Corporate Express Australia Limited 31/01 
EAC East African Coffee Plantations Limited 31/12 
ERA Energy Resources of Australia Limited 31/12 
FUN Funtastic Limited 31/12 
GRD GRD Limited 31/12 
HLD Headline Group Limited 31/12 
HPX HPAL Limited 31/12 
ILU Iluka Resources Limited 31/12 
IPH Ipoh Limited 31/12 
IRE Iress Market Technology Limited 31/12 
LDW Ludowici Limited 31/12 
MLB Melbourne IT Limited 31/12 
MTX Metals Exploration Limited 31/12 
MYO MYOB Limited 31/12 
NVS Novus Petroleum Limited 31/12 
PBB Pacifica Group Limited 31/12 
PMM Portman Limited 31/12 
QBE QBE Insurance Group Limited 31/12 
RIO Rio Tinto Limited 31/12 
ROC Roc Oil Company Limited 31/12 
SFE SFE Corporation Limited 31/12 
SGN STW Communications Group Limited 31/12 
SIG Sigma Company Limited 31/01 
SIP Sigma Pharmaceuticals Limited 31/12 
SPC SPC Ardmona Limited 31/12 
STO Santos Limited 31/12 
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TOR Ticor Limited 31/12 
UEC Uecomm Limited 31/12 
UEL United Energy Limited 31/12 
UOS United Overseas Australia Limited 31/12 
VLS Vita Life Sciences Limited 31/12 
WDP Wadepack Limited 31/12 
WPL Woodside Petroleum Limited 31/12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
